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POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP, PUBLIC CHOICE, AND SYMBOLIC
REFORM ANALYSIS OF SECTION 198, THE BROWNFIELDS TAx
INCENTIVE: CARROT OR STICK OR JUST NEVER MIND?
JOHN W. LEE* & W. EUGENE SEAGOt
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Brownfield Remediation and Section 198
A "brownfield" site is abandoned or underutilized urban property
which private sources will not redevelop due to the reality or just the
perception of hazardous waste (including asbestos containing materials)
and fear of attendant liability for environmental remediation or cleanup.'
Such liability might arise under state law, or prior to 2001 amendments
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), which extends "Superfund" liability to all
persons in the chain of title, including a subsequent non-polluting
purchaser; and state liability often is imposed for lesser contamination.2 In
any event, if a purchaser is legally or even just economically compelled
(e.g., as a condition to financing) to disturb a brownfield contamination
site, such activities trigger extensive Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") and Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA")
regulations governing removal of hazardous waste, renovation or
demolition of buildings containing asbestos-containing materials, resultant
debris disposal, and the working conditions for such activities,
respectively.3 The cleanup costs of contaminated brownfield sites may
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2 See infra text accompanying notes 68 and 82.
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exceed the fair market value of the remediated site.4 Moreover, if the new
owner purchased contaminated property anticipating cleaning it up (and
thus rationally would have reduced its purchase price), the cleanup costs
are treated as a contingent part of the purchase price and capitalized when
incurred or paid.5 The end result has been that developers have often
declined to buy sites in brownfields and municipalities often end up
owning abandoned brownfield sites through delinquent property tax
foreclosures.
6
Section 198, as enacted in 1997,' provided until December 31,
2000 an ordinary deduction for otherwise capitalizable remediation costs
(including remediation costs anticipated at the time of purchase). The
Senate Finance Committee later noted that the 1997 provision had applied
to a "relatively narrow class of sites." 8 Around 200 targeted brownfields
(with less than Superfund contamination) were covered, containing 15,000
"qualified contaminated sites" (essentially target poverty areas mostly in
some large cities and in a few rural areas-probably less than five percent
of all brownfield sites).9 The Treasury Department estimated in 1999 that
making this provision permanent would leverage, over the following ten
years, $7 billion in private investment and return 18,000 brownfields to
productive use'I--at that time actually only twenty to thirty sites had used
Section 198 nationwide." Amendments to Section 198 in 200012
eliminated the geographic restrictions, expanding it to cover contaminated
areas lying in suburban and rural areas, and extended the already once
extended expiration date13 until December 31, 2003.
B. Why Section 198 Was Thought Necessary
Initially the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") denied any
deduction for environmental cleanup in general, thus requiring a taxpayer
4See infra note 354 and accompanying text.
5See infra text accompanying notes 422-26.
6 See infra note 334.
7 Pub. L. No.105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
8S. REP. No. 106-201, at 17 (1999) (describing original provision).
9 See infra note 315.
10 See infra note 270.
1See id. and accompanying text.
12 The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub L. No.106-554, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-625 (1999); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-1033, at 995-96 (2000); S. REP. No. 106-
201, at 17 (1999).
13 See infra note 283.
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to capitalize brownfield remediation costs and add to its basis in the non-
depreciable land. 14 Gradually, the Service shifted to allowing a taxpayer
to currently deduct in many, but not all, cases the cost of cleaning up
contamination which the taxpayer had created.' 5 Under one view the
contaminator's cleanup costs should be treated as deferred maintenance
expenses; that is, the cleanup could have taken place each year, in which
case the cost would have been deductible in those years, but the taxpayer
chose to remove several prior years' contamination in one year. 16 Under
another view a current deduction for soil remediation costs is appropriate
because no depreciation would be available if the remediation costs were
added to the basis of the non-depreciable land. 17 In contrast, a purchaser
could not deduct the cost of remediating toxic waste existing at the time of
purchase. 18 Section 198 puts a purchaser so remediating in almost t9 as
good, and sometimes a better 20 tax position as that of a remediating
14 See infra note 387 and accompanying text.
15 See infra note 388.
16 See infra note 368. If measurement of taxable income consistently followed the
matching principle, a taxpayer using an accrual basis method of tax accounting would be
allowed to accrue its cleanup costs each year, as the contamination occurs. Instead
Section 461 (h) requires deferral of the expense until the work is accomplished.
17 John Lee et al., Capitalizing and Depreciating Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs.
More-Trouble-Than-It's-Worth?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 161, 198 n.145 (1997); see also U.S.
Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1146 (7th Cir. 2001) (arguing that a
current deduction is allowed where the administrative burden of capitalization outweighs
the gain in precision for the taxing authorities gained by achieving a more perfect match
of expenses with future income);
Where the burden on both taxpayers and Service to account for each
item of property separately is great, and the likelihood of distortion of
income is nil or minimal, the Code is not so rigid and so impracticable
that it demands that nevertheless all items be accounted for
individually, no matter what the trouble or the onus.
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 573 (Ct.
Cl. 1970).
18 See infra notes 443-44 and accompanying text.
19Such a purchaser must "convert" upon a sale any gain (otherwise taxable usually as a
capital gain under Section 1231) equivalent to the Section 198 deduction into ordinary
income, i.e., "recapture" the Section 198 deduction. See infra note 343 and
accompanying text. In contrast, a contaminator deducting remediation costs under
Section 162 does not See infra note 347 and accompanying text. For industry criticism
of this rule as explaining in part the scant use of Section 198, see infra note 353 and
accompanying text.
20 The purchaser can deduct under Section 198 remediation costs incurred in connection
with a general plan of rehabilitation, or adaptation to a different use, of the contaminated
property; whereas the contaminator can not under conventional wisdom. See infra note 29
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taxpayer who had contaminated the property.
The current deduction for the clean-up cost for a taxpayer with
taxable income means that the after-tax cost of the clean-up is (1-T)(C),
where T is the taxpayer's marginal tax rate and C is the cost of the clean-
up. Current deductibility of the cleanup costs may create situations in
which it is more economical for the owner to decontaminate the property
and put it back into use, rather than moving to a new location. Many
brownfield owners, however, have no taxable income. For instance,
many, if not most brownfield sites have been long abandoned, with the
former owners forfeiting their titles to local governments 2' who are
unaffected by the federal tax consequences of any cleanup costs. For
many other brownfields owned by private enterprise, the owners have no
interest in redeveloping the property or have net operating losses 22 and
thus can not presently utilize a current deduction. With the advent of
Section 198, the new owners may deduct the cleanup costs of pre-purchase
contamination and if the price of the property is discounted by the total
cost of the future cleanup, the contaminated property could be more
appealing than similar property without the contaminants. 23 For example,
if the cost of the contamination cleanup is $800 and the value of the
property after the cleanup is estimated to be only $600, in the absence of
tax benefits, the property will remain idle. However, if the costs can be
deducted by a taxpayer in the thirty-five percent marginal bracket, 24 the
after-tax cost is less than the value of the property, (1-.35)($800) = $520.
Thus, otherwise idle property would be returned to productive use.25
and accompanying text.
21 See infra note 334 and accompanying text.
22 Section 172 provides that a business "net operating loss" may be carried back for the
two most recent tax years and forward for the next 20 tax years, offsetting business
income in those tax years in that order.
23 This assumes that the remediation costs do not exceed the value of the property once
remediated plus tax savings. For example, a new owner who paid $200 for contaminated
property, which would be worth $1,000 without the contaminants, should be willing to pay
as much as $1,231 to remove the contaminants, assuming the marginal tax rate is .35. The
$1,231 deductibel expenditure would have an after-tax cost of (1-.35)($1,231) = $800,
which would equal the increase in the value of the land (from $200 to $1000). The
company's before tax investment of $200 + $1,231 = $1,431 would be partially matched
by the federal government's .35($1,231) = $431 tax expenditure. This is likely not to be
the case. See infra note 354 and accompanying text.
24 The current top corporate income tax rate is 35%, I.R.C. § 1 l(b)(1)(D) (1986); the top
individual rate is scheduled to be 35% in 2006 and thereafter, I.R.C. § 1(I)(2).
25 The deduction is a deferral of tax, rather than a permanent forgiveness of tax, since the
expenditures for remediation increase the value of the property but do not increase its
basis.
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Accordingly, resources should flow to brownfields, all other things being
equal.26
Under current Service policy, a property owner is allowed to
deduct toxic waste cleanup costs, provided the taxpayer created the
contamination, 27 so that it might appear that Section 198 was intended
merely to provide tax parity between the contaminator and a purchaser.
The authorities, however, fashion two exceptions to the general rule that
the contaminator may deduct remediation costs by requiring capitalization
of such cleanup costs: (1) occurring in a "general plan of rehabilitation;"
28
and (2) occurring in the conversion of the property to a new and different
use.29 Section 198 eliminates these incongruities only as to a purchaser,
creating economic inefficiency.30  A non-transparent motivation might
have been an inclination to punish the contaminator. 31 Moreover, in many
situations where environmental cleanup will be needed--e.g, release of
friable asbestos within a building upon remodeling or otherwise or an
abandoned service station-the remediation costs may not be currently
deducted either by the owner under conventional wisdom as to the tax
32 3
common law, nor by a purchaser under Section 198.33
Brownfields compete with many other potential locations,
especially "greenfields"-industrial and commercial locations outside of
urban areas. Thus, brownfields remediation tax expenditure34 proponents
deliberately promoted a tax provision "tilting the playing field in favor of
brownfields." 35 In actuality, however, greenfields usually continued to
have an economic advantage over urban brownfields due to heavy costs of
remediation; Section 198 really tilted the playing field in favor of large
26 For non-tax factors that might drive the business decision, see infra notes 81 and 353
and accompanying text. Additionally other things usually are not equal-the cost of
cleanup often exceeds the fair market value of the remediated site plus tax savings of a
Section 198 deduction. See infra note 354.
27 See supra note 15.
28 See infra note 434.
29 See infra note 380 and accompanying text.
30 Economic inefficiency results from a taxpayer modifying her normal business
operations to insure qualifying for preferential tax treatment. See Joseph A. Snoe, Tax
Simplification and Fairness: Four Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 61, 66 (1996). Such modification often lies at the heart of tax planning or
structuring a transaction to obtain the best tax result.
31 See infra notes 71 and 86.
32 See infra note 434.
33 See infra note 96.
34 See infra note I11.
35See infra note 113.
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city brownfields over brownfields in suburbs and small towns. After
brownfields had enjoyed a three-year window of opportunity, Congress
broadened Section 198 to create parity between brownfields in all cities
and in the suburbs, small towns, and rural areas.
This Article shows in Part IV that the case law doctrinal backdrop
against which Section 198 was enacted, as well as subsequent judicial
developments, is seriously flawed conceptually. It suggests some rather
simple doctrinal adjustments that would complement, if not render
unnecessary in many cases, the Section 198 deduction.
C. Public Choice and Policy Entrepreneurship and Section 198
"Public Choice" theory holds that legislators obtain ballot votes
and other contributions in exchange for legislative votes to: (a) provide
asymmetrical (tax) benefits to a special interest or "pressure" group; (b)
impose disproportionate (tax) burdens on competitors of such pressure
group; or (c) retain a (tax) preference for a pressure group or a (tax)
burden for its target.36 Another explanation of motivation of legislators is
"policy entrepreneurship." A tax policy entrepreneur in promoting a
policy idea invests personal resources in mobilizing latent public support
by linking her idea with broader themes resonating with values already
widely shared by the public or media during a window of political
opportunity to obtain enactment of that idea.37 Both theories can apply as
is the case with Section 198.
Part III of this Article shows that the origin of Section 198 was the
tax policy entrepreneurship of tax incentives to increase voluntary
brownfield remediation, begun in 1993 by Democratic Chicago Mayor
Richard Daley, and then continued in 1996 and 1997 by the national
Democratic Administration-Vice President Al Gore and ultimately
President Bill Clinton38 (other policy entrepreneurship federal brownfield
remediation incentives are beyond the scope of this Article39). It traces
through the news media in 1993-97, the growth of 4ublic, i.e., media,
awareness of the problems that brownfields create, the linkage of a
brownfields tax incentive with alleviation of those problems, 41 and the
36 See infra note 100.
37 See infra note 101.
38 See infra notes 119 and 148-50 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 83-85 and 147 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 159, 173, and 185 and accompanying text
41 See infra notes 203 and 212-15 and accompanying text
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Clinton Administration's creation of a window of political opportunity,
largely by "log rolling," in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 to obtain
enactment of Section 198.42
At the same time, "Public Choice" insights illuminate the
motivations of the policy entrepreneurs who pushed the original, and of
those who pushed the current, revised Section 198. For the national
policy, entrepreneurs of the 1997 version of Section 198 aimed it primarily
at targeted (high poverty) urban brownfields as part of a successful
strategy of gaining the support of large cities and minorities for Clinton
and Gore in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. 43 In the 2000
version, in turn, other policy entrepreneurs 44 were able after the November
presidential election to expand Section 198 to cover brownfields
everywhere in order to encompass Republican constituencies as well.
"Public Choice" analysis also is helpful in determining who would
be the better actor in resolving the taxation of brownfield cleanups outside
of Section 198. 45 Sadly the existing Section 198 and the case law both
vary from the ideal in many aspects. Broadened, Section 198 still does not
reach (a) common indoor asbestos release, as in remodeling by a
purchaser; and (b) petroleum and petroleum products contamination
(abandoned gas stations), which account for close to half of all brownfield
sites;46 nor (c) is it permanent.47 Moreover, in the common business
circumstances of remodeling or adapting buildings or other property with
asbestos products to a new use, the Section 162 authorities do not permit
the existing owner to currently deduct remediation costs for contamination
it had caused. This Article asserts that they are conceptually wrong;
where such remediation adds no value (as by substituting an inferior
insulation for asbestos), a current deduction should be allowed under
Section 162 based upon the "reverse" rule of tax parity, or under Section
165 as a realized economic lOSS. 49 Uncertainty exists as to the current
deductibility by such an owner of the costs of remediating asbestos being
released indoors in the unlikely event such remediation is carried out in
42 See infra notes 252-55 and 269 and accompanying text
43 See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
44See infra notes 284 and 286 and accompanying text.
45See infra notes 129-41 and accompanying text
46 See infra note 75.
47See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 434 and 436 and accompanying text.
49See infra notes 447-63, 472-73,495, and 507-09 and accompanying text.
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the absence of remodeling.5 0 Moreover, by failing to expressly consider
the competing environmental policies,5 1 the Service too often appears to
have conceded specific environmental deduction issues in an ad hoc,
unprincipled fashion.52 This Article suggests relatively simple doctrinal
"clarifications," producing a current deduction in many of the above cases
that could be implemented by the courts, or more likely by Treasury and
the Service through regulations.
D. Symbolic Reform
Political science literature utilizes "symbolism" to mean
demonizing "political enemies" in political discourse, which tends to
deflect those seeking substantive reform.5 3 The story of Section 198 well
illustrates this notion, as the Clinton Administration depicted the
Republican Congressional opposition after 1994 as "enemies of the
environment"5 4 and the Clinton-Gore Administration as the "friend of the
cities" 55 and of the environment 56 by opposing urban sprawl-the mantra
was cleanup brownfields instead of developing greenfields 5 7  The
Administration linked its brownfields tax incentive with the problem of
brownfields against this backdrop. 58 At the same time, the Section 198
brownfields tax incentive itself was mostly symbolic in another sense: it
was deliberately restricted in a number of ways to limit its cost and to aid
only inner cities.5 9 Other, probably less intentional features resulted in
Section 198 being hardly used at all, notwithstanding the Administration's
rhetoric as to its significance. 60  The net result was sound bites on
50 See infra note 434.
51 See Lee et al., supra note 17, at 234 (under the public policy doctrine, the Service
should consider the policy of another agency where (1) Congress or the courts have
clearly identified an overlap of the policy of the other agency with the tax policy
applicable to the item; and (2) application of the Service's tax policy would severely
frustrate the policy of the other agency).
52 See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35; Rev. Rul. 98-25, 1998-1 C.B. 998.
53 See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
54See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
55See infra note 277.
56 See infra note 106.
57 See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
58 See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
59See infra notes 108 (targeted to inner cities) and 125-28 (sunset) and accompanying
text.
60 See infra notes 281 (inapplicable to in-door releases of asbestos fibers and lead from
620 [Vol.26:613
THE BROWNFIELDS TAX INCENTIVE
brownfields by President Clinton campaigning on a list of
accomplishments or goals with little practical effect or cost-"a little
something for everyone but not a lot of any one thing to anyone.
61
However, by the 2000 presidential election campaign, both Republican
and Democratic candidates proposed positive environmental initiatives, or
62better sound bites.
Sadly, the Clinton-Gore Administration's pushing of Section 198
as its major brownfields incentive might have served to retard more
meaningful reform of brownfield cleanups, as through changes to
CERCLA limiting liability of innocent purchasers, or authorization of
EPA grants for brownfield study and remediation (including mild
contamination by petroleum or petroleum products and land scarred by
mining).63 Such reform was ultimately enacted in 2001 under the Bush
Administration and probably will be much more effective than Section
198 in encouraging remediation of land contaminated by hazardous or
toxic waste. The core elements of that reform, however, were, in effect,
codification, and more adequate funding for existing EPA brownfield
incentives to cede brownfield cleanups to state voluntary remediation with
release from any future liability; for study; and for some cleanup grants.
64
Statutory relief from CERCLA liability for an innocent purchaser of a
brownfield (wherever located) and specifically including abandoned gas
stations and mine-scarred lands was a good thing.
65
paint), 353 (recapture of Section 198 deduction as ordinary income), and 354 (costs of
cleanup greater than value after remediation) and accompanying text.
61 Editorial, Three Benefits in Clinton's Budget, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1999, at A14.
62 Compare Martin A. Sullivan, Dueling Tax Plans: Texas Two-Step Gives Way to the
Tennessee Waltz, 89 TAX NOTES 10, 12 (2000) (Gore would make Section 198
permanent), with GOP Platform on Conservation and Preservation. "Stewardship of
Our Natural Resources, "2000 TNT 150-39 (Aug. 3, 2000) [hereinafter GOP Platform].
The platform states:
In 35 states, voluntary programs are cleaning up thousands of
brownfield sites faster and more effectively, and with less litigation,
than under the federal Superfund program. A case in point is Texas,
where, under Governor Bush, the number of brownfield sites restored
to productive use climbed from zero to 451, not only improving the
environment but restoring more than $200 million in property value to
local tax rolls, most of it in poor communities. We will replicate
Governor Bush's success on the national level.
GOP Platform, supra.
63 See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text
64 Local EPA offices apparently still dragged their heels in releasing remediating owners
from liability. See infra notes 83-84.
65 See infra note 75.
2002]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
II. REMEDIATION OF BROWNFIELD SITES
The literature defines a brownfield site as any site where any use,
expansion of current usage, or redevelopment is prevented by real or often
just suspected environmental contamination.66 This broad definition of
brownfields includes urban, suburban and rural (greenfields), and
industrial and non-industrial sites. Since this definition would include
"Superfund" sites, where CERCLA and the Superfund 67 Amendment and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 establish retroactive, strict, and joint and
several liability for those found to be "potentially responsible parties" for
heavily contaminating property, which includes past or present "owners,"
66 Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary
Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 890 n.20, 899 n.71 (1996)
[hereinafter Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams]; William W. Buzbee, Brownfields,
Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y REV. 1, 4 n.1 (1997). Brownfields are contrasted with "greenfields" or
undeveloped or agricultural rural land. Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Policies For
Sustainable Cities, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. POL'Y F. 187, 189 (1999) [hereinafter Eisen,
Brownfields Policies]. CERCLA § 101(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (1995 & Supp.
2001), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat 2356 (2002), provides the following
definition: "The term 'brownfield site' means real property, the expansion,
redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential
presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant." Subsection (39)(D) adds
sites contaminated by a controlled substance, relatively low-risk petroleum or petroleum
product contamination, and mine-scarred land. See infra note 75.
Superfund refers to the fund created by corporate environmental tax and special levies
on chemical feedstocks and crude oil to finance the cleanup of hazardous substances at
sites where no financially viable responsible party could be found and to expedite the
cleanup of sites where costs would ultimately be recovered from responsible parties.
Such taxes and levies had been funneling-prior to expiration of the act-about $4
million per day into the Superfund Trust Fund; the Superfund also was authorized to
receive appropriations of $44 million per year from general revenues. The total revenue
for the Superfund was intended to be $1.6 billion over five years. David Brazell &
Geraldine Gerardi, Issues in Financing the Superfund: Tax Policy and the Social
Agenda, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 677 (1994); Glenn Hess, Administration Superfund Moves Seen
as Major Setbacks by CMA, CHEM. MKT. REP., Feb. 23, 1998, at 1. This tax expired in
1995, a hostage to the Republican majority's goal of repealing joint and several
retroactive liability upon present and past owners and actual contaminators. John T.
McQuiston, Planned U.S. Cuts Imperil Sludge Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at
B10; Gary Lee, GOP Proposal Would Repeal Key Superfund Component: Cleanup of
Older Hazardous Waste Sites Is at Issue, WASH. POST, July 8, 1995, at A2. Congress
still has not been able to agree on such liability issue to which corporate Superfund taxes
has remained a hostage, so that the Federal government has been spending about $1.54
billion a year to operate the Superfund program. Eric Pianin, Superfund Cleanup Effort
Shows Results, Study Shows, WASH. POST, July 10, 2001, at A19.
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"operators," "transporters," or generators of contamination.68  Litigating
such "retroactive" liability has resulted in enormous transaction costs
6§
and delayed cleanup. Section 198 and the 2002 brownfield amendments
to CERCLA carefully exclude Superfund sites, but the fear that parties
with no direct role in the extreme contamination of property-e.g., current
property owners or lenders-might be liable for the entire cost of the
cleanup, 7 ° reportedly led to developers avoiding brownfield sites.
71
68 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75.
69 Jerry Zremski, GOP Superfund Plan Causes Concern. Could Delay Area Cleanup
Efforts, BUFF. NEWS, Aug. 14, 1995, at Cl (reporting that more than 25% of Superfund
spending has gone to legal fees); Jim Nichols, Revisionists Retreat: Republicans Back Off
Touted Reform of Environmental Law in Light of Polls Showing Support for Protection of
Resources, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 22, 1995, at lB (stating that 1/3 to legal fees and related
costs); see also Don Hopey, A Super Threat: Superfund Program to Clean up
Contaminated Sites May be Cut, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 13, 1995, at A6. The political
rhetoric is that as much as 50% of all the money spent for Superfund goes for attorney fees
and regulatory costs. 147 CONG. REC. H10,899 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001) (remarks of Rep.
Paul E. Gillmor, R-Oh., chief sponsor of Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act, H.R. 2869, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted)).
70 4 JACKSON B. BATTLE & MAXINE I. LIPELES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 317 (2d ed. 1993);
see also Steven G. Black, Note, The Continuing Saga of Environmental Cleanup Costs:
Current Deduction Allowed Under the Restoration Principle of Plainfield Union, 1995
BYU L. REV. 1321, 1345 & n.132.
71 Several witnesses testified before our committee that fear of liability
kept them from cleaning up brownfields, and when people are afraid to
use a brownfield because of the expense, because of the aggravation
involved, they go out and acquire green spaces or virgin land for
development instead of safely cleaning up and developing a
brownfield.
147 CONG. REC. H1O,899 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001) (remarks of Rep. Paul E. Gillmor, R-
Oh.);
The "polluter pays" principle, fundamental to Superfund's success in
deterring the creation of new contaminated sites, has caused public and
private investors to shy away from buying and cleaning up land which
may be contaminated. Fear of that liability drives investors toward
undeveloped 'greenfields.' The result can be a diminished supply of
pristine land and economic decline in industrial and urban centers.
Both are detrimental to communities.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
or Superfund, Section 104; Announcement of Competition for Final Five Brownfield
Economic Redevelopment Initiative Pilots, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,012 (Nov. 21, 1994); Jim
Nichols, Companies Getting Green Light to Oversee Own "Brownfields," PLAIN
DEALER, June 27, 1996, at 4B ("Fear of state environmental-enforcement litigation has
largely chased away developers and financiers from brownfields .... The unintended
consequence of laws meant to punish polluters has been to encourage even greater
development in unused suburban 'greenfields. "'(emphasis added));
6232002]
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CERCLA does provide an "innocent landowner defense" under
which a non-governmental entity that intentionally acquires a Superfund
site may escape CERCLA liability if: (1) it can establish that the
hazardous substances were placed at the site before its acquisition; and (2)
it exercised due diligence to detect contamination of the property before
72the purchase. Today due diligence would, however, usually disclose
such substantial contamination, but the costs and uncertainty of such
endeavors themselves may have retarded redevelopment of brownfields.73
Again note that Section 198 specifically applies to sites with less
contamination than Superfund sites.
More significantly, on January 11, 2002, Congress enacted H.R.
2869, the "Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization
Act,"74 which, among other provisions, protects innocent landowners and
prospective purchasers or developers of brownfields from Superfund
liability.75  While this Act enjoyed widespread bipartisan support and
Throughout Maryland there are numerous abandoned buildings and
industrial warehouses no company will touch under present law.
Instead of recycling these 'brownfields,' companies opt for plants in the
'greenfields' of suburbia, gobbling up former farmland. This is an
irrational policy. Government should be encouraging firms to locate in
existing industrial sites that already have costly infrastructure. We
don't need more sprawl . . . .We should give property owners
rewards-not punitive disincentives-to complete costly clean-ups. If
the remediation passes state muster, the reward is a liability waiver
needed to get bank loans and avoid future lawsuits.
Editorial, Turning Brown Plant Sites Green, BALT. SUN, Mar. 26, 1996, at A6. But see
Chet Bridger, Brownfields Looking A ttractive--Investors Buying Contaminated Land Not
Liable for Prior Owner's Pollution, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 19, 2002, at El ("'The liability is
an issue. But what we've been told is it's the clean up standards that's more of a barrier
to creating the shovel-ready sites that we need here,' [president of Buffalo Niagara
Partnership] Rudnick said.").
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(A)-(C), 9607.
73 See infra note 180.
74 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115
Stat. 2356 (2002).
75 Id. § 222(a)-(b) (adding 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40) and 9607(r)); id. § 223 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 9601(35)); Chet Bridger, Brownfields Looking Attractive, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 19,
2002, at El; Lew Sichelman, "Brownfields" Bill Allots More Money for Cleanups:
President Urges Nation To Recycle Polluted Sites, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 2002, at
Z400 ("The bill gives states and localities up to $250 million a year for five years to clean
up polluted industrial sites, known as 'brownfields.' It also shields potential developers
from liability for the cost of cleaning up toxic wastes that existed at a site prior to the
purchase of the property."); Eric Pianin, "Brownfields" Cleanup Beefed Up: Bush Signs
Bill Offering $200 Million a Year for Reclamation, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2002, at A3;
For the first time, the measure permits the government to use
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President Bush's approval,76 it was held hostage for some time to
extraneous political issues.77
brownfield funds to clean up petroleum waste sites. The EPA estimates
that there are as many as 300,000 abandoned gas stations, but the
Superfund legislation forbade the use of funds for petroleum cleanup.
The House added a provision that would exempt from liability under
the Superfund law small businesses contributing less than 110 gallons
or 200 pounds of hazardous waste to a contaminated site. That
provision sweetened the deal for many Republicans and helped assure
passage.
Elizabeth Shogren, The Nation: Congress OKs $250-Million "Brownfield" Cleanup,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, at 47; 147 CONG. REC. H10,902 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001)
(remarks of Rep. Gary Miller, R-Cal.) (addressing petroleum contamination); 147 CONG.
REC. S3834 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2001) (remarks of Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla.) ("Small
business owners who threw ordinary trash into Superfund landfills could be immune to
environmental cleanup liability under the 'Small Business Liability Protection Act' . . .
."); Sabrina Eaton, House Votes to Ease Business' Cleanup Role, PLAIN DEALER, May
23, 2001, at 3C. The small businesses and household waste exceptions appear more
political. Stories in the floor debate about disposal of household waste triggering EPA
imposition of joint and several liability, 147 CONG. REC. H10,900, H10,902 (daily ed.
Dec. 19, 2001) (remarks of Reps. Paul E. Gillmor, R-Oh. and John Shimkus, R-Ill.,
respectively), call to mind "William Atherton as the nasty Environmental Protection
Agency representative who monitored the Busters' operation" in Ghostbusters I (and was
responsible for the trapped poltergeists escaping). Terry Kelleher, Getting Slimed by
"Ghostbusters 11, "NEWSDAY, June 14, 1989, at 2.
76 Julie Mason, Brownfields Cleanup Bill Proposed. Houston Would Share $200 Million
in Funds, Hous. CHRON., June 19, 2001, at A15; Eaton, supra note 75, at 3C (Rep.
Gillmor, new Chair of House Commerce Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous
Materials, said "The time has come to break Superfund down into smaller parts and pass
those things that we all agree should be done.");
For all its success, this bill also marks a failure. Separate brownfields
legislation is needed because Congress has failed in its efforts to
revamp as well as reauthorize the broader federal Superfund program.
Brownfields grants and loans have been made since 1993 under
Superfund, but the long-standing impasse over Superfund is not likely
to be broken this year. With much broader support, the separate
brownfields measure-which links development needs to
environmental concerns-was easier to craft. Debates centered
primarily on how much liability protection to extend to developers, and
how to define the role of the EPA.
Editorial, The Senate's Brownfields Bill, BUFF. NEWS, May 14, 2001, at B4; Christopher
Lee, Brownfields Legislation Lingers on Capitol Hill: Dallas Redevelopment Would
Benefit from Grants, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 6, 2001, at 12A ("President Bush
has made the cleanup of brownfield sites one of his environmental priorities, arguing for
it during the campaign and in his budget address to Congress in January."); Eric Pianin,
Senate Passes Environmental Cleanup Bill, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2001, at A18.
77 Eric Pianin & Juliet Eilperin, Congress Approves Bush-Backed Measure for
Brownfield Cleanup, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2001, at A4; Pianin, supra note 75, at A3; cf
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In 1995, foreshadowing the 2002 CERCLA amendments, the EPA
removed 25,000 brownfields from its then Superfund list of 38,000 sites78
as the U.S. Conference of Mayors79 and Congress 80 urged. Such removal
probably did more than anything else over the rest of the decade to
encourage remediation of brownfields. Prior to such de-listing, while the
Eric Pianin, Lott Under Pressure on Superfund Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2000, at A2;
Bruce Alpert, Industrial Cleanup Measure Pushed: Morial, EPA Chief Press Bill's
Passage, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 10, 2001, at 8 ("In the past two years, the legislation
was stymied by lawmakers who wanted comprehensive reform of the federal Superfund
law.").
78 Brownfields have become one of the hottest issues among urban
planners as a means for stimulating job growth, stores and housing in
business districts and neighborhoods in cities nationwide. More than
31 states have adopted or are considering voluntary cleanup regulations
for brownfields, including Pennsylvania and Virginia .... Part of the
push for brownfields legislation at state and federal levels stems from
the effort to curtail the Environmental Protection Agency's oversight of
the cleanup of properties whose contamination levels are less
threatening than those for other large sites on the Superfund list. Last
January, the agency removed 24,000 smaller properties from its
Superfund list, EPA administrator Carol M. Browner said. "By what's
happened, a helluva lot more sites are getting cleaned up than before,"
she said. "We removed the stigma so that development would be likely
to occur." The EPA recently started a two-year program offering state
and local governments $200,000 grants to help develop programs that
would define site assessment, environmental cleanup regulations and
redevelopment of brownfield properties.
Judith Evans, Cleaning Up The Nation's 'Brownfields': Critics Want Some Assurances
Industrial Sites Aren't Re-Polluted, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1995, at El;
Twenty-five states, including New York, New Jersey and Connecticut,
have adopted laws or regulations that ease the threat of liability and
adjust pollution treatment standards. And the Environmental Protection
Agency has taken a series of administrative measures, including
removing thousands of less-polluted properties from its list of possible
Superfund sites, in an effort to spur commercial development.
John Holusha, E.P.A. Helping Cities to Revive Industrial Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1995,
at Al.
79 Sabrina Eaton, Superfund to "De-list" Sites to Spur Urban Development, PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 26, 1995, at 1B; Editorial, Eased EPA Rules Will Help Cities, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 1995, at 14B ("EPA not only will remove 25,000 sites from its
Superfund inventory but will award 50 'brownfield' grants of $200,000 each to help
cities cover the costs of some cleanups. In addition, the EPA will soon begin relieving
developers of liability problems if they acquire land that later turns out to be polluted.");
Randy Lee Loftis, EPA Targets Toxic Sites in Nation's Urban Areas, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 13, 1995, at IA; Neal R. Peirce, Brownfields Can Grow Green, PLAIN
DEALER, Mar. 12, 1995, at 4C.
80 Cf Gregg Easterbrook, Beyond Politics as Usual, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1995, at W20.
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vast majority of brownfields never would have been subject to an EPA
Superfund investigation, the perception of potential Superfund liability
discouraged selling, purchasing, or lending as to brownfields.
8 1
Where the contamination is less than Superfund status so that
CERCLA liability does not attach, but still poses a risk to the public or the
environment, most states impose liability on the owner and other
responsible persons under analogous state environmental laws.82 Again
foreshadowing the 2002 amendments to CERCLA excepting cleanup
liability for innocent purchasers of brownfields, over the last half of the
1990's most states, in cooperation with the EPA, have provided for
limitation of liability of those who cleanup brownfields to specified
standards for specific future uses.83 Despite a slow start,84 state voluntary
81 T.J. Becker, Clean-Up Costs, Red Tape Tie Up Recycling Sites, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15,
1995, at C1 ("Although there's a perception that contamination equals 'crushing
liability,' not all sites are of Superfund status, said Henry Henderson, Chicago's
environmental commissioner at a recent forum on brownfields. Brownfields are
properties idle or abandoned due to real or suspected environmental contamination."); see
generally Hearings on Reclamation and Reuse of Abandoned Industrial Sites Before the
Subcomm. on Tech., Env't and Aviation of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and
Tech., 103d Cong. 26-27 (1994) (statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst,
Economic Development, Northeast-Midwest Institute); Lee, supra note 76
("[Dievelopers say cleaning up such sites often isn't worth the expense, especially
considering the threat of lawsuits and tough oversight by federal regulators.").
82 Andrea Lee Rimer, Environmental Liability and the Brownfields Phenomenon: An
Analysis of Federal Options for Redevelopment, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 67 (1996)
(forty-five states have laws similar to CERCLA); Christine Kolodij Carver, Note,
Brownfield Blues, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 241, 242 n.7 (1997) ("Generally, the type
and extent of contamination at a site determines whether federal or state remediation law
Iovems.").
3 By 1999 forty states had enacted voluntary clean-up or brownfield legislation. Glen
M. Vogel, P.E., An Examination of Two of New York State's Brownfields Remediation
Initiatives: Title V of the 1996 Bond Act and the Voluntary Remediation Program, 17
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 112 (1999). Minnesota instituted the first state voluntary
brownfield cleanup program in 1988. John Chihak et al., Developing Brownflelds, 19
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 254, 273 (1997) (explaining that a problem prior to the
Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 was
obtaining EPA release of owner liability).
84 Ohio Cleanup Program Shows Only 10 Successes Since 1989, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Feb. 25, 2001, at A2 (discussing how only ten Superfund sites have been cleaned
completely by state program; some of the money from the state tax of $1 per ton of solid
waste-generating $14 million per year-"whittled away for ... a voluntary clean up
effort," which in turn resulted in only fifty-seven state covenants not to sue since 1996
"due to [the] federal government's refusal to grant property owners immunity from law
suits."); Randall Edwards, EPA Plan Easing Pollution Cleanup Hits Snag, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Aug. 27, 1996, at B I ("Since the program began in September 1994, only four
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cleanup programs may have picked up steam recently, 85 as has EPA
overseen-cleanup of Superfund sites.
86
EPA has promulgated hazardous air pollutant standards for
"friable" 87 asbestos, usually indoors (e.g., completely dried out insulation
in a forty-year old building or piece of machinery or asbestos containing
roofing and flooring materials when torn off or abraded8 8), which is
inhaleable and linked to many adverse health conditions.8 9 Such standards
usually are not exceeded unless friable asbestos is stirred up by
remodeling or demolition, 90 in which case the removal of asbestos
sites have been issued covenants not to sue, largely because the interim rules don't permit
roperties with contaminated groundwater to get involved.").
147 CONG. REC. S3898 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Voinovich, R-Oh.)
(stating that seventy-eight sites have been cleaned up under Ohio's voluntary program in
past five years). Perhaps Senator Voinovich is not limiting this number to sites that have
been issued covenants not to sue. See supra note 84.
86 Eric Pianin, Superfund Cleanup Effort Shows Results, Study Reports, WASH. POST,
July 10, 2001, at A19 ("As of late last year, according to the [GAO] study, about 57
percent of the more than 1,280 toxic waste dumps on the EPA's national priority list-
other than polluted federal or military property-had been designated 'construction
complete' or free of any immediate threats to humans."); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
("GAO"), HAZARDOUS WASTE, EPA HAS REMOVED SOME BARRIERS TO CLEANUPS 16-7
(GAO/RCED-00-224 Aug. 2000); see also GAO, SUPERFUND: INFORMATION ON THE
STATUS OF SITES (GAO/RCED-98-241 Aug., 1998);
That result [not re-enacting the Superfund tax as the Bush
administration has proposed] would turn back the clock on the
substantial progress made during the past decade. In its early days, the
Superfund program was inefficient and slow. In fact, after the first 12
years of its existence, only 155 sites had been cleaned up.
During the Clinton administration, the EPA carried out an
aggressive set of reforms that helped reduce litigation delays over how
cleanups would be conducted. The administration also introduced a
more flexible process for reaching agreements with the polluters. With
these reforms, 602 cleanups were completed in eight years-with an
average of 85 sites being cleaned each year in the administration's final
four years.
Carol M. Browner, Op-Ed, Polluters Should Have to Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at
A23.
87 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (rev'd ed. 2001). Asbestos is friable when it can be crumbled by
hand when dry. Otherwise non-friable asbestos may become airborne as by grinding or
polishing asbestos floor tiles or running over an asbestos-coated steel beam with a
bulldozer.
8 8 AWARENESS TRAINING FOR ASBESTOS AND LEAD § 1.2 (1996).
89 Id. These include asbestosis (blockage of the lungs by thickened tissue),
mesothelioma, and various cancers (lung, larynx, and digestive system).
90 Hearing on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 79, 81 (1996) [hereinafter MacEwen
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containing materials and disposal of resulting debris is subject to EPA
regulations. 91 OSHA also regulates occupational exposure to asbestos in
the construction industry in such circumstances. 92  EPA estimates that
approximately 733,000 non-residential buildings, or one in five in the
United States, contain friable asbestos products. 93 Also it estimates that
asbestos-containing flooring products are present in over 3.6 million
buildings.
94
Indoor releases of asbestos and other hazardous substances are not
covered by CERCLA. 95 Since Section 198's definition of hazardous
substances is defined by reference to CERCLA, indoor asbestos removal
is not eligible for Section 198 treatment.96  This was an intentional
limitation, probably to limit revenue losses and possibly to tilt the
Statement] (prepared statement of Bruce W. MacEwen, representing National Realty
Committee) ("The other issues regarding cleanup and demolition costs are issues that
have been in the forefront now for the last few years with the advent of the asbestos
roblem.").
1 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.145, 150 (rev'd ed. 2001). Congress once blamed the lack of EPA
regulatory guidance and standards for continued existence and possible worsening of
asbestos hazards in schools and other public and commercial buildings. H.R. REP. No.
95-294, at 187 (1977). In 1986, Congress required school districts to inspect their
buildings for friable asbestos and develop plans to limit exposures or remove the
substance. See Margaret E. Kriz, Good Riddance?, 21 NAT'L J. 1928 (1989). Thus, the
strongest EPA authority as to asbestos insulation came to be over schools. 40 C.F.R. §
763.83 (rev'd ed. 2001).
92 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101 (rev'd ed. 2001).
93 J. Mark Morford, Asbestos - New Twists In Ancient Fibers: An Asbestos Liability
Primer, 5 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (1990).
94OFFICE OF Toxic SUBSTANCES, EPA, ASBESTOS IN BUILDINGS: A NATIONAL SURVEY
OF ASBESTOS-CONTAINING FRIABLE MATERIALS (EPA 560/5-84-006 Oct. 1984).
9542 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3); see supra note 90 and infra note 97.
96 Section 198(d)... includes expenditures associated with substances for
which a removal or remedial action would not be permitted under
CERCLA § 104(a)(3). CERCLA § 104(a)(3) generally provides that a
removal or remedial action cannot be taken to address products that are
part of the building structure and result in exposure within residential
buildings or business or community structures (e.g., interior lead-based
paint contamination or asbestos which results in indoor exposure).
EPA, Brownfields Tax Incentive, Frequently Asked Questions (Q&A 12), at
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/html-doc/taxfaq.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002). This
CERCLA limitation may have been due to a reluctance "to give the thousands of asbestos
victims a cause of action under CERCLA." Kimberly A. Marsh, Environmental Quality:
Hazardous Waste, 21 ENVTL. L. 1141, 1153 (1991) (reporting the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of this provision in 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d
1355 (9th Cir. 1990)).
97STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
6292002]
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playing field more towards urban brownfields.
98
III. SECTION 198 AND BROWNFIELD REMEDIATION
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997, JCS-23-97, at 136 (Comm. Print 1997) ("Hazardous
substances generally are defined by reference to sections 101(14) and 102 of CERCLA,
subject to additional limitations applicable to asbestos and other similar substances within
buildings . ... "). In the context of Section 198, such exclusion draws one more
distinction between urban and suburban contamination in that contamination in the
former probably is more likely to involve release outside of buildings as from prior
manufacturing operations and in the latter more from release inside buildings from friable
asbestos. In 1999 the EPA Chief of Staff urged Congress to expand Section 198 to
include remediation of such inside releases:
We have heard from the States and others that to make .. .[section
198] more broadly available we ought to look at changing the definition
of what is a hazardous substance, to include petroleum, asbestos, and
lead paint. And we are working with our colleagues at Treasury to see
if that is indeed workable. They [i.e., the States and others] certainly
make some good arguments as to how that would help them clean up
brownfields quicker.
Hearings on the Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, Conservation, and Preservation Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 29, 31
(1999) [hereinafter 1999 Hearings on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use] (statement of D.
Reid Wilson, Chief of Staff, EPA). Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski, D-Pa., hoped that the term
"brownfields" would be extended to "former mine-scarred lands." Id. at 11, 12. Rep.
Jerry Weller, R-Ill., apparently understood that Section 198 applied to cleanups of
abandoned gas stations. Id. at 48. That was questionable since CERCLA, and hence
Section 198 did not apply to petroleum contamination. See supra note 75. The recent
Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 does,
however, amend CERCLA to provide liability relief as to contamination for innocent
purchasers of brownfields covering relatively low risk petroleum contamination and
mine-scarred land in 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(39)(D)(II) and (III). See Pub. L. No. 107-118, §
211(a) (2002). No relief was explicitly provided for indoor asbestos or lead paint
releases, although a parallel bill, introduced by Reps. Weller, Johnson and William
Coyne, D-Pa., to expand Section 198 would have. H.R. 2264 Would Expand Expensing of
Brownfields Remediation, 2001 TNT 135-32 (July 13, 2001) (would amend Section 198
definition of "hazardous substances" by a cross reference to Section 302(a) of the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 and add: (D) any
asbestos (whether friable or non-friable), oil (as defined in Section 1001(23) of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990), pesticide (as defined in Section 2(u) of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act), radon, and lead-based paint (as defined in Lead:
Requirements for Disclosure of Known Lead-Based Paint and/or Lead-Based Paint
Hazards in Housing (61 Fed. Reg. 9062)"); see also Johnson Bill, H.R. 4200, Would
Encourage Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites, 96 TNT 198-48 (Oct. 9, 1996) [hereinafter
Johnson Bill] ("[Q]ualified contaminated site" turned on containing any "hazardous
substance," which in addition to CERCLA and Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act cross references included "(D) asbestos (whether friable or
nonfriable), (E) radon, (F) lead paint, and (G) any petroleum product.").
98 See infra note 113.
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A. Public Choice, Policy Entrepreneurship, and Symbolic Reform
I. Introduction
"Public Choice" theory is a currently fashionable explanation of
(tax) legislation.99 "Public Choice" theory holds that legislators obtain
ballot votes and other contributions in exchange for legislative votes to (a)
provide asymmetrical (tax) benefits to a special interest or "pressure"
group; (b) impose disproportionate (tax) burdens on competitors of such
pressure group; or (c) retain a (tax) preference for a pressure group or a
(tax) burden for its target.' 00
Another, often more accurate, explanation of motivation of
legislators is "policy entrepreneurship." A tax policy entrepreneur, in
promoting a policy idea, invests personal resources in mobilizing latent
public support by linking her idea with broader themcs resonating with
values already widely shared by the public or media during a window of
political opportunity to obtain enactment of that idea.' 0' Some view
"Public Choice" as failing to account for policy entrepreneurship or
ideology;' 0 2 others see it as encompassing policy entrepreneurship.
03
"Symbolic Reform" describes certain types of legislation rather
than the motivation or activities of the politicians promoting it. The
classic idea is that by demonizing one's political opponents the impetus in
the populace for true reform can be deflected. 10 4  The Clinton
Administration certainly did so demonize the Republican controlled
99 A widely cited definition of "Public Choice" theory is "the economic study of
nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to political science."
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 1 (1989). The central thesis is that political
behavior is purposive, e.g., most members of Congress first and foremost want to be re-
elected and act accordingly. Morris P. Fiorina, When Stakes are High, Rationality Kicks
In, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at B 11.
100 John Lee et al., Restating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for Rough
Justice Regulations (Part One), 23 OHIO NORTHERN U. L. REV 631, 733 & n.374 and
authorities cited therein (1997).
101 Sidney A. Shapiro, Justice Breyer's Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
721, 724 n.17 (1995) (citing James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 370 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980)).
102 Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice And Public Interest: A Study of The
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
92 (1990).
103 Id.
104 See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
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Congress as to its position on the environment, 10 5 thereby painting itself as
a "friend of the environment." 10 6  Section 198 constitutes even more
symbolic reform in that it was hardly ever used due to a number of design
defects.' 0 7  Some of these defects were driven by "Public Choice"
considerations °8 and others by a desire to keep revenue costs low in order
to promote a lot of "boutique" incentives. 109 Such incentives provide a
little something, but not much, 110 for as many constituent interest groups
as possible within the confines of pay-go budget legislation rules. Such
rules dictate that any new tax incentive or expenditure'" be offset by a
105 See infra notes 225-26 and 236 and accompanying text.
106 Although the Clinton White House has enjoyed a reputation as a friend
of the environment, it has never really earned that standing. When
confronted by a difficult environmental issue, it has repeatedly
undercut its own agency heads-Bruce Babbitt at the Department of
Interior, Carol Browner at the Environmental Protection Agency,
among others-rather than offend the special-interest groups that dump
so much money into campaign coffers. President Clinton hasn't
suffered politically for those decisions in part because he has used Vice
President Al Gore-"Senator Treehugger," as he used to be known-to
give him cover. The strident anti-environmental rhetoric of his
Republican opponents has also made the president seem downright
progressive in comparison.
Editorial, EPA Needs White House, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 22, 1997, at B6; see also
Editorial, The Better Friend, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, at M4 ("Just about every political
candidate declares himself, in some way, a friend of the environment. Gore has been a
better friend than Bush and has the record to show it.").
107 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
108 Section 198 was primarily targeted to the inner cities to tilt the playing field in their
favor compared to the suburbs. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
109 See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
110 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
III "Tax expenditure theory essentially provides that the legal effect of certain tax
benefits should be analyzed as if the government had provided the recipient of the tax
benefit an equivalent grant of money." David A. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social
Justice, and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights Laws to Apply to Tax-
Exempt Charities, 2001 BYU L. REV. 167, 208-09;
"Tax expenditures" are defined under the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ("the Budget Act") as "revenue
losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a
special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax
liability." Thus, tax expenditures include any reductions in income tax
liabilities that result from special tax provisions or regulations that
provide tax benefits to particular taxpayers .... The legislative history
of the Budget Act indicates that tax expenditures are to be defined with
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new revenue raiser or spending cuts."12
This Section first considers the "Public Choice" or interest group
aspects of the enactment of Section 198, then recounts its paradigm Policy
Entrepreurship story, and concludes that Section 198 also constitutes a
paradigm Symbolic Reform.
2. Public Choice
Brownfields remediation tax expenditure proponents deliberately
promoted a tax provision "tilting the playing field in favor of
brownfields."" 3 For instance, proponents of a brownfield tax incentive,
such as mayors, wanted brownfield incentives to be targeted to them and
to be denied to suburban communities' 1 4 to which they had lost population
reference to a normal income tax structure ....
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2001-2005, JCS-1-01, at 2 (Comm. Print 2001). The
Joint Committee estimates $700 million in tax expenditures under Section 198 for fiscal
years 2001-05, consisting of $200 million by corporations in fiscal years 2003-04; $300
million by individuals in 2002-04 and less than $50 million a year by each in the other
years. Id. at 20. Obviously the Joint Committee assumes that Section 198 will continue
to be extended. Cf. Julie Mason, Brownfields Cleanup Bill Proposed, Hous. CHRON.,
June 19, 2001, at A15 ("[A]dministration officials hope to make tax incentives for
brownfields redevelopment a permanent feature of the tax code.").
112See infra note 132.
113 Letter from Norman B. Rice, on behalf of U.S. Conference of Mayors, to Secretary of
the Treasury Robert Rubin (Oct. 18, 1995), in 95 TNT 212-57 (Oct. 30, 1995)
[hereinafter Rice Letter] (requesting remediation tax credit and targeted tax cuts only);
Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, Remarks to the John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University (Dec. 12, 1996) (noting that in his meeting with the
mayors, the brownfields tax incentive was number one on their list; the incentive would
"resurrect 30,000 brownfield sites around the country").
114 Rice Letter, supra note 113 (favoring targeted tax cuts, i.e., limited to cities);
Although Seif [head of Department of Environmental Protection]
credits the law for "breaking the logjam" on cleaning up abandoned
industrial sites, others have criticized it, saying its brownfield focus is
weak. "The problem is, the bill didn't limit cleanup concessions to
brownfields," Woodwell [Pennsylvania Environmental Council western
office director] said. "Businesses can develop "greenfields" and have
the same cleanup opportunities. So instead of tilting the playing field
in favor of brownfields, it gave everyone the same opportunity.
Don Hopey, Ridge's DEP Under Scrutiny: Is Pennsylvania Backsliding on the
Environment?, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 7, 1996, at A7. See Tom Daykin, Brownfields
Cleanup Fund Sought, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 6, 1996, at 1 (State Senator Peggy
Rosenzweig and Rep. Scott Walker "said state law now requires the Commerce
Department to offer the same incentives to businesses whether they develop on
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and allegedly jobs for the past two decades or so."15  Clearly cities lost
population to the suburbs, but the cities lost largely high pay, low skill
manufacturing jobs while the suburbs largely gained information and
service jobs often requiring greater skills. 16 In actuality, greenfields
usually continued to have an economic advantage over urban
brownfields;117 Section 198 merely tilted the playing field in favor of large
city brownfields over brownfields in suburbs and small towns.
After earlier, policy-based opposition,' 18  the Clinton-Gore
Administration became in 1996 a policy entrepreneur of an urban-targeted
brownfields cleanup tax incentive as part of a successful strategy of
gaining the support of large cities and minorities for Clinton and Gore in
the 1996 and 2000 Presidential elections. 119 Section 198 was part of a
brownfields or on uncontaminated land, known as 'greenfields."' They wanted funds to
go only to brownfields). This desire to hurt other special interests as well as helping one's
own interest is consistent with "Public Choice" thinking. See also Shaviro, supra note
102, at 71 (Under the "Public Choice" model of rent seeking "politicians do not merely
certify the high bidder in the 'legislative auction', 'but work to raise the bidding by both
promising benefit and threatening harm.'). Professor Shaviro correctly reasons that factors
other than merely rent seeking motivates members of Congress, such as ideology and
policy entrepreneurship in order to be known as a player.
15 See infra note 165.
116 See infra notes 200 and 330-32 and accompanying text.
117 "According to case studies ... total site preparation costs per acre for long-time
industrial sites in inner city areas can be quadruple those of a site of the same size in a new
pristine development." 1999 Hearings on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, supra note 97,
at 63 (statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Economic Development,
Northeast-Midwest Institute). The cost of the brownfield must be very cheap and the cost
of the greenfield very expensive for the total cost of the brownfield acreage plus site
preparation (less the Section 198 tax savings) to be less than the total cost of identical
reenfield acreage plus site preparation.
18 See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
119 Abby Goodnough, Democrats Say Urban Votes Clinched Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
9, 1996, at 1-28; David Firestone, The 1996 Elections: The Region-The Voters; Fear of
G.O.P. Cuts Emerges In Clinton's Northeast Sweep, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at Al
(reporting that Clinton carried New York City by over 75%); Martin F. Nolan, Their
Places in History: Election '96 - Assessing the Results, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1996, at
A31 (reporting that Clinton carried Boston by 75%); Alan Bemstein, Decline in Turnout
Paid Offfor GOP, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1996, at 25 (reporting that blacks supported
Clinton almost exclusively and "[ljower middle-class Anglos favored Clinton, 52 percent
to 40 percent, in the key urban precincts"); Rafael Lorente, Broward Played A Major
Role In Giving Florida To Clinton, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, FL), Nov. 10, 1996,
at A6 (reporting that Clinton got more votes than his challengers in every city in the
county except four); Scott Gold & Nicole Sterghos, Despite Clinton's Performance, It
Was a Bad Day for Democrats, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, FL), Nov. 10, 1996, at
A6 (reporting that Clinton carried every city in Palm Beach County with a Democratic
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package targeting, in addition to selected poverty areas in inner cities,
such areas in selected rural areas and Indian reservations; apparently so
proponents could claim that the benefits were not limited to cities, 120 to
affect log rolling, and to serve the logy of support for the downtrodden.
Gore was also able to weave the brownsfield tax incentive into his version
of "smart growth.'
121
Similarly the desire to extend Section 198 by Republicans and
others' 22 to brownfields in all areas of the nation, 123 which was achieved in
majority); Mark Sherman, Georgia's Disputed Election, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 30,
2000, at A16 ("Vice President Al Gore won the popular vote nationally, carrying cities
and suburbs across the country. Gov. George W. Bush of Texas won rural areas and
more states."); Ronald Brownstein, Washington Outlook: National Perspective, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, at A5 ("Gore carried three-fifths of big-city voters; Bush three-
fifths of rural voters."). For the widespread appellation of President Clinton as "friend of
the cities," see infra note 212.
120 Senator Carol Mosely-Braun, D-1ll., in introducing her 1997 brownfields tax
incentive proposal (but not her identical 1996 proposal) stated that this was "not just a
big-city solution. This is something that will affect the cities, the suburbs, and the rural
areas as well in providing an incentive to reclaim these environmentally challenged areas
of our country." 143 CONG. REC. S8556 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1997).
121 "Smart growth" is roughly defined as the redirection of growth from
new suburban and exurban developments to already established urban
and inner suburban communities .... Now Vice President Al Gore,
long a purveyor of 'green' policy, hopes that he can capitalize on
people's frustrations with suburban sprawl in his 2000 bid for the
White House. Gore calls his program "Livable Communities," a
package of initiatives that would preserve green space, reduce traffic
congestion, protect water quality and clean up abandoned industrial
sites (known as "brownfields").
Mary S. Dalrymple, Smart Growth: Hot New Local Campaign Issue?, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS 8 (Apr. 1999). See also Larry Conley & Richard Hallman, Sprawl Is a Hot
Issue, and Everyone Has an Opinion, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 26, 1999, at 6E;
George F. Will, Al Gore Has a New Worry, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1999, at 76; James B.
Goodno, Gridlocked: Saving Ourselves From Sprawl, IN THESE TIMES, Aug. 18, 1999, at
15; Jesse Walker, Undiscovered Country: Effects of Sprawl, REASON, Aug. 1, 1999, at
13; Jonathan H. Adler, Road Warriors: Al Gore's Way or the Highway, NAT'L REV.,
June 28, 1999; Merrill Goozner, Tax Breaks Insufficient to Lift Cities, Curb Suburban
Sprawl, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 1999, at C3.
By advance billing, President Clinton's address to the U.S. Conference
of Mayors, meeting in San Francisco in late June, was to encompass the
first comprehensive urban agenda of his 4 1/2-old administration.
Simultaneously, a "State of the Cities" report, prepared by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, was called by Vice
President Gore "the most significant report on the condition of urban
America in a generation" ..... Echoing traditional liberal rhetoric, the
cities report preaches to the suburbs that they should care about inner
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2000, is explainable in terms of interest groups politics.' 24
"Public Choice" analysis also would suggest that the structure of
"extenders," i.e., bills extending sunset dates of tax provisions, offers
greater opportunities for rent seeking by legislators' 25 and thus encourages
enactment of provisions like Section 198 with sunsets that are often
reset.126 Interest groups however may understandably discount highly the
benefits from such provisions. It is more likely that the sunsets are more
driven by a desire to promote as many boutique tax policy ideas as
possible against a background of minimum revenue costs. Perhaps both
stories played a role in Section 198's sunsets, in that both President
Clinton and President Bush advocated making Section 198 permanent,
128
but were unable to persuade Congress.
"Public Choice" also offers insight into who is the best actor for
cities. But it miraculously misses the wave of research showing that
older working-class suburbs are starting the same slippery slide as inner
cities, experiencing job loss, crime and declining property values.
Neal R. Peirce, One More "Historic," But Empty, Clinton Initiative, BALT. SUN, July 7,
1997, at A9.
123 See Johnson Bill, supra note 97 (providing expensing of costs of cleaning up any
brownfield sites).
124 See infra notes 254 and 294-95 and accompanying text.
125 See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (Harvard Univ. Press 1997); Fred S.
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation,
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
126 Conventional wisdom holds that revenue (or spending reduction) offsets to new
revenue losses or "tax expenditures" requirements under paygo requirements are the main
reason for extenders. Heidi Glenn, Expiring Provisions Never Die, They Just Become
"Extenders, " 73 TAX NOTES 1009, 1010 (1996) (stating that in some cases Congress
wants to test such a "temporary" provision). Such an offset requirement provides
Congress an opportunity to reevaluate tax expenditures. Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing
Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 501, 506, 510 (1998). But the periodic extension-with some such
temporary provisions being made permanent and others expiring. See id. at 562
(providing examples of these categories); see Glenn supra-undoubtedly offers
opportunities for rent extraction. The Administration's 1997 proposal based the
millennial sunset on a policy of wait-and-see if the budget agreement did produce a
"dividend" by 2000. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1997 BUDGET
PROPOSAL (RELEASED ON MARCH 19, 1996), JCS-2-96, at 50 (Comm. Print 1996).
127 See infra notes 267 and 304-05 and accompanying text.
128 For President Clinton, see infra note 271 and accompanying text; for President Bush,
see Mason, supra note 111.
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resolving the tax treatment of toxic or hazardous waste remediation.
129
This Article concludes that judicial resolution most likely would take too
long and is by-and-large going down the wrong road by employing an
archaic "restoration" doctrine, 30 unresponsive to the modem basis for
capitalizing, viz., significant future benefit requires capitalization unless
"the administrative and record keeping costs associated with capitalization
. . . [out]weigh . . . the potential distortion of income"'13  from not
capitalizing such future benefit cost. Congressional resolution, although
ideal, appears politically unlikely. Congress finds it difficult to overturn
bad tax answers reached in the judicial process due to "paygo"
considerations132 -i.e., Congress must increase taxes or cut spending to
pay for even a remedial tax cut or correction.1 33 Even with the millennial
advent of budget "surpluses," partisan deadlock prevailed between the
goal of cutting taxes and of new spending programs, reflecting in part pent
up demand from paygo during the preceding deficit era. Only with a
budget surplus, Republican control of Congress, and imminent Republican
control of the White House was the ideal legislative resolution of taxation
of toxic and hazardous waste cleanup costs even a step closer to enactment
in late 2000. Broadened, Section 198 still does not reach very common
129 See Lee et al., supra note 100, at 666-8 1.
130 See infra notes 397-99 and accompanying text.
131 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 3461 (Jan. 24, 2002). In a 124-page
response to the Service's request in Notice 96-7, 1996-1 C.B. 359, for comments on the
application of Sections 162 and 263 in light of INDOPCO, Professor Lee and his students
advocated just such an advance notice as a discussion draft with citations to judicial
support for the proposed rules. Lee et al., supra note 100, at 664-65. They also
recommended, with case law and congressional support, a balancing of the burdens and
benefits of capitalization standard (adopted by the advance notice) supporting safe harbor
"rough justice" rules most of which it proposes or for which it seeks additional
comments. See also John Lee et al., Restating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The
Case for Rough Justice Regulations (Part Two), 23 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1483, 1521-33
(1997) [hereinafter Lee et al., Rough Justice II] (e.g., relatively short life; de minimis
rule, regular and recurring, 12-month rule, and safe harbor amortization periods); supra
note 17 and authorities cited therein. Compare 67 Fed. Reg. at 3462, 3464, with Lee et
al., supra note 100, at 648.
132 See Garrett, supra note 126, at 503-04 (stating that the "pay-as-you-go" provision
("PAYGO"), enacted in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, "requires advocates for
new tax expenditures to pay for them in one of three ways: raising taxes, reducing
current tax subsidies, or reducing spending for existing entitlement programs." Title XIII,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573, codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 902 (1994)).
133 Fred T. Goldberg, Filling The Void: Can the IRS Restructuring Bring Purpose and
Meaning to the Random World of Tax Litigation, 51ST ANN. U. CHI. TAX CONF., 77
TAXES 179, 180 (1999).
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indoor asbestos release, as in remodeling, or abandoned filling stations
(accounting for almost fifty percent of brownfields), nor the existing
owner's cost of remediation of contamination it had caused in common
business circumstances of remodeling or adapting the property to a new
use.
Consequently, formal regulation by the Service and Treasury of the
taxation of brownfield and other toxic waste cleanup costs not currently
covered by Section 198 is probably the most efficient avenue for
achieving uniform and equitable tax treatment of such costs.
Unfortunately the Service's track record to date as to capitalization in
general over the past decade, and in particular, with respect to toxic and
hazardous waste remediation costs, has been short-sighted and misguided,
as well as hugely inefficient. The Service unfortunately chose to regulate
such taxation by audit, litigation, and incrementally oblique, if not opaque,
published and private rulings after its victory in INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner.114 As former Commissioner, Chief Counsel, and Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy Fred Goldberg, Jr., points out, prior to the 1997
Congressionally-mandated reorganization of the Service, revenue agents
were rewarded for raising issues and litigators were rewarded for winning
cases without regard to whether the result was good tax policy and/or good
tax administration. 135  Goldberg illustrates this process with the
"INDOPCO fiasco."' 136 (Moreover, by failing to expressly consider the
competing environmental policies, 137 the Service too often appears to have
conceded specific environmental deduction issues in an ad hoc,
unprincipled fashion.138) "Hope springs eternal,''139 however. Treasury
and IRS's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, "Guidance
Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expendures," 4 0 in its general
134 503 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1992) ("[The Code] endeavors to match expenses with the
revenues of the taxable period to which [the expenses] are properly attributable, thereby
resulting in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes;" outside
transaction costs of the target corporation for investment bankers, attorneys, accountants,
printers, etc., capitalized due to future benefits forecast by the board of the target
corporation recommending the corporate transaction.); see Lee et al., supra note 100, at
648-50.
135Fred T. Goldberg, supra note 133.
136 Id. at 185-86.
137See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
138 Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35; Rev. Rul. 98-25, 1998-1 C.B. 998.
139 "Hope springs eternal in the human breast. Man never Is, but always To be blest."
ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON MAN [1733-34] Epistle I, 1.95.
140 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 3461 (Jan. 24, 2002).
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"rough justice" approach, offers substantial grounds for hope that the




The story of the brownfield remediation tax deduction under
Section 198 illustrates "policy entrepreneurship," the political science
concept of a politician's investment of personal resources in promoting a
particular policy with the anticipated "return" often depending on the
enactment of legislation. 14 2 A tax policy entrepreneur, in promoting a tax
policy, mobilizes latent public support by linking it with broader themes
resonating with values already widely held by the public or at least
opinion leaders and the media.143 Legislation results under this, originally
political science, model of a "garbage can" theory of governance, first
designed to explain the "organized anarchy" of universities (where the
participants do not clearly know or define their goals and participation in
decisions is fluid and unpredictable), 14 4 when the policy entrepreneur so
connects a proposed policy with a perceived problem in a window of
political opportunity. 45 Policy entrepreneurs adopt policy proposals in
order to promote their own interests, gain favors and obligations for future
bargaining ("Public Choice" notion) or just because they personally favor
those particular policies as a matter of ideology or otherwise.1
46
141 Id. at 3462.
142 j. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 88-94, 122-23 (2d ed.
1995) (Policy entrepreneurs are willing "to invest their resources-time, energy,
reputation, and sometimes money-in the hope of a future return. That return might
come to them in the form of policies of which they approve, satisfaction from
participation, or even personal aggrandizement in the form of job security or career
V romotion."); Shaviro, supra note 102, at 92.13 Shapiro, supra note 101, at 724 n.17.
144 Michael Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 1-25 (1972); Paul J. Culhane, NEPA's Effect on Agency Decision Making.
Article. NEPA's Impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and Unanticipated, 20
ENVTL. L. 681, 683 (1990).
145 Kingdon borrows from the "garbage can" model, supra text accompanying note 144,
with "streams" consisting of "problem recognition," "policy proposals," and "politics."
KINGDON, supra note 142, at 92. He suggests that the enactment of a law requires the
convergence of all three streams, together with an "entrepreneur" to guide the law's
passage through Congress. Id. See also Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An
Exloratory Study, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 425, 433 (1994).
Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Reform: The 1980's in Perspective, 46 TAX L. REV. 489,
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Four major federal policy ideas to encourage brownfields
redevelopment have been considered in the second half of the 1990's: (1)
limiting environmental liability for purchasers and lenders where
remediation is undertaken; (2) considering the future use of the
contaminated property, e.g., lower cleanup standards for industrial or
perhaps commercial use than for residential or recreational use; (3)
voluntary cleanup programs; and (4) a focus of this Article, use of tax
incentives such as providing a current deduction for otherwise
capitalizable cleanup costs.
147
The origin of Section 198 is the tax policy entrepreneurship of tax
incentives to increase voluntary brownfield remediation, beginning in
1993 by Democratic Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, 148 and then in 1996
and 1997 by the national Democratic Administration-Vice President Al
Gore and ultimately President Bill Clinton149 -against the backdrop of the
1995 attempts of the Republican-controlled Congress to rollback federal
environmental regulation.150  (Other policy entrepreneurship federal
brownfield remediation incentives are beyond the scope of this Article.' 51)
After enactment of Section 198 in 1997, its near-term fate was inextricably
519(1991).
147 Rimer, supra note 82, at 71; Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and
Industrial Redevelopment: Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21
ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 726 (1994).
Since 1988, almost forty states have developed voluntary cleanup
programs ("VCPs") through statutory and regulatory reforms intended
to speed up the cleanup of brownfields sites. No two states have
identical programs and most differ widely in terms of the cleanup
process and its requirements, but the VCP process, broadly speaking, is
similar in most states .... Following an investigation to determine the
level of contamination, the developer remediates the site to meet
"generic" or site-specific cleanup standards, or concludes the process if
remediation is not necessary. At the end of the process, the developer
receives liability protection from the state but none from the federal
government, except in those states with whom the EPA has agreed to
refrain from pursuing enforcement actions.
Eisen, Brownfields Policies, supra note 66, at 193-94 (footnotes omitted). See infra
notes 172, 178, 181-82, 199, and 208 and accompanying text for newspaper treatment of
this policy idea and legislation embodying it in various states. See supra notes 74-75 for
2002 amendments to CERCLA eliminating CERCLA liability for innocent purchasers of
brownfield sites.
148 See infra notes 162-65.
149 See infra notes 213-15 and 230.
150 See infra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
Is See supra notes 83 and 147 and accompanying text.
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interwoven with then Vice President Gore's "Smart Growth"'152 policy
entrepreneurship, which included the notion that cleaning up brownfield
sites is vital to growth in the urban economy 153 and at the same time helps
preserve undeveloped property or "greenfields."' 154  In contrast, Senate
Finance Committee Chair William Roth, Jr., R-Del., 155 and other
Republicans 156  repeatedly manifested a commitment to broader
availability of Section 198 by eliminating the targeted aspect and
extending it to any site state-certified as contaminated. This view
eventually prevailed in 2000157 (after Governor George W. Bush had been
elected President) with Republican control of Congress and imminent
control of the White House for the first time since 1954.158
b. Recognition of Brownfields Problem: 1993-95
Brownfields are the chemically scorched areas of many
manufacturing cities that scare off developers and leave
many residents in the vicinity without jobs or hope.
Brownfields once held the mills, factories and other heavy
industry that made this and many other Northeast Ohio
towns viable and important.
Now, these poisoned sites are nothing more than
vacant wastelands. Acre after acre of contaminated land
represents a threat to the environment, an impediment to
job creation and an attraction to vandals. Brownfields have
grown like a cancer, slowly weakening and eventually
destroying many cities. Brownfields kill inner-city jobs
152 See supra note 121 and infra note 218 and accompanying text. The forerunner of the
current deduction alternative was a 1995 bill cosponsored by Rep. Amo Houghton, R-
N.Y., 1999 Hearings on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, supra note 97, at 64 (written
statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Economic Development, Northeast-
Midwest Institute).
153 See infra notes 160 and 190 and accompanying text.
154 Others explicitly linked cleaning up brownfields with preserving greenfields. See
infra notes 170 and 180 and accompanying texts.
U.S. Finance Committee Chair William V. Roth's Bill Would Provide Incentives for
Distressed Areas, 2000 TNT 214-16 (Nov. 3, 2000).
156 1999 Hearings on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, supra note 97 (statements of
Reps. Nancy L. Johnson, R-Conn., and Jerry Weller, R-Ill.).
157Pub. L. No. 554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (containing the broadening and extension of
Section 198).
158 George E. Condon, Jr., Tax Cut a Tough Sell to Crisis-Free Nation Bent on Cutting
Debt, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 28, 2001, at Al.
20021
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and it is the lack of those jobs that are a primary cause of
our societal ills.'
59
Democratic Chicago Mayor Richard Daley first proposed in
1993,160 and subsequently as President of the United States Conference of
Mayors pursued, 16 the granting to businesses a tax credit (spread over five
years) for twenty-five percent of the cost of cleaning up abandoned
contaminated industrial land in a small number of large and medium sized
cities. Representative Mel Reynolds, D-Ill., introduced H.R. 2340, the
159 Editorial, Find A Sensible Standard for Dirt, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 19, 1993, at E2.
Inflexible state and federal environmental laws ... virtually ensure that
brownfields remain vacant and uncleaned. The laws, though well-
intentioned, have slowly strangled and impoverished our cities. The
laws rigidly demand that any purchaser be responsible for large-scale
or even total cleanup of the contaminated land. Such cleansing can cost
millions of dollars before the first shovel of dirt is turned for new
construction. Worse yet, what you find underground may be difficult
and costly to dispose of safely.
Id.; see also Tom Barnes, Stringent U.S. Industrial Waste Cleanup Laws Hit, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 10, 1994, at Cl ("Old manufacturing and mill sites, often contaminated
with some form of hazardous materials, are called 'brownfields.' Brownfields usually are
within older communities and are much harder to develop than 'virgin greenfield'
territory in the country."). For discussion of the impact of CERCLA on creating
brownfields, see infra notes 173 and 180.
160 Hearings on Miscellaneous Revenue Issues Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways & Means (Part I), 103d Cong. 830 (1993)
(statement of Mayor Richard Daley) [hereinafter 1993 House Hearings (Part 1)]; Letter
from Henry L. Henderson, Commissioner, Chicago Department of Environment, Revise
Superfund, CHI. TRJB., March 5, 1994, at 18 ("Testifying last summer before Congress,
Mayor Daley asked for tax incentives which could help induce private firms to form
partnerships with our cities, bringing desolate industrial sites back into productive use.");
Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to
Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 285, 322-23 (1995)
(discussing factors that should be taken into account in determining whether tax incentive
should be granted, e.g., "state of the art waste disposal and emission controls, maintaining
full operation of the plant, industry, or business for a certain number of years, and
guaranteeing the continued employment of a minimum number of individuals from the
local community").
161 Basil Talbott, President Suggests Tax Incentives for Industrial Cleanup, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1996, at 12; Matthew Tungate, Cleveland Set To Host U.S. Conference
Of Mayors, PLAIN DEALER, June 16, 1996, at B-6 ("[President of the Conference of
Mayors, Richard] Daley wants to push for federal legislation giving companies tax breaks
to clean up polluted areas."); Michael Kilian, CTA Tax Credit Tops Daley Wish List, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 28, 1996, at 6; Michael Gillis, Daley, Moseley-Braun Tout Tax Break for
'Brownfield' Cleanups, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 14, 1996, at 17; Fran Spielman, Daley
Wants Tax Break for Cleaning Commercial Sites, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 31, 1996, at 32.
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Environmental Remediation Tax Credit Act of 1993, which he and Mayor
Daley had developed. 162  Mayor Daley testified in 1993 Hearings on
Miscellaneous Revenue Issues that brownfield site problems "include
asbestos filled rubble, underground storage tanks, and hazardous waste"
which are too expensive for the localities or the Federal Superfund to
cleanup and private companies will not clean them up either when they
can get cleaner ex-urban sites.' 63 Thus, brownfield sites must be made
economically attractive to the private sector since the potential large costs
in cleaning them up discourages purchase and redevelopment. 164 Mayor
Daley also linked cleaning up brownfield sites with preventing further
"unsightly inefficient sprawl, increasing automobile traffic and, of course,
more pollution."
165
The window of political opportunity had not yet opened in 1993
and the policy entrepreneurship at the federal level was at best
lukewarm. 66 For instance, Representative Reynolds' testimony on his bill
162 Reynolds Bill, H.R. 2340, Would Provide Credit For Waste Cleanup, 93 TNT 128-33
(June 17, 1993); 1993 House Hearings (Part 1), supra note 160, at 834 (prepared
statement of Mayor Richard Daley).
163 1993 House Hearings (Part 1), supra note 160, at 831 (prepared statement of Mayor
Richard Daley).
164 Id. at 834 (prepared statement of Mayor Richard Daley).
165 Id. at 831. This was a slam at greenfields;
We have lost thousands of jobs because of policies that discourage
development of urban industrial areas .... Rather than helping to clean
up and redevelop former industrial sites, said Daley, the present federal
policy encourages investment to move to pristine farmland outside the
city. "We want Chicago to be on a level playing field with the
suburbs," he said.
William Smith, Speed Up Efforts To Clean Industrial Sites, Daley Urges, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, July 22, 1994, at 42. Suburban areas, too, had contaminated sites. Basil Talbott,
Plan Includes $2 Billion To Clean Polluted Sites, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at S15
("Suburbs suffer some of the same problems, said Arlington Heights Mayor Arlene
Mulder. Rulings by the Environmental Protection Agency have caused gas stations to
close, leaving land empty because 'no one is going to buy an EPA nightmare that costs so
much to clean,' Mulder said."). Proponents actually wanted a playing field tilted towards
cities as to cleanup of contaminated sites. See supra note 114 and infra note 199 and
accompanying text.
166 Smith, supra note 165 (Mayor Richard Daley "pushed for a bill in Congress that
would offer tax credits to companies that cleanup the sites. The legislation, sponsored by
U.S. Rep. Mel Reynolds (D-Ill.), was introduced last year, but has languished in the
House Ways and Means Committee."); Spielman, supra note 161 ("Daley's proposals for
state and federal tax incentives to help clean abandoned industrial sites have stalled in
Washington and Springfield. On Thursday, he lowered his sights to the Cook County
Board, where his brother John is Finance Committee chairman.").
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was perfunctory. 167  Although House Ways and Committee Chair Dan
Rostenkowski, D-Ill., popped into the subcommittee hearing to introduce
Mayor Daley and spoke favorably about the bill, 168 he acknowledged that
"the cost question is always a problem" particularly when "[w]e are here
talking about cutbacks in federal spending.' 69 The political reality was
that Congress had already passed President Clinton's major 1993 tax
act,170 the Clinton Administration opposed a brownfield tax subsidy, and
Chair Rostenkowski was in the political fight of his career due to the
House Post Office and other corruption scandals and lost his seat in
Congress the following November. 171 In short there was not yet sufficient
167 1993 House Hearings (Part 1), supra note 160, at 838 (statement of Rep. Mel
Reynolds, D.-Ill.). "This is a very important piece of legislation as far as helping the
cities and cleaning up some sites around our city. As the mayor points out, what are we
going to do with sites if we don't find some way of cleaning them up? I want to urge my
colleagues to be in support of this." Id. at 848. "I just wanted to make one point, Mr.
Chairman. That was, as far as sites around the city, there are lots of sites like that. On the
south side of Chicago in my district we have several that have just gone on, and on, and
on, and we must do something to revitalize these sites." Id. at 848. In contrast, Rep.
Reynolds testified at length shortly thereafter in the same hearing about a proposal to
have Somalia declared a combat zone so that members of the armed forces serving there
would obtain tax benefits. Id. at 857.
168 Basil Talbott, Daley Pitches Bill- With Rosty's Help, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 14, 1993,
at 54 ("Mayor Daley's newest pet project, a proposed environmental tax break for
industry, got a strong start in Congress Tuesday with the help of Rep. Dan Rostenkowski
(D-Ill.)."). When Ways and Means Chair Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., introduced Mayor
Richard Daley to the Subcommittee, Rep. Andy Jacobs, Jr., D-Ind., the presiding
subcommittee member, remarked that "I am sure you know you are very honored to have
our leader alongside you. You may have help somewhere along the line." 1993 House
Hearings (Part 1), supra note 160, at 829. Rostenkowski in his early years in Congress
had been very close to Mayor Daley's father, also Mayor of Chicago. Tom McNamee,
The Making of "Mr. Chairman;" Politician's Son Learned Lessons in Chicago Clout,
CHI. SuN-TIMES, June 2, 1994, at 20. The fact that Subcommittee Chair Charles B.
Rangel, D-N.Y., was not presiding was probably indicative that the political window was
not yet even cracked, much less opened.
169 1993 House Hearings (Part 1), supra note 160, at 829-30.
170 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 313.
171 Peter Carlson, Dan Rostenkowski Goes Down in History, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1993,
at W35; Michael York & Jim McGee, U.S. Tries to Show Pattern of Fraud by
Rostenkowski: Corruption Probe May Stretch for Months, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1993,
at Al; Isabel Wilkerson, Rostenkowski Inquiry Is Said to Widen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
1993, at A24; Rostenkowski Staff Payroll Is Scrutinized, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1993, at
Al; Michael Briggs, Alleged Rosty "Ghost" Accused of Perjury, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec.
14, 1993, at 1; Lewis H. Lapham, A Bull for Apollo: Rep. Dan Rostenkowski's
Indictment for Fraud, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1994, at 6; Carl Mollins, Rosty's Fall;
Embezzlement Charges Bring Down a Key Clinton Ally, MACLEAN'S, June 13, 1994, at
26; Don Terry, Rostenkowski, The Old Lion, Is Defeated by a Cub, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
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political momentum for a brownfield tax subsidy; indeed, there wasn't
even sufficient recognition of the problem.
There were no magazine articles and relatively few newspaper
articles in 1993 on brownfield remediation. The newspaper articles
mostly appeared in papers in cities with numerous brownfields such as
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. The seventeen brownfield news
articles published in 1993 mostly dealt with (a) new state guidelines or
statutory proposals for the cleanup of brownfields to make redevelopment
of those areas easier 172 and the background thesis that inflexible federal
and state environmental laws "have slowly strangled and impoverished
our cities,"' 73 (b) state enterprise zones and other tax incentives, 174 (c)
EPA or state study grants, 175 (d) the environmental problems of particular
local brownfield sites, 176 and (e) cleanup of brownfields as an alternative
to developing "green fields, i.e., "untouched farm or woodland spaces."'
177
1994, at B2; Mary McGrory, Democrats Gallant in Defeat, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1994, at
A2.
172 Don Hopey, DER [Department of Environmental Resources] Announces New
Cleanup Rules at Industrial Sites, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 16, 1993, at B1; Isaac E.
Yomtovian, A Way to Hoist the Barriers to Property Cleanup, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 15,
1993, at B9 (lauding bill introduced in state senate to create a voluntary, privatized
cleanup program with risk assessment varying according to future use, and after
certification of clean bill of health covenant not to sue owner).
173 See, e.g., Editorial, Find a Sensible Standard for Dirt, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 19, 1993,
at E2 ("The biggest reason Ohio's core cities have failed to attract manufacturing
redevelopment isn't limited to troubled schools, rampant crime, collectively bargained
work rules or runaway worker compensation costs. It is also the result of inflexible state
and federal environmental rules that virtually ensure that brownfields remain vacant and
uncleaned."); John Mangels, Cities Sowing Seeds of Help in "Brownfields," PLAIN
DEALER, July 19, 1993, at A8; Don Hopey, State Aims to Redevelop Old Mill Sites, PITT.
POST-GAZETTrE, May 24, 1993, at B10; Greg Peterson, Op-Ed, A Shot in the Foot:
Change Our Regulations for Brownfields or Watch Prospective Businesses Go
Elsewhere, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 1993, at B3.
174 Vindu P. Goel, Debating Enterprise Zones For Everybody, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 9,
1993, at B9; Mangels, supra note 173; John Mangels, Report Due on Revival of Sites:
Cleanups at Old Plants Seen as Vital, PLAIN DEALER, July 13, 1993, at BI; Editorial, Fix
Enterprise Law Now, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 8, 1993, at B8.
175 Michael K. McIntyre, Cleanup Program Gets Trial Run in Cleveland, PLAIN DEALER,
Nov. 9, 1993, at B1; Editorial, Bright Hopes for Brownfields?, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 12,
1993, at B6.
176 Benjamin Marrison, Worsted Mills Debris Being Buried on Site, PLAIN DEALER, July
26, 1993, at Al.
177 Clarke Thomas, Brownfields: The Logical Reuse of Our Old Industrial Sites, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1993, at B3 (stating that environmentalists and business and
industry have found a common cause- "reuse of old industrial sites rather than carving
out plant sites in untouched farm or woodland spaces"); Editorial, The Best Choice for
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The same patterns178 continued in 1994 with more than twice as many
brownfield news articles (37). Thus "problem recognition"' 79 was growing
but had not yet reached a critical mass. Again a recurring theme was to
blame brownfields on EPA standards. 180 Additionally, a large portion of
Cleveland, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 17, 1993, at C2 ("In the past four years, Cleveland has
lost an estimated 36,000 jobs, many of which will never return. Thousands more are
regularly being lured away by suburbs offering tax incentives. Brownfield sites
discourage construction and inner cities in general have suffered significantly from
cutbacks in federal spending.");
To some, the problem of vacant space in our older factory cities and
suburbs is environmental "redlining." Builders, lenders, corporations
and insurers systematically reject urban sites where even the slightest
hint of industrial contamination exists. Others call it the "brownfields"
problem - that instead of recycling sites where the Industrial Revolution
in America was born, much of our national wealth was generated and
our history written, developers keep heading out for exurban
"greenfields."
Neal Peirce, Time To Recycle Abandoned Urban Industrial Sites, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug.
13, 1993, at B7.
178 In 1994 brownfield articles focused on topics familiar from 1993 such as (a)
enterprise zones and other tax incentives, see Tom Barnes, Tax Credit Seen as Key to
Downtown Restoration, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 9, 1994, at B7, (b) EPA grants, (see
Tom Barnes, City Loses Bid for Big U.S. Grant, But it Wins $3 Million to Share With
River Towns, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 22, 1994, at Al; Paul Souhrada, $1.5 Million
Will Launch Site Cleanup, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 12, 1994, at B3 (discussing grant
to start a voluntary environmental cleanup program); Harry Stainer, Superfund to the
Rescue: EPA to Consider Plight of Cities in Setting Cleanup Rules, PLAIN DEALER, Mar.
6, 1994, at B9, (c) local brownfields, see Casey Bukro, City, Businesses Wrestle with
Contaminated Industrial Sites, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 20, 1994, at 2 ("The Internal Revenue
Service turned down a proposal to set aside $50,000 a year for 10 years in pretax dollars
to help pay for the cleanup. The IRS wanted Blacklidge to pay for the cleanup from
savings, or after-tax dollars."); Editorial, . . . Example; Westinghouse, Airport Is
Encountering "Brownfield" Disease, BUFF. NEWS, July 6, 1994, at 2, and (d) greenfields
with a new twist, Thomas Bier, Clean Land is Going Fast, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 5, 1994,
at B7 ("[F]uture of Cuyahoga County depends squarely on future real estate
development. The hooker is this: The county is running out of greenfields on which
development, particularly residential, can most easily occur.").
179 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
180 Tom Barnes, Stringent U.S. Industrial Waste Laws Hit, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Dec.
10, 1994, at Cl; Editorial, Superfund Becomes a Noose Strangling Buffalo Regrowth,
BUFF. NEWS, July 5, 1994, at editorial page; Neal R. Peirce, How Superfund Stifles
Urban Recovery, BALT. SUN, May 2, 1994, at A9 (Mayors have high hopes that a
rewritten CERCLA "would let them recycle blighted industrial 'brownfield' sites into
productive use. It would save rural 'greenfields' and help industries locate close to inner
cities' job-hungry populations."). See generally Sarah W. Rubenstein, Comment,
CERCLA's Contribution to the Federal Brownfields Problem: A Proposal for Federal
Reform, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 149 (1997) (discussing how CERCLA
THE BROWNFIELDS TAX INCENTIVE
the 1995 articles report on the legislative development and then enactment
of an Ohio statute providing for voluntary, largely owner-monitored
compliance with lowered standards for remediation of non-Superfund sites
varying according to the intended use and limitation of liability 18 1 or
similar proposals in other states.
182
In 1993 the Clinton Treasury Department opposed the Daley
brownfield cleanup costs tax incentive proposal as "complex and difficult
to administer . . . . In addition, the proposal would have significant
revenue cost, and would not be the most efficient means of providing
subsidies to finance cleanup costs." 183  It repeated these criticisms
verbatim in 1995,184 but without adding any data to support this position.
By 1995 the problem of brownfield redevelopment began receiving
contributes to the brownfields problem through (1) purchaser liability; (2) lender liability;
(3) overlapping jurisdiction over hazardous waste sites by EPA and state environmental
agencies; (4) CERCLA settlement provisions; (5) uncertain cleanup standards; and (6)
costs of extensive testing and investigation to meet the "all appropriate inquiry" rule for
innocent purchaser exception, see supra note 72); Vogel, supra note 83, at 92-94.
181 Alan Johnson, Voinovich Signs Bill to Revitalize "Brownfields", COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, June 30, 1994, at D2; Editorial, Brownflelds: Business Has Chance to Clean
Old Sites, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 12, 1994, at A6; Scott Powers, Environmental
Concerns a Factor in Redevelopment, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 26, 1994, at D2
(stating that contaminated site could be first in Columbus to take advantage of new
Brownfield's law); T.C. Brown, Political Climate Feared Harmful to Environment,
PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 27, 1994, at B1; T.C. Brown, Bill Targets "Brownfields:"
Environmentalists Leery of Possible Loopholes, PLAIN DEALER, June 26, 1994, at B1;
Gregory J. DeGulis, New Cleanup Law Creates Business Opportunities, PLAIN DEALER,
Sept. 27, 1994, at C4; David Stearman, Op-Ed, With Better Laws, "Brownfields" Could
be Assets, BUFF. NEWS, July 26, 1994, at 2 ("The state voluntary cleanup program has
shown more promise in encouraging redevelopment over the past three years than federal
programs have demonstrated in the past eighteen years."); Brian Thomas Lang, Note,
Ohio's Voluntary Action Program: Solving Ohio's Toxic Waste Woes?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
285 (1999). But see supra notes 83 and 84 and infra note 209 for a lack of initial success
of this state program.
182 See, e.g., Thomas Scott & Brian Hill, Op-Ed, Trojan Horse: Look Inside Legislation
on the Cleanup of Contaminated Sites, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 28, 1994, at C3; Don
Hopey, Two Approaches to Old Plant Sites, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 27, 1994, at B6;
Editorial, State, Counties Must Awaken to Waste of Re-Usable Land, Help Developers
Give Old Areas New Vitality, BUFF. NEWS, July 6, 1994, at 2 (stating that New York
should follow other states and enact voluntary mildly contaminated site cleanup program
with resultant official release from liability).
183 1993 House Hearings (Part 1), supra note 160, at 302, 341 (prepared statement of
Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) Department of the Treasury))
184 Hearings on Miscellaneous Tax Reforms Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 104th Cong., 233, 238 (1995) (prepared statement of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant
Secretary (Tax Policy) Department of the Treasury).
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broader recognition in the media--"one of the hottest topics right now in
state and local development circles."'' 8 5 The number of brownfield articles
(89) again doubled from the preceding year. General stories on
brownfields began to appear in newspapers other than in the industrial
Midwest and Great Lakes areas, 186 and, more significantly, reporting on
brownfield remediation in general or local sites appeared in national
newspapers such as the New York Times, 187 the Wall Street Journal, 188 and
the Washington Post. 1
89
In 1995 the Conference of Mayors (of which Mayor Daley was
then President) told President Clinton's Secretary of the Treasury Robert
Rubin that their top federal tax priority was a tax incentive to put
environmentally contaminated areas in their inner city back in use.190 At
185 Vindu P. Goel, Cities Focus on Developing Abandoned Industrial Sites, PLAIN
DEALER, Aug. 13, 1995, at H13; see also Evans, supra note 78 ("Brownfields have
become one of the hottest issues among urban planners as a means for stimulating job
growth, stores and housing in business districts and neighborhoods in cities nationwide.
More than 31 states have adopted or are considering voluntary cleanup regulations for
brownfields, including Pennsylvania and Virginia.").
186 Andrew Melnykovych, Using City's Wastelands Seen as Vital to Renewal, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 5, 1995, at Al; Leonard Inskip, Cleanup, Reuse of
Contaminated Urban Land is a Wise Option, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Mn), June 13,
1995, at Al 1; Loftis, supra note 79; John A. Baden, A Market-Incentive Gift for Inner-
City Brownfields, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 10, 1995, at BI 1; Sheldon D. Korlin, Turning
Brownfields Green, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 1995, at B3.
187 John Holusha, E.P.A. Helping Cities to Revive Industrial Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1995, at Al; Barbara Flanagan, Design Notebook. Bethlehem Searches for a New Heart,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at Cl; Eleanor Charles, In the Region: Connecticut--
Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at 9-11.
188 Christopher Williams, Brownfield-Redevelopment Effort Grows, WALL ST. J., Sept.
22, 1995, at 9-F.
189 Lavea Brachman, Toxic Test Case: In Georgia, a Superfund Site That's Actually
Getting Recycled, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1995, at Cl; Evans, supra note 185.
190 Rice Letter, supra note 113; President Clinton, in his policy entrepreneurship of a
brownfields remediation tax incentive, came to agree:
Let me also say that our cities are full of what we call brownfields-
urban toxic waste sites. We have proved that they can be cleaned up
and turned into homes for safe businesses that create jobs in areas that
thought they would never get any new jobs again. The most important
thing that I am working on with the mayors of America today is
cleaning up these brownfields so we can create jobs in the city. Again,
I tell you, good environmental policy is good for the economy. It
creates jobs. It creates a future for America and we have to be prepared
to do it.
Pres. Clinton Delivers Remarks on The Environment in Kalamazoo, MI, 1996
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN PRESS MATERIALS (Aug. 28, 1996).
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the same time, the mayors wanted brownfield incentives to be targeted to
them and to be denied to suburban communities to which they had lost
population and allegedly jobs for the past two decades or so.' 9' Clearly
cities lost population to the suburbs, but the cities lost largely high pay,
low skill manufacturing jobs while the suburbs largely gained information
and service jobs often requiring greater skills.
192
News articles in 1995 largely dealt with brownfield topics familiar
from the two previous years: (a) Superfund liability;
193 (b) greenfields; 194
191 Rice Letter, supra note 113 (favoring targeted tax cuts, i.e., limited to cities).
Although Seif [head of Department of Environmental Protection]
credits the law for "breaking the logjam" on cleaning up abandoned
industrial sites, others have criticized it, saying its brownfield focus is
weak. "The problem is, the bill didn't limit cleanup concessions to
brownfields," Woodwell [Pennsylvania Environmental Council western
office director] said. "Businesses can develop 'greenfields' and have
the same cleanup opportunities. So instead of tilting the playing field
in favor of brownfields, it gave everyone the same opportunity."
Cf. Don Hopey, supra note 114; Tom Daykin, supra note 114 (State Senator Peggy
Rosenzweig and Rep. Scott Walker "said state law now requires the Commerce
Department to offer the same incentives to businesses whether they develop on
brownfields or on uncontaminated land, known as 'greenfields."' They wanted funds to
go only to brownfields.). In fact, they tilted the playing field more usually in favor of
urban brownfields as compared with suburban brownfields. "According to case studies
... total site preparation costs per acre for long-time industrial sites in inner city areas
can be quadruple those of a site of the same size in a new pristine development." 1999
Hearings on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, supra note 97, at 63 (statement of Charles
Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Economic Development, Northeast-Midwest Institute).
Accordingly, the cost of the brownfield must be very cheap and the cost of the greenfield
very expensive for the total cost of the brownfield acreage plus site preparation (less the
Section 198 tax savings) to be less than the total cost of identical greenfield acreage plus
site preparation. For example, in the case of a company in the .35 marginal tax bracket, a
greenfield that can be purchased for $200 and that requires $100 in cleanup costs has an
after-tax cost of $200 + (1 - .35)($100) = $265. If the company's alternative is to
purchase a brownfield requiring $400 in cleanup costs, four times the greenfield cleanup
costs, the most the company would be willing to pay for the brownfield is $5. That is, the
$5 initial investment plus the after-tax cost of the cleanup (1 - .35)($400) = $260, equals
the $265 after-tax cost of the greenfield. Given the .35 marginal tax rate and the 4:1
cleanup ratio, mathematically, the original cost of the brownfield must be equal to the
original cost of the Greenfield reduced by the 1.95 multiplied by the greenfield cleanup
cost ($200 - 1.95($100) = $5 = maximum price of the brownfield). It should be apparent
that in some situations the brownfield will not be competitive with the greenfield.
192 See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
193 Fred Webber, Time to Fix the Superfund Law, J. COM., Dec. 11, 1995 at A12.
194 Jerry Zremski, Congress Weighs Salvaging Industrial Sites: Development May Be
Spurred by Easing Laws on Hazardous Waste Cleanup, BUFF. NEWS, July 11, 1995, at
B7.
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(c) EPA grants and state credits; 195 and (d) voluntary remediation with
release from liability196 issues. In addition, the EPA's de-listing of 25,000
brownfields from the 38,000 listed on the Superfund list received repeated
coverage throughout 1995.197 The newspapers reported the proposal or
enactment of brownfield tax credits in a number of states' 98 and even more
had instituted programs of voluntary remediation of brownfields with the
carrot of limitation of state environmental liability. 199  Occasionally
journalists reported, however, that the voluntary remediation efforts were
not always producing results due to factors other than potential toxic waste
cleanup liability retarding redevelopment. 20 With the benefit of
195 Korlin, supra note 186.
196 Id.
197 Holusha, supra note 187; Robert Foxen, Real Estate--Commercial Viewpoint:
There's a Bright Side to Brownfields, BOSTON HERALD, July 21, 1995, at 57; Tom
Horton, The Ultimate Recycling Challenge, BALT. SuN, July 8, 1995, at B1; Neal R.
Peirce, Cleaning Up the Urban "Brownfields", BALT. SUN, Mar. 13, 1995, at A7; Loftis,
supra note 79; Editorial, Eased EPA Rules Will Help Cities, ST. Louis DISPATCH, Feb.
11, 1995, at B14; Mark Gillispie, Deficit Remedy Tied To Development, Jobs, PLAIN
DEALER, Feb. 2, 1995, at B4; Eaton, supra note 77; Bill Lambrecht, EPA to Reduce
Surerfund List by 25,000 Sites to Help Cities, ST. Louis DISPATCH, Jan. 26, 1995, at A4.
19 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746 (2001); 1995 Pa. Laws 2; R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23-19.14 (1995); MINN. STAT. § 115B.175 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2285-90
(West 1996); VA. CODE. ANN. tit. 10.1 § 1429.1 (1995); Del. S. Bill No. 41 (Mar. 15,
1995).
199 Eisen, Brownfields Policies, supra note 66, at 193; Rimer, supra note 82, at 88.
200 Editorial, The Greening of Brownfields: Task Force Report: State Policy Needed to
Return Old Toxic Waste Sites to Productive Reuse, BALT. SUN, Nov. 23, 1995, at A26
("Brownfields programs are no panacea for urban redevelopment. Land costs, taxes,
crime, transportation and other factors influence private development decisions. But
effective standards to promote reuse can help."); Timothy B. Wheeler, Pollution Fear
Sends Companies to Suburbs: "Brownfield" Sites Considered a Risk, THE SUN
(Baltimore), Dec. 3, 1995, at Cl ("environmentalists question whether other factors, such
as taxes and crime, don't deter urban redevelopment"); Ann Scott Tyson, A City Creates
Jobs on Abandoned Lots, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 20, 1994, at 4 ("The easing of
environmental regulations-although only one of several factors discouraging firms from
locating in inner cities-has spurred interest in brownfields from a range of businesses,
says J. Thomas Black of the Urban Land Institute in Washington, D.C.");
No longer are place and distance such vital factors. The new economy
is driven by technological changes that allow people with means to live
and work largely where they want, experts say. New suburbs are the
No. 1 choice .... Jobs have been leaving cities in massive numbers
and are not being replaced. About 70 percent of new jobs, most
requiring extensive technical training, were being created outside cities
.... Business and residential developers seek large plots of cheap land.
Those are markets that most older cities, with all their problems, cannot
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hindsight, the most significant news development in 1995 for the viability
of enactment of a tax deduction for environmental remediation was
President Clinton's launching a counterattack against the Republican-
controlled Congress on environmental issues.20 1 "Problem recognition,"
the first stage in the garbage can model of organizational choice,20 2 was
well on its way.
c. Linkage of Cleanup Tax Incentive with Recognition of
Brownfields Problem: 1996
The great increase in news stories in 1996 over 1995 (from 89 to
132) manifests attainment of the second stage in the model, here linking a
remediation tax incentive with the now widely recognized problem of
brownfields--"the hottest topic in urban environmental policy. 20 3 These
stories reported a flurry of EPA grants to study brownfields in a number of
cities and the new "empowerment zones" for which special brownfield
provisions were available, 20 4 as well as loans, etc. by other agencies for
serve or compete against. As a result, the United States is
decentralizing faster than any other society in history, experts say. One
telling statistic: 15 of the largest 25 U.S. cities have lost 4 million
people since 1965, while the total population has risen by 60 million.
Chris Kelley, In Search of New Life; Once-proud Industrial Cites Pursue Answers to a
Changing Economy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 3, 1995, at Al; See generally Heidi
Gorovitz, One Piece of the Puzzle.: Why State Brownfields Programs Can't Lure
Businesses to the Urban Cores Without Finding the Missing Pieces, 51 RUTGERS L. REV.
1075, 1076 (1999) ("[O]ther pieces, largely missing from existing efforts to encourage
redevelopment of brownfields, are non-environmental factors, such as size and location
of candidate sites, infrastructure issues, and the relative obsolescence of existing
structures.").
201 Carl M. Cannon & Timothy B. Wheeler, Clinton to Attack EPA Cuts, BALT. SUN,
Aug. 8, 1995, at BI ("under the guise of cutting the federal budget, Republicans on
Capitol Hill are weakening environmental laws at the behest of corporate contributors
and polluters"). This approach struck a cord in localities with Superfund sites. The
following front page headline says it all. Coleman Warner, Cuts Imperil Dump Cleanup,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 6, 1995, at Al ("Prospects for a federally financed cleanup of a
9th Ward neighborhood built atop a contaminated dump look increasingly bleak as
Congress moves ahead with plans for deep budget cuts to the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency.").
202 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
203 Scott Allen, Waste Sites Now Paying Dividends, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 1996, at
Al ("[T]oday, these so-called 'brownfields' are the hottest topic in urban environmental
policy. Everyone from President Clinton to Gov. William F. Weld wants to offer tax
breaks, modest grants or reduced liability for cleanups to developers willing to build on
former industrial and commercial land-rather than a pollution-free site.").
204 Karen Merk, Neighborhoods Rebuild. Money, Ideas Forge New Life in Old Areas,
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brownfield remediation. 20 5  This publicity blitz provoked Republican
outrage. 20 6  Also stories appeared on the by now familiar Superfund
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 28, 1996, at Al (Twenty-five percent of land
in local empowerment zone consists of brownfields); Judith Evans, Baltimore's Dawn of
an Urban Renaissance: Empowerment Program Pays Off In Jobs and Hope, WASH.
POST, Nov. 2, 1996, at El; William E. Clayton Jr., United, Democrats Draft Centrist
Platform, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 6,1996, at 6; Michael Gillis, Daley, Moseley-Braun Tout
Tax Break for "Brownfield" Cleanups, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 14, 1996, at 17.
205 Gary Lee, Breathing New Life Into "Brownfield": Incentives Lure Firms To
Contaminated Sites, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1996, at A4 ("Environmental Protection
Agency has awarded $200,000 grants to forty cities (including Cleveland) to encourage
the redevelopment of brownfields, and plans to give ten more by the end of the year.");
Mike Vogel, The Brownfield Problem, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 6, 1996, at H1 ("HUD-EPA
'memorandum of understanding,' . . . is only part of the picture. Increasingly,
'brownfields' are drawing interest and funding: EPA launched its Brownfields Initiative
earlier this year, giving Buffalo and 18 other cities $200,000 grants for regional pilot
projects."); Charles Seabrook, City Gets Seed Money to Tackle "Brownfields," ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Dec. 17, 1996, at D3 ("EPA awarded Atlanta a $100,000 grant through its
national Brownfield Economic Redevelopment Initiative to do a pilot assessment of
several city brownfield sites."); Coleman Warner, Redevelopment Hoped For Idle
Industrial Sites, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 18, 1996, at B1; Evans, supra note 204; Elsa
Brenner, Environmental Bill: The Pros and Cons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, at 13-WC-
1; Jacquelyn Heard, Loan To Aid Industrial Cleanup, CHI. TRIB., Oct, 18, 1996, at N2
(Some suggested the announcement of a $10 million HUD loan to cleanup contaminated
and abandoned industrial sites "was part of the Clinton administration's strategy to woo
local voters with the presidential election less than three weeks away."); Daniel P. Jones,
Grant Targets Deserted Industrial Properties, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 3, 1996, at A3;
Pat Kossan, A Stinking Mess and a Runaround; the Pollution of Brownfelds, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Mar. 30, 1996, at Al (Phoenix applying for EPA grant). See generally GAO,
EPA'S CONTINUING PROGRAMS AND PROJECT GRANTS (GAO/01/860R June 29, 2001);
GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: INFORMATION ON EPA PROJECT GRANTS AND USE
OF WAIVER AUTHORITY (GAO/01/359 Mar. 2001). The "Brownfields Economic
Redevelopment Pilot" encourages the safe and appropriate cleanup and revitalization of
abandoned commercial facilities where redevelopment is inhibited by real or perceived
environmental contamination.
EPA's Brownfields Pilots (to be funded at $200,000 each over two
years) will test redevelopment models, direct special efforts toward
removing regulatory barriers without sacrificing protectiveness, and
facilitate coordinated efforts at the federal, state, and local levels. EPA
will develop a coordinated federal strategy to help initiate a significant
national effort to clean up and redevelop brownfields.
59 Fed. Reg. 60,012 (Nov. 21, 1994).
206 House GOP leaders denounced the Environmental Protection Agency's
top official yesterday for holding a costly "extravaganza" in Pittsburgh
this week to showcase the Clinton administration's toxic waste
initiatives, rather than spending its money for site cleanup or coming to
Capitol Hill to work out compromises for stalled Superfund program
legislation.
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problems 207 and state voluntary remediation laws. 2 8 Again some reported
that existing brownfields programs often were ineffective. 20 9 The familiar
anti-greenfield development stories were repeated, but sometimes with a
new aspect of retarding or reverse urban sprawl.210 Indeed, the smart
growth philosophy of Maryland's Democratic Governor Glendening
began to appear.
211
Judy Packer-Tursman, Brownfields Parley Decried. House Panel Chairman Denounces
Conference "Toxic Waste," PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 19, 1996, at D6.
207 The Candidates, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 13, 1996, at A20 ("Campaigning on a
pledge to accelerate the sluggish pace of cleanup of toxic waste sites and contaminated
urban 'brownfields,'... [Clinton] is pledging that two-thirds of the 1,387 toxic sites on
the Superfund national priorities list will be cleaned up by 2000."). In fact substantial
progress was made in the ensuing years. See Pianin supra note 74 ("about 57 percent of
the more than 1,280 toxic waste dumps on the EPA's national priority list-other than
polluted federal or military property-had been designated 'construction complete'....";
see GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE: EPA HAS REMOVED SOME BARRIERS TO CLEANUPS 16-7
tGAO/RCED-00-224 Aug. 31, 2000).
Scott Powers, Ohio EPA Unveils Changes in Brownfields Cleanup Rules, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Oct. 8, 1996, at C3, Lesley Wright, Hitting Pay Dirt: Spurred By More
Lenient Policies, Developers Are Buying Blighted Sites And Turning Them Into
Profitable Real Estate, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1996, at DI (Clinton Administration's
Brownfield Incentive plus more lenient state standards "opened the gates for this new
land rush.").
209 Randall Edwards, EPA Plan Easing Pollution Cleanup Hits Snag, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Aug. 27, 1996, at BI ("Since the program began in September 1994, only four
sites have been issued covenants not to sue, largely because the interim rules don't permit
properties with contaminated groundwater to get involved.").
lO See, e.g., Jim Nichols, Brownfields Rules Under Attack: EPA Either Too Strict or
Too Lenient, Sides Say, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 4, 1996, at BI ("If urban land can be
reclaimed, the demand will wane for transformation of suburban 'greenfields' into office
parks, industrial complexes, and subdivisions."); Editorial, Suburban ization: Topsy Is
Bad Role Model For City Growth, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 1996, at B2 (Ohio's
new brownfields law is "among possibilities for spurring businesses and people to move
back toward the center of cities instead of on to farmland," which creates sprawl); Liz
Atwood, Md. Moving to Contain Sprawl: As Suburbs Grow, State Aims to Steer
Residents to Older Communities, BALT. SUN, Aug. 8, 1996, at BI. For a discussion of
the sprawl debate, see Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the
Splrawl Debate in the United States, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENV. L. & POL'Y 137 (1999).
Larry Carson, Balto. Co. Sees Green in Growth Plan, THE SUN (Baltimore), Dec. 29,
1996, at B 1 ("Gov. Parris N. Glendening's Smart Growth proposal to curb suburban
sprawl . . . announced recently as part of his 1997 legislative package, would focus
public works spending on established communities while protecting rural land from
development and encouraging reuse of old industrial sites."); Timothy B. Wheeler,
Glendening Plan Would Limit Sprawl, THE SUN (Baltimore), Dec. 22, 1996, at BI;
Timothy B. Wheeler, Coalition to Fight Suburban Sprawl, Save Forests, Farms, BALT.
SUN, Oct. 24, 1996, at B2; Atwood, supra note 210.
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The clearest examples of such linkage, however, were stories
specifically treating a brownfield remediation tax deduction, e.g., Mayor
Daley and other mayors pushing brownfield remediation tax deduction;
one story reported that Mayor Daley in urging quick action on a
brownfield tax incentive called "President Clinton 'a friend' to cities.'
2 12
212 Swift action on tax incentives to clean up "brownfield" industrial sites
on Mayor Daley's wish list for Illinois congressional delegation; he
called "President Clinton 'a friend to cities' ...... The mayor said he
was particularly optimistic about getting bipartisan support in Congress
for his "brownfield" initiative because industrial decay and
contamination affect Republican constituencies as well. "Hastert asked
me about it," Daley said. "They (Republicans) like this initiative
because it goes all over the state, say, along the Illinois River and a lot
of towns."
Michael Kilian, CTA Tax Credit Tops Daley Wish List, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1996, at N6;
Lobbying for federal help to clean up polluted industrial sites paid off
for Mayor Daley when President Clinton put $2 billion to begin the job
in his proposed 1997 budget released Monday. Treasury Secretary
Robert Rubin said Clinton wants to spend "roughly $2 billion" over
seven years in incentives to companies "to resuscitate industrial sites in
economically distressed areas, both rural and urban, known as
brownfields." .. . . After initiating the idea of a tax credit four years
ago, Daley failed to get legislation through Congress. He has since
raised the issue with Clinton, Vice President Al Gore and Senate
Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kan.).
Basil Talbott, Plan Includes $2 Billion To Clean Polluted Sites, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 6,
1996, at 16; Lima Gets $200,000 Redevelopment Grant, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 16,
1996, at D10 (Vice President Gore announced that 20 communities were awarded nearly
$3 million in brownfield cleanup grants; "President Clinton has proposed expanding the
program to provide tax breaks for companies that clean up and develop brownfields-
sites contaminated by previous industrial use.");
President Clinton signed off on the idea earlier this year, including $2
billion in his seven-year balanced budget plan to allow businesses that
acquire sites in specific areas to deduct environmental cleanup costs.
Moseley-Braun will introduce the legislation this month. Although
congressional Republicans haven't agreed to the proposal, Moseley-
Braun predicted it would pass. "I'm getting bipartisan support for it, so
we're optimistic," Moseley-Braun said after participating in a forum on
the issue that also was attended by U.S. Rep. Bobby Rush (D-Illinois).
Gillis, supra note 161; President Clinton's appellation as "friend of cities" was widely
reported. Joe Frolik, Crime Tops Clinton's Message To Mayors, PLAIN DEALER, June 23,
1996, at Al ("Toledo Mayor Carty S. Finkbeiner said Clinton had proven himself to be a
great friend of cities without spending the kind of federal money dispensed during the
Great Society years."); Terence Samuel, Proposal Provides Cities with Anti-Poverty
Boost, Funds for Creating Jobs, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 1998, at A4
("Thomas Cochran, executive director of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, said: 'President
Clinton and HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo have proven that they are friends of
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Especially significant for linkage of a tax incentive policy with the
problem of brownfields cleanups was President Clinton's 1996 inclusion
of a brownfield remediation deduction for innocent purchasers in his
proposed budget for 1997,213 its inclusion as a plank in his 1996
Presidential Campaign214 and the subsequent stories of his speeches on it
in cities across the country.
215
In the context of policy entrepreneurship several factors coalesced
in 1996 to firmly establish this second stage of linking the policy idea of
tax incentive with the problem of brownfield remediation. Vice President
Al Gore, well-known for his long concern with environmental issues,
216
and Mayor Daley had become close personal friends and political allies in
the mid-1990s.2 17  Cleaning up brownfields then became a signature
policy entrepreneurship for Gore, who had became a policy entrepreneur
America's cities and that they understand that healthy city economies are essential to
continue healthy national economies."'); Katharine Q. Seelye, President Goes Forth, To
Mixed Reception, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1998, at A14 ("[Y]ou, through your policies, Mr.
President, have been a true friend of Worcester."); Ron Taylor & Jingle Davis, Clinton
Finds Admiration Aplenty in Atlanta, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 10, 2001, at A3
("[Mayor Bill] Campbell said, 'I am always delighted to have President Clinton come to
Atlanta. He's been a good friend of mine and a great friend of the city of Atlanta."').
213 In his State of the Union address in January, President Clinton
mentioned the renewal of brownfields as a key plank in his
environmental agenda. Today, in a major speech on the environment
that Clinton is to deliver in New Jersey, he will outline a program to
give tax incentives to companies that locate on brownfield sites,
administration officials said.
Lee, supra note 205. See Clinton Proposes Tax Incentives, CHI. TRJB., Mar. 11, 1996, at
Cl; Gillis, supra note 159; Melinda Wilson, Tax Breaks Proposed for Removing Toxins,
DET. NEWS METRO, Apr. 4, 1996 (reporting on similar provision introduced by Sen.
Spencer Abraham, R-Mich.).
214 See 1996 Democratic Platform, infra note 241; George Weeks, Despite All the
Planks, Both Parties Must Hammer Harder for a Cleaner Tomorrow, DET. NEWS, Aug.
30, 1996, at All.
215 Tim Poor, Clinton Announces Plan For Clean Environment, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 29, 1996, at A14; Charlie Cain & Phil Linsata, Last Two Michigan Stops
Feature Environment Cleanup Plan, DET. NEWS, Aug. 29, 1996, at A4; Martha T.
Moore, Clinton Proposes $1.9 Bfor Toxic Waste Programs, USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 1996,
at A4 ("spend $300 million to promote the revitalization of "brownfields," mildly
contaminated industrial or commercial facilities in urban areas").
216 Carl M. Cannon, The Old-Timers, 31 NAT'L J. 1386 (1999)("In his 1992 book, EARTH
IN THE BALANCE, Gore characterized the pollution caused by automobiles as 'a mortal
threat to the security of every nation, that is more deadly than that of any military enemy
we are ever again likely to confront."'); Margaret Kriz, A Few Hints of Green, 31 NAT'L
J. 2289 (1999).
217 Richard L. Berke, The Gore Guide to the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, at 6-30.
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of "smart growth, ' ' 218 adopting the idea from democratic Governor
Glendening of Maryland.2
Most significantly, "Clinton, who ceded most environmental
efforts to Vice President Al Gore during his first two years in office,
approached environmentalism with new enthusiasm after the Republican
takeover of Congress [in 1994], when polls showed voters
overwhelmingly opposed GOP efforts to loosen environmental
protections.' 22°  In classic "garbage can" fashion, President Clinton's
tactics in response seemed with hindsight brilliant but sprang in part from
inadvertence. 221 In a garbage can world the able politician has a guiding
218 Cosmo Macero Jr., Bill Targets Contaminated Sites, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 15, 1997,
at 27 ("The move to get polluted sites developed as part of a larger environmental policy
stems from federal legislation championed by Vice President Al Gore that will set aside
$2 billion for brownfields projects."); James M. Odato, 18-Acre Tomato Greenhouse
Takes Shape In City, BUFF. NEWS, Aug. 2, 1997, at B9 (Gore using erection of giant
green house for growing tomatoes from property once used as a parking lot for
steelworkers' cars as the 1997 example of brownfield development); Phil Fairbanks, Off
Main Street, BUFF. NEWS, July 27, 1997, at Cl ("Vice President Gore has adopted as a
new mantra on the importance of brownfield development "If we clean it up, they will
come," from a telephone conversation with mayor of Buffalo."); see Dalrymple, supra
note 121.
219 See supra note 211.
220 Amy Bayer, Day of the Environment: Clinton Targets Toxics on Final Leg of
Journey, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Aug. 29, 1996, at A3;
[T]he Administration's record is best defined by how it performed in a
colossal collision with Congress midway through its first four years.
When Republicans won control in 1994, they aggressively pressed
forward with an antiregulatory agenda that environmentalists saw as
threatening to dismantle a whole generation of rules that not only
preserved open spaces and wilderness areas, but also put protection of
the public's health and safety above other considerations, including
economic ones. An intense battle over how to reshape environmental
regulations ensued, with the Administration presenting its own,
moderate ideas but essentially playing a defensive game and labeling
the Republicans as tools of industrial special interests. The fight made
every issue, including cleaning up toxic wastes or chopping down
ancient forests, a matter of pitched partisan politics.
John H. Cushman, Jr. & Timothy Egan, Battles on Conservation Are Reaping Dividends,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1996, at Al.
221 In retrospect, Clinton had scored a major victory by standing firm. But
what seemed brilliant tactics had sprung-as so often is the case in
politics-in part from inadvertence. Morris himself had wanted to
make a budget deal; the back channel was not just a ruse. Morris's
liberal foes, Stephanopoulos and Ickes, had been terrified that the
president would fold. Clinton himself had no master plan; he had
played the whole thing day by day. .. . Only after the game was over
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strategy but adjusts it quickly to unfolding events. Here Clinton followed
political consultant Dick Morris' "triangulation" concept:
Clinton should move right, Morris said. But he
needn't become a pseudo-Republican. The trick was to co-
opt the Republicans on issues that were truly popular, like
balancing the budget and reforming welfare. Meanwhile,
let the Republicans tear themselves apart over abortion, and
paint them as extremists on education and the environment.
It was like a triangle, he said. The Republicans and the
traditional Democrats would be strung out down at the
bottom, while you, the president, would float above them at
the apex.
222
The Republican-controlled Congress had reduced the EPA budget
by over twenty percent in 1995 and refused to renew the chemical and
feedstock tax, which funded the Superfund.223
did they realize that it had helped to bamboozle the other side. "You
couldn't have bought a better disinformation campaign if you tried. It
was stunning. You know, Clinton's a genius," said Stephanopoulos
laughing. Two months after the press declared Clinton the winner in
the budget battle, Leon Panetta, too, was still marveling at the
president's good fortune. "I could tell this was all Machiavellian," he
said and burst into laughter. "Let's face it," Stephanopoulos said.
"Gingrich saved our butt." His hot rhetoric allowed the White House to
paint him and his unruly freshmen followers ('the Shites') as
extremists.
EVAN THOMAS ET AL., BACK FROM THE DEAD; How CLINTON SURVIVED THE
REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION 41-2 (1997).
222 Id. at 12.
223 Nancy Mathis & Greg McDonald, GOP Rejects Clinton Offers: Dole, Gingrich
Request Budget Meeting Instead, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 19, 1995, at Al ("Clinton said
Republican cuts of 21 percent for EPA, 21 percent for housing and 40 percent for the arts
were unacceptable."); Bob Hohler, EPA Service Suffering Under Cuts: Local Towns,
Ratepayers to Pick Up Tab, Agency Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 1995, at 1 (proposed
23% reduction in the EPA's 1996 budget);
Dissent within the party reached a crescendo this summer when fifty-
one House Republicans, the vast majority from the East, voted against
legislation that would slash the Environmental Protection Agency
budget by one-third and eliminate funding for a host of EPA programs,
including regulation of sewage spills and toxic air pollution at oil
refineries.
Frank Clifford, GOP Divided on Environmental Deregulation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1995, at Al; GOP Scraps Superfund Plans, 52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 4-13 (1996).
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Under the prodding of House Whip Tom DeLay, a former
Texas exterminator who once called the EPA "the Gestapo
of government, pure and simple," what had begun as
"regulatory reform" to cut red tape turned into an all-out
assault on the popular Clean Air and Clean Water Act.
Republicans began to look like enemies of the environment
and tools of corporate interests, who were in fact drafting
much of the legislation.224
Their extreme positions on many issues, including the environment, united
the Democrats and gave President Clinton perfect targets by which to
224 THOMAS ET AL., supra note 221, at 35-36. Searching CONGRESSIONAL RECORD does
not reveal use of the term "Gestapo" by Delay; it is, however, used by other Republicans.
See e.g., Government Overregulation Hurting American Citizens, 138 CONG. REC. H907
(Mar. 3, 1992) (remarks of Rep. James Inhofe, R-Okla.) ("I can only say that what this
country does not need is another Gestapo bureaucracy like the EPA and OSHA.").
Democrats have linked the term to Delay, e.g., What is Going on in Congress?, 144
CONG. REC. H10527 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Jim McDermott, D-
Wash.) ("[The Republican] whip denounced the Environmental Protection Agency as the
Gestapo of the government"); Earth Day, 142 CONG. REC. H3659 (daily ed. Apr. 23,
1996) (remarks of Rep. George Miller, D-Cal.) ("Four out of five Americans want the
Environmental Protection Agency maintained or strengthened and they are shocked by
the statements of Majority Whip Tom DeLay who declared the EPA the Gestapo of
government."). See also Molly Ivins, The Exterminato:. Rep. Tom DeLay Hates Clinton,
Loves Lobbyists and Is the Big Winner in Washington's Saga of Sin, PLAYBOY, May 1,
1999, at 120; Eric Alterman, Democracy Disappears, 268 THE NATION 12 (1999) ("'The
Hammer'-a man who compares EPA regulators to Gestapo agents"); David Helvarg,
Congress Plans an American Clearcut, 261 THE NATION 699 (1995); The Great
Environment Divide, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 23; Nicholas Confessore, The
Judicial Vigilantes, AMERICAN PROSPECT, May-June, 1999, at 75. Delay probably had
the record expunged after second thoughts. Gestapo is an acronym for
Geheimstaatspolizei or State Secret Police.
DeLay and his assistants guided industry supporters in an ad hoc group
whose name, Project Relief, sounded more like a Third World
humanitarian aid effort than a corporate alliance with a half-million-
dollar communications budget. On key amendments, the coalition
provided the draftsman. And once the bill and the debate moved to the
House floor, lobbyists hovered nearby, tapping out talking points on a
laptop computer for delivery to Republican floor leaders.
Michael Weisskopf & David Maraniss, Forging an Alliance for Deregulation: Rep.
DeLay Makes Companies Full Partners in the Movement, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1995, at
Al. Two years later "Wisconsin Representative David Obey brandished... [this] article
describing how lobbyists wrote drafts of legislation with DeLay's help. DeLay denied
'categorically that it ever happened' and challenged Obey to identify the participants.
When Obey waved the article under DeLay's nose, DeLay shoved him and called him a
'gutless chickenshit."' Ivins, supra.
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define (and save) his Administration.225
President Clinton cited Congress' slashing environmental progress
as one of the reasons for vetoing the spending resolution presented to him
in the budget showdown leading to the long government shutdown in
1995, for which the public blamed the Republicans.226 Congressional
Republicans had misread the 1994 elections, thinking it was a mandate for
the Republican "Contract with America," rather than voter disappointment
with Clinton's first two years as President. 227  "Gingrich 'misread the
elections entirely. People did not vote to cut education and cut funding for
225 Ann Devroy, Opponents' Issues Drive Clinton's Political Recovery: Reelection
Strategies Position President on Centrist Platform, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1995, at Al
(Clinton's strategy was "to co-opt Republicans on the issues most popular with the
American public. The next move is to identify the Republican issues that Americans are
most uncomfortable with-identified by the White House as loosening environmental
protections or cutting the social safety net-and make them stick."); Carl M. Cannon,
Clinton Enters New Year on Upswing, BALT. SuN, Jan. 1, 1996, at 1A (Clinton's surge in
polls from 40% to the high 50's was fueled by rhetoric in defense of programs targeted
by Republican budget cutters);
The GOP pushed to delay implementation of new meat inspection
rules; postpone workplace regulations aimed at reducing repetitive
stress injury; eliminate retroactive corporate liability at Superfund toxic
waste sites; revise the Clean Air Act to provide regulatory relief to
private and public sector entities overburdened by the law's mandates;
slash the budget for the Environmental Protection Agency; and pass
riders easing enforcement of some pollution controls.
Dan Morgan, A Revolution Derailed: How Three Ideas of Big Government From the
'60's Helped Put the Republican Juggernaut in the Shop, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1996, at
Cl; Helen Dewar, Democrats Credit GOP "Extremism for their Newfound Bonding,
WASH. POST, June 2, 1996, at A18.
226 David E. Rosenbaum, Battle Over the Budget: the Details, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
1995, at Al; Helvarg, supra note 224; Campaign '96, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996,
at 4-14 ("Campaign historians will probably identify the day the Government shut down
as the day Mr. Clinton began his political revival."); Michael Weisskopf & David
Maraniss, Stung and Beset, Speaker Breaks Down and Weeps, WASH. POST, Jan. 18,
1996, at Al ("House Majority Whip Tom DeLay sauntered up to Vice President Al Gore
and said: 'You have to realize we're serious. We'll shut down the government if we have
to balance the budget.' 'Our polls show you guys lose if the government shuts down,'
Gore responded."); William Schneider, The Root of the Budget Fight: How Much
Government Can an Affluent Society Afford?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1996, at MI (In ABC
News poll 44% said the government shutdown was the GOP's fault; only 25% blamed
President Clinton). The truth was not so simple. Both sides were to blame for the budget
shutdown .... But it didn't matter. The public wasn't interested in details. THOMAS ET
AL., supra note 221, at 41.
227 Clarence Page, Why Clinton Likes the GOP Congress, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1996, at
C2 1.
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the environment and cut funding for programs they care about."'
228
Gingrich "had mistaken the election returns of 1994 for a revolution, when
only 19 percent of the eligible electorate had actually voted Republican for
Congress and fewer still had understood what it was voting for."
2 2 9
"For several years, Daley has pushed for federal tax incentives to
help cleanup tainted industrial sites, known as brownfields. President
Clinton signed off on the idea earlier this year [1996], including $2 billion
in his seven-year balanced budget plan to allow businesses that acquire
sites in specific areas to deduct environmental cleanup costs." 230 President
Clinton and Vice President Gore drew public attention to the problem of
"brownfields" or abandoned or underutilized urban property with some at
least perceived contamination, which are by definition less than Superfund
sites for purposes of Section 198,231 but are often contaminated by
asbestos-containing materials among other hazardous materials.
President Clinton linked his brownfield initiative with broader themes:
[T]he brownfields initiative-that doesn't mean anything to
most of you, but it will before long. A brownfield is a place
where there used to be jobs in a city where there is now
nothing but pollution. And what we aim to do is to clean up
those brownfields so we can get rid of the pollution and
bring back the jobs. And we're going to do it all over
233
America, and we are going to do it right here in St. Louis.
228 Michael Kranish, Democrats' Strategy." Contract on Gingrich, BOSTON GLOBE, May
26, 1996, at 1 (quoting Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, R-N.Y., manager of Senate Republican
Campaign).
229 THOMAS ETAL., supra note 221, at 210.
230 Gillis, supra note 161, at 17. See Basil Talbott, supra note 212.
231 Section 198(d)(2) ("Hazardous substance" does not include any substance subject to
Superfund remedial action). The EPA defines brownfields as "abandoned, idled or
under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is
complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination." OFFICE OF SOLID
WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, EPA, BROWNFIELDS ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVE: APPLICATION GUIDELINES FOR DEMONSTRATION PILOTS 2 (Pub. No.
EPA/540/R-94/068 1995).
232 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
233 Remarks of President Clinton at Rally St. Louis, Missouri, FED. NEWS SERVICE (Sept.
10, 1996);
We build a stronger community when we keep our environment clean
and safe. This legislation gives the Environmental Protection Agency
the resources to protect our air and water; to carry forward our
Brownfields Urban Toxic Waste Initiative; to build on our record pace
of toxic waste cleanups; to see to it that our children live near parks, not
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The terms of the political discourse below the Presidential level
were extreme.234 Republican proponents of federal re-regulation of
environmental controls demonized opponents as "the environmentalist
lobby and their extremist friends in the 'eco-terrorist underworld' and 'the
green extremists.' 235 In turn, Gore demonized them with the metaphor of
jihad against the environment.236 And never to be forgotten is House GOP
Party Whip Delay's reported description of the EPA as the Gestapo of the
poison. And we will continue to seek additional resources for these and
a few other areas in our ongoing budget negotiations.
Remarks by President Bill Clinton, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, Vice President Al
Gore and Mrs. Tipper Gore at the Signing of the VA/HUD Appropriations Bill in the
Rose Garden, the White House, FED. NEWS SERVICE (Sept. 26, 1996);
I believe that there will be a movement, particularly of smaller-scale-
like 300 and down-manufacturing facilities back to urban areas in the
next 10 years, because I think the property will be cheaper and I think
the workforce will be there. And I think if you have a serious welfare-
to-work effort like this, you can really make it work. And between the
funds we're trying to give the cities to clean environmentally polluted
areas to make them attractive for new investments again-this so-called
brownfields initiative-and we're going to try to triple the number of
these empowerment zones, I believe that you can have this story repeat
itself.
Remarks by President Bill Clinton During Roundtable Discussion with Local Leaders
and Officials, FED. NEWS SERVICE (Sept. 10, 1996).
234 Since World War II many vice presidents served, as did Nixon and Agnew, primarily
as political hatchet men for their presidents. See John Morton Blum, Presidents in the
Wings, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1992, at X4; Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, Al Gore
is Breaking His Wooden Wonk Mold Wide Open, BALT. SUN, Oct. 26, 1998, at 9A ("Vice
presidents going back at least to Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew have been cast as
partisan hatchet men in off-year congressional elections. Mr. Gore is playing that role
now, but with much more finesse and humor than either of those two earlier worthies
ever did.").
235 Molly Ivins, A Greener GOP Camouflages Bid to Undo Controls, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Dec. 21, 1995, at B5 (quoting "Republican Party memo advising members on how to
appear concerned about the environment" while GOP's "only moves [are] to repeal, cut
back, downsize, eliminate or reverse existing environmental protections").
236 Earth Matters (CNN television broadcast, October 28, 1995) ("I think that Mr.
Gingrich and some of his partners who have been kowtowing to these right-wing
extremists' groups and conducting a jihad against the environment are beginning to get
the results of the public opinion polls." (voice over, Vice President Al Gore)); Jim
Nichols, Revisonists Retreat: Republicans Back Off Touted Reform of Environmental
Law in Light of Polls Showing Support for Protection of Resources, PLAIN DEALER, Oct.
22, 1995, at lB. "Jihad" also is a popular label with the de-regulation camp as well.
Karen Hosler, House GOP Backs Away From Curbs on the EPA, BALT. SUN, Nov. 3,
1995, at 1A ("'The PR campaign against us has been unbelievable-it's part of the jihad
by environmental extremists,' said John Feehrey, a spokesman for Majority Whip Tom
Delay.").
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Government.237
President Clinton's January 1996 State of the Union Address,
reversing his Administration's earlier position, called for a tax subsidy
2 38
for brownfield remediation.239 In early 1996 the Clinton Administration
proposed Brownfield tax incentives 240 in essentially the form enacted in
1997 as Section 198, which were also part of the Democratic Platform for
the 1996 elections. 241 This time the major Congressional supporters of a
brownfield remediation tax subsidy were senators and such support was
more or less bi-partisan.242 Probably recognizing the inevitability of urban
brownfield targeting in proposed Section 198, a real estate lobbyist urged
at the time that at least rapid amortization of cleanup costs, e.g., over sixty
months, be available for a purchaser of contaminated suburban
properties.
243
237 See supra note 224.
238 Initially the Clinton Administration considered amortization (probably along lines of
Mayor Daley's 5-year tax credit). Heidi Glenn & John Godfrey, Few Surprises in
Clinton's '97 Budget Plan, 96 TNT 26-1 (Feb. 6, 1996).
239 Treasury Secretary, White House Budget Director, and Council of Economic
Advisers Chairman Hold News Conference on President Clinton's 1997 Budget Proposal
(Feb. 5, 1996) Transcript, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE (statement of Secretary of
Treasury Robert Rubin).
240 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1997 BUDGET PROPOSAL
(RELEASED ON MARCH 19, 1996), JCS-2-96, at 49-50 (Comm. Print 1996).
24 Over the next four years, we want a second round of Empowerment
Zones to bring economic growth to more American communities; a
significant expansion of the Community Development Financial
Institutions Fund to spur more private sector investment in local
economies; and a new tax incentive to encourage further cleanup and
redevelopment of brownfields. We are committed to American cities.
We believe that vast opportunities for private investment exist in
America's cities. We want to leverage federal investment to maximize
private sector investments in our urban centers and support a
comprehensive approach to urban problems. Today's Democratic Party
knows that the best way to bring jobs and growth back to our poorest
neighborhoods is to harness the job-creating power of the private
sector.
1996 Democratic Platform, 1996 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN PRESS MATERIALS (Aug. 28,
1996).
242 142 CONG. REC. S7179- 7185 (daily ed. June 27, 1996) (remarks of Senators Carol
Moseley-Braun, D-Ill., and Alfonse D'Amato, R-N.Y., both members of the Senate
Finance Committee); see supra note 212.
243 MacEwen Statement, supra note 90, at 81 ("We would urge that the 'brownfields'
concept providing an immediate tax deduction for the costs of cleaning up acquired
contaminated land in targeted areas be extended to non-targeted areas as well. If not
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President Clinton as a political entrepreneur had adopted the idea
of a balanced budget enactment in 1996 and the Republicans' family tax
credit,244 but he also wanted in the budget agreement certain direct and
indirect (tax preference) spending increases, as for education245 and
brownfields. In 1996, President Clinton was re-elected President-the
first Democrat to do so since President Franklin D. Roosevelt-but the
Republicans retained the control over both houses of Congress, which
meant that their tax demands as well as his must be met.246 This set the
immediate deductibility, than some rapid amortization period would seem appropriate for
non-targeted areas."). In oral testimony he suggested 60-month amortization. Id. at 78.
244 The origin of the [Taxpayer Relief] Act [of 1997] was an agreement
between the Republicans [sic] leadership to provide the Clinton
Administration with increased funding for education and child care in
exchange for their long sought-after tax cuts .... The most significant
changes made by the Act came in the areas of child tax credits, college
tuition credits and the capital gains tax.
TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 1997: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW NO. 105-34,
111 STAT. 788 (William H. Manz, ed. 2001) [hereinafter TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF
1997]. This compromise was severely criticized-and justly so. See E. J. Dionne, Jr., A
Political Classic, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at A21; David S. Broder, The Politics of
Minimalism, WASH. POST, May 14, 1997, at A21 (the 1997 budget agreement [and
accompanying tax act] constitute "a minimalist agreement, a lowest-common-
denominator compromise"); Robert Kuttner, A Republican Budget Triumph: Clinton Has
Stolen the GOP's Clothes, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1997, at C7.
245 For a blistering, well-founded critique of the 1997 education tax incentives from a
perspective of policy, effectiveness, complexity, and just bad drafting, see Glenn E.
Coven, Bad Drafting: A Case Study of the Design and Implementation of the Income Tax
Subsidies for Education, 54 TAX LAW 1 (2000) (providing thoughtful analysis of
systemic causes and a staggering number of resulting design defects).
In 1993, having campaigned on populist/class warfare themes, with Democrats in
control of both chambers and President George Bush having vetoed essentially the tax
bill that the Clinton Administration was pushing, President Clinton had increased the
income tax rates on the highest income American citizens and corporations and not given
a capital gains quid for the rate increase quo. 138 CONG. REC. S3279 (daily ed. Mar. 11,
1992) (remarks of Senator Steve Syrnms, R-Idaho) ("It seems to me once again we are
going to soak the rich but this time they don't even get anything in return.") (speaking to
the substantially similar individual ordinary income rate increase on the top five percent
only without any increased capital gains preference). As it turned out, use of the
increased revenues from such rate increases to reduce otherwise projected increases in the
deficit lead to the Federal Reserve Bank's lowering the interest rate, which in turn helped
grow the economy and the stock market boom, from which the top five percent gained
disproportionate income gains. See David Cay Johnston, Wealthiest Pay a Declining
Share of Their Incomes in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001, at C2 (the increase in share
of income and declining effective rate due to the increase in capital gains income; one-
third of all long-term capital gains taxes paid by fewer than 13,000 taxpayers); Robert
Kuttner, Alan Greenspan and the Temple of Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at 7-10
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stage for classic "log rolling," in which a single piece of legislation with
an up or down vote contains disparate elements appealing to different
247partisan factions.
President Clinton acknowledged that he must cooperate with the
Republicans.248 The Republican majorities in both houses of Congress
("[Greenspan] brokered and kept the grand bargain of the 1990's: deficit reduction for
lower interest rates."); Bob Woodward, Behind the Boom: A Republican Fed Chairman
and a Democratic President Might Have Seemed Strange Bedfellows, WASH. POST MAG.,
Nov. 12, 2000, at W8. Other factors were an increase in productivity and technological
advances. Compare R.C. Longworth, Boom Linked to All Work and Flat Pay, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 23, 1998, at C1 with Walter Hamilton, Dow's Surges to Close Above 10,000
Level, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1999, at Al. See generally Martin Crutsinger, Can Bush
Economy Ever Match the Booming Years of Clinton?, THE SCOTSMAN, Dec. 26, 2000, at
17.
247 "Log rolling" originally meant bargaining between legislators to support each other's
pet projects for mutual benefit.
Among settlers in the wilderness, cooperation in handling logs for land
clearing and construction was a force overriding any differences among
neighbors. So too in politics. "If you will vote for my interest," said
Congressman B. F. Butler in 1870, "I will vote for yours. That is how
these tariffs are log-rolled through.
M. Albert Figiniski, Maryland's Constitutional One Subject Rule: Neither Dead Letter
Nor An Undue Restriction, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 363, 364 n.8 (1998) (tracing use of
political term back to beginning of 19th Century). The term also covers a bill where
factions favoring disparate misjoined provisions in it may not have directly bargained for
each other's support. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 appears a mixture of both
elements.
248 Doyle McManus, Into the Final Fray: How Did Candidate Clinton Pull Off His
Amazing Political Resurrection?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at 10 ("Clinton has become
what political scientists call an 'accommodator'-a president who accepts that he must
work within a policy framework designed by his opponents, like Republican President
Dwight D. Eisenhower in an earlier, Democratic age. He has become a 'yes, but'
president.");
One of the ways that the St. Louis economy will grow faster-an[d the]
economy of every city in this country-is if we invest more money in
environmental cleanup. Our brownfields initiative, so-called-a lot of
people don't know what a brownfield is-a brownfield is a place in a
city that used to have jobs and now has pollution. That's what a
brownfield is. And what we want to do is get rid of the pollution so the
jobs can come back. All the major economic analyses are that it will
become more economically advantageous for people to reinvest in
cities again for new jobs in the future if we can take away the
environmental problem. So, yes, balance the budget, but be careful
how we do it. Do it in a way that brings us together, doesn't drive us
apart.
Remarks of President Clinton, Democratic National Committee Dinner, St. Louis,
Missouri, FED. NEWS SERVICE (Sept. 10, 1996) (emphasis added).
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demanded a substantial capital gains tax cut arid estate tax cuts as well as
IRA's. 249 Furthermore, it may be that the fall off in women voting in the
1994 Congressional elections perceived as having often lost the
Democratic candidates a margin for victory, helped induce President
Clinton to seek co-operation with the Republicans rather than
confrontational tax-fairness rhetoric as a means of attracting back the lost
women voters.25°
d. Window of Opportunity for Enactment of Brownsfield Tax
Incentive Opens for Democrats: 1997
The third and last stage of a political window of opportunity,
however, had not yet opened in 1996 for reasons unrelated to the
brownfields issue. The Republicans would not agree with Clinton in 1996
on a balanced budget, with which any significant tax act was inextricably
linked, prior to the November 1996 Presidential Election which they
hoped to win.251 After the election there was not enough time left to
accomplish such significant legislation (of which a brownsfield tax
deduction was a minor part). In 1997 the political window of opportunity
for brownsfields tax legislation did open. While the number of news
articles on brownsfields declined slightly from 1996 (from 132 to 127), the
number specifically dealing with a brownsfields cleanup tax deduction
exponentially increased.2 5 2 Many dealt specifically with the bi-partisan
249 See supra note 244 and infra note 266 and accompanying text.
250 In the 1996 Presidential election women overwhelmingly supported Clinton again,
playing a disproportionate role in his re-election. Michael Kranish, Clinton, GOP Stake
Middle-ground Claim, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1996, at Al (according to exit polls
Clinton lead among women 54-38%; Dole, men 44-43% with the remainder going to
Perot); Susan Baer, Clinton's Mandate to Preserve Status Quo; Voters Offer Ideas for
Second Term, THE SUN (Baltimore), Nov. 10, 1996, at Al (noting that female voters were
decisive in Clinton's victory).
251 As Elections Loom, GOP Ardor Gives Way to Pragmatism, 52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC
1-3, 1-5 (1996); Budget Amendment Rejected Again, 52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 2-32
(1996); Paul Tsongas et al., Two Responsible Plans to Free Hostage Budget, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 26, 1996, at 19.
252 Gore, Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin and the mayors criticized
Congress for failing to include in draft tax legislation incentives to
clean up contaminated industrial zones, hire people off welfare and
invest in financial institutions that fund urban economic development..
. Congressional Republicans considered including the administration's
urban initiatives in its tax package, but given the many competing
interests, "not everything sought can be accepted," Fleisher [spokesman
for the House Ways and Means Committee] said. Gore went to bat for
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the urban initiatives because President Clinton is out of the country and
Senate and House members plan to meet in conference soon to
reconcile differences between their versions of the five-year, $85-
billion tax-cut package.
Elizabeth Shogren, White House, Mayors Urge Aid for Cities, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1997,
at A10; Mark Sherman, Gore Asks Mayors' Aid on Tax Cuts, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
July 3, 1997, at A6 ("Neither the House nor Senate version of the tax bill included the
brownfield or empowerment zone proposals, but Gore said he believes the Republican
leadership in Congress will include them in the legislation that emerges from a
conference of House and Senate negotiators this summer."); Michael Remez,
Environmental Program To Aid Four Municipalities, HARTFORD COURANT, May 14,
1997, at A3 ("Gore said fifteen federal agencies will pool resources to spend $300
million on the Brownfields program, which is coordinated by the EPA. The
administration also is pushing Congress to enact an expanded tax break for businesses
that move to the targeted areas.");
A bipartisan group of senators, including Illinois' Sen. Carol Moseley-
Braun, on Thursday introduced legislation to provide tax incentives for
environmental cleanup.., the latest version of so-called "brownfields"
legislation .... Passage of some type of "brownfields" incentive has
been a major priority for Mayor Richard M. Daley . . . . Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) predicted later Thursday that
brownfields legislation "is going to be addressed this Congress. We
may be able to get something done there." The Senate Democratic
leadership has proposed direct government grants for cleanup efforts
while Republican proposals call for broad tax incentives not limited to
distressed areas.
Mike Doming, Urban Cleanup Bill is Proposed, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 1997, at N4;
William Neikirk, Political Battle Lines Drawn, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1997, at NI ("The
president's so-called 'brownfields initiative,' essentially a tax credit for businesses that
develop environmentally contaminated sites, also was included in the measure . . .
President Clinton will propose what officials describe as his
administration's first comprehensive urban agenda in an address about
inner-city problems today to the U.S. Conference of Mayors .... Many
items in the president's urban plan are already disparate elements of the
budget agreement, such as the nearly $2 billion in proposed tax
incentives for businesses that agree to clean up old industrial sites
known as "brownfields."
Susan Schmidt, President Set To Spell Out Urban Agenda. Clinton Speaks Today To
Mayors Conference, WASH. POST, June 23, 1997, at A6; Yael T. Abouhaka, Reclaim and
Reuse Brownfields Could Help Cleanup Environment, KANSAS CITY STAR, Sept. 3, 1997,
at C6 (stating that it makes good sense to offer federal and state tax breaks to cleanup
brownfields, but "costs-and longterm benefits-to taxpayers need to be closely
watched"); Jeffrey Spivak & Mark Morris, New Emphasis on an Old Problem: Fight
Against Urban Blight Focuses on Empty Industrial "Brownfields ", KANSAS CITY STAR,
Sept. 4, 1997, at Cl ("first federal tax incentives for brownfields were included in the
recent budget agreement");
Promoted heavily by Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, the so-called
brownfields tax incentive included in the budget deal offers a break to
developers who clean up environmentally contaminated industrial and
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support for the provision or for the proposed tax bill in general, as well as
the policy entrepreneurship of Mayor Daley and others.
The most sophisticated political analysis was that the Democratic
leadership supported a provision limited to urban areas, while the
Republican leadership called "for broad tax incentives not limited to
distressed areas., 254  Similarly news stories highlighted the political
alignment of Clinton, Gore and the mayors-especially Mayor Daley,
truly the first political entrepreneur of a brownfield cleanup tax
commercial property in or near high-poverty areas. The concept is to
put abandoned, inner-city, industrial "brown fields" back in use rather
than promote new development on outlying "green fields." Budgeters
estimate that over the next three years the provision will pour $1.5
billion in tax subsidies into environmental cleanups in the targeted
high-poverty areas .... Daley has been one of the concept's earlier and
more vigorous promoters, regularly championing the tax incentive for
at least five years. U.S. Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun (D-Ill.) also lobbied
for the measure as sponsor of the brownfields legislation in the Senate,
and U.S. Rep. Jerry Weller, the Republican from Morris, backed a
similar proposal from his position on the tax-writing House Ways and
Means Committee.
Mike Doming, City's "Brownfields" May See Long Green Out of Budget Deal, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 3, 1997, at C3;
The new laws [a balanced budget mandate and a tax cut] were
hammered out of the partisan rancor that turned into a desperate need to
show voters that Congress and the White House could get something
done . . . . It provides tax credits for the cleanup of so-called
brownfields or chemical waste dumps in inner cities. "The beauty of
this package is that it really applies to every single American in one
way or another," said House Budget Committee Chairman John
Kasich...who helped negotiate the deal."
Tax Measure Signed, But Much Work Lies Ahead, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 6, 1997, at A12.
253 The two have common political interests. One is promoting federal
legislation that would create a tax credit to encourage cleanup and reuse
of thousands of polluted and abandoned industrial sites, so-called
brownfields, in Chicago and the suburbs. Weller and Daley worked
together to advance that in the last session of Congress.
William Presecky & John Kass, Daley And Weller Find Shared Goal, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28,
1997, at N3;
Daley, who has made "brownfield" cleanup his top economic
development priority as mayor and as president of the U.S. Conference
of Mayors, endorsed two bills introduced by U.S. Rep. Jerry Weller (R-
Ill.) this month. The first would permit investors to deduct up to
$500,000 in environmental clean-up costs in one year and to capitalize
the rest over a much shorter time.
Fran Spielman, Daley Backs Bill on Brownfields, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 19, 1997, at 525.
254 Doming, Urban Cleanup Bill is Proposed, supra note 252.
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incentive. 255 The opening of the political window for enactment of such a
tax incentive also is evidenced in the greater number of sponsors and
political coalitions supporting it this year.256 Moreover, the Repubican
255 Mayor Masiello shared the stage with Vice President Gore on Monday
as the Clinton administration began a publicity offensive aimed at
getting Congress to pass a tax-cut plan that will help the nation's cities.
... The House did not include such a tax incentive in its $85 billion
tax-cut bill, and the Senate tax bill includes a much narrower tax break
for brownfields development. House and Senate negotiators are
attempting to forge a compromise, and the White House is working
with them on a bipartisan tax bill.
Jerry Zremski, Mayor Teams Up with Gore to Push Tax Plan, BUFF. NEWS, July 8, 1997,
at BI; Mark Sherman, Gore Asks Mayors' Aid on Tax Cuts, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July
3, 1997, at A6 ("In a conference telephone call with... [a half-dozen] mayors that also
was open to reporters, Gore said the White House would push for tax breaks for cleaning
urban industrial sites, dubbed 'brownfields' . . . ."); Bruce Alpert, Gore Asks Cities to
Help Restore Tax Incentives, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 3, 1997, at A3 ("[New Orleans
Mayor] Morial asked Gore what the mayors could do to help restore the provisions
[removed from the tax bills passed by the House and Senate last week], and was told the
administration wants city leaders to contact their Democratic and Republican
members.");
Two different tax cut bills have passed the House and the Senate. The
bills contain many good elements, but I do not believe they represent
the best way to cut taxes, nor are they consistent with the balanced-
budget agreement . . . . [My plan] will also provide tax cuts to
businesses that clean up urban toxic waste sites, known as brownfields,
and convert these sites to productive use.
Excerpts From Remarks By Clinton on Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at A16;
"The President has endorsed a federal tax credit for 'brownfield'
cleanups, and congressional leaders this spring voiced their support for
such a measure," Daley said at a West Side press conference, where he
was joined by colleagues from the U.S. Conference of Mayors.
"Mayors from across the nation are speaking with one voice: It is time
for the federal government to act."
Gary Washburn, More Help Sought in City's Effort To Clean Up Its Old Industrial Sites,
CHI. TRIB., May 30, 1997, at N3; Thomas J. Dolan, Masiello Lauds President's
Proposals For Brownfields in National Hook-Up, BUFF. NEWS, July 2, 1997, at B4.
256 Underneath Washington's partisan shouting is a current of
convergence, with many Republicans and Democrats coming to similar
conclusions about what the federal government must do to improve
education, fix Medicare, and tackle social problems without either side
abandoning its core beliefs. The result is the emergence of a new
network of coalitions-a so-called "third force"-that may lead to
progress on some of Washington's most intractable problems.. .. Two
think tanks with solid Republican and Democratic credentials join with
Sens. Spencer Abraham (R) of Michigan and Joe Lieberman (D) of
Connecticut to highlight areas in which the two parties can work
together to pass legislation . . . . Cleanup of contaminated
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leadership, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, R-Ga.,257 and Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., supported a brownfield tax
provision, 258 although House Ways & Means Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex.,
did not.259 Other Republican members of the Ways & Means Committee
supported a brownfield tax incentive. 260  There also was an increase in
articles linking brownfield remediation with fighting urban sprawl and
preserving greenfields. 261 This reflected the political themes of the 1996
Clinton-Gore campaigns. As the head of EPA told a national conference,
"brownfields" is also on the agenda.
Lawrence J. Goodrich, New Coalitions Stir Washington Politics, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 12, 1997, at 1; accord Spencer Abraham & Joseph Lieberman, How to
Mend America's Broken Urban Areas, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 20, 1997, at 18.
257 Diverse Strategies Offered As Response to President, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1997, at
B 12 ("Speaker Newt Gingrich... outlined 10 steps tonight to improve race relations in
the United States [including] ... targeted, pro-growth tax benefits ... brownfields clean-
up"). Rep. Dennis Hastert, R-I1l., was destined to become Speaker of the House in 1999,
see Michael Kranish, Hastert Sails to Election as Speaker, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 7, 1999,
at A21, and he also strongly supported Daley's brownfields tax incentive. See supra note
212.
258 Doming, supra note 252 (Lott predicts brownfields legislation is going to be
addressed); Balancing the Budget: Clinton Budget Proposes $100 Billion in Tax Cuts,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 3, 1997, at Al.
259 Jack Torry, GOP Tax Plan Boon To Rich, Democrats Say, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, June
10, 1997, at Al (Treasury Secretary Rubin pointed out that "the Archer plan didn't
include any tax breaks to encourage major companies to invest on abandoned inner-city
industrial sites, known as 'brownfields.' Big-city mayors have championed such tax
breaks as a way to revive long-dormant areas of their inner cities."). Apparently House
Ways and Means Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex., held brownfield remediaton tax incentives
hostage to Superfund legislation. See John Godfrey & Heidi Glenn, W&M Slogs
Through Tax Bill Amendments on Way to Passage, 97 TNT 114-1 (June 13, 1997)
("Archer said the brownfields tax incentives would be addressed in future Superfund
legislation."). Archer represented Houston, home to many large oil companies subject to
the expired Superfund tax.
260 See Johnson Bill, supra note 97 (applying to abatement or control of hazardous
substances (including friable asbestos) at any contaminated site qualified by an
appropriate state agency); see also News Release, Congressman Jerry Weller, Weller
Offers Expanded .Brownfields Clean Up Legislation: Congressman Pushes For Greater
Public-Private Partnership For Industrial Clean Up & Expanded Reach of Clean Up Tax
Incentive into Suburban & Rural Areas (Mar. 16, 2000) ("Now it is time to expand this
incentive to reclaim even more land in our neighborhoods and to extend the time line for
this successful imitative."), available at 2000 TNT 54-93 (Mar. 20, 2000).
261 Mike Vogel, Mayor Says New Board To Deal With Master Plan, BUFF. NEWS, July
14, 1997, at B5; Neal Peirce, Smart Growth Important New Planning Strategy, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Dec. 15, 1997, at B5; Lucy Soto, Smart Growth?; New Urbanism Focuses On
Old Concepts but Success Is Unclear, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1997, at W15; Editorial, A
Clean Billfor Brownfields, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8, 1997, at A22.
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"brownfields . . . [are] the hottest experiment in the fight against urban
blight .... They have devised a new class of tax breaks to spur new uses
for brownfields-adding a tool to the ever-growing list of development
incentives. '' 262 Again the most sophisticated reporting paints a very mixed
picture as to the impact on brownfield cleanups of market forces and
government incentives (the most important of which was the EPA
delisting of brownfields from Superfund "status").2 63
262 Spivak & Morris, supra note 252; accord Casey Bukro, Beginnings Of A Brownfield
Transformation: Navistar's $11 Million Wisconsin Steel Effort Marks An Important Step
In The Cleanup Of Legacies Of The City's Industrial Past, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 1997, at
N1 ("brownfields are one of the hottest topics to come out of the environmental industry
in a long time"). Spivak and Morris further reported that "[b]rownfields are a hot topic
because other issues on the urban agenda, notably crime, have been addressed." Spivak
& Morris, supra note 252.
263 The actual evidence cuts both ways. Some pieces of the urban
resurgence appear to be almost purely market driven-meaning they
would probably be happening no matter what Government had or
hadn't done. Others do seem to be caused by a changing government
climate. And some, like the nationwide decline in crime, are crucial
but don't fit into either category. The story of the brownfields offers a
textbook case of how all those forces combined. Brownfields are
former industrial sites, many of them in poor urban areas, that are
vacant and polluted, but not polluted enough to qualify for clean-up
money from Washington. Beginning in 1994, the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency quietly relaxed its formulas for the
brownfields. A retail use, for example, would require a less rigorous,
and less expensive, clean-up than a residential use. That change created
a new industry, which arose to clean up and resell the properties. At
the same time, the cataloguing of brownfield sites became a function of
local government, which can respond to the needs of business faster
than the Federal bureaucracy. And perhaps most crucially, investors
who were looking for returns greater than the 12 percent to 15 percent
typical in mainstream real estate saw urban values appreciating as the
crime rate declined. "On a brownfield site, you can make 20 percent to
30 percent, if you do the numbers right," said Christopher J. Daggett,
president of Chadwick Partners, an Edison, N.J., company formed 19
months ago to get into the brownfields business. "When the market is
tight, people look for other alternatives." Retailers rediscovered cities
for the same reason: higher returns than the suburbs, with too many
stores, could offer. Companies like Disney went to Harlem not to do
economic development, but to make money. An explosion in the
number and size of Wall Street mortgage investment pools has
similarly aided the cities without particular intent. The pools, which
buy and sell residential and business mortgages, have grown so large
that they find they can venture into urban areas, where risks and returns
are both higher than in the suburbs, without significantly raising their
overall risk. And the competition for the best return creates a pressure
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Although the Republicans still retained control of Congress after
President Clinton's 1996 re-election, the Administration's representatives
fought hard in the 1997 budget negotiations (resulting in a balanced
budget in seven years264) on behalf of Vice President Gore for such a
brownfield remediation tax incentive and on behalf of President Clinton
for education tax incentives and spending for children's health insurance
and restoration of disability benefits to legal immigrants. 265 At the same
time, the Republicans held to their vision of capital gains and estate tax
relief, IRA expansion dear to their enterpriser wing, and a $500-per-child
credit dear to their moralist wing and the middle class in general.266
to make those new investments.
Kirk Johnson, The Nation: Washington Steps Back and Cities Recover, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1997, at 4-5.
264 President Clinton started 1995 with a proposed budget that projected deficits
indefinitely, then at mid-year under pressure from a GOP-controlled Congress proposed
balancing the budget in 10 years, and finally submitted a detailed budget meeting their
seven year time frame. See Susan Page, Budget Makes Clinton Middleman: Seven-year
Plan Lets Him Lay Claim to Political Center, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 1995, at 8A; David S.
Broder, Revisiting the Issue of Clinton's Character, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1995, at A6;
Francis X. Clines, Battle Over The Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at A16.
265 Gore . . . insinuated himself into the negotiations over the balanced
budget, emerging with measures to help him with vital Democratic
constituencies . . . . Gore got his way on an empowerment-zone
program . . . efforts he can present to inner-city voters,
environmentalists . . . in the 2000 primaries. "During the balanced-
budget negotiations, Erskine knew what the Vice President's priorities
were... and made sure they were negotiated as hard as possible."
Richard L. Berke, The Gore Guide to the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, at 6-30.
266 Jerry Gray, In Budget Battle, Advantage Goes to G.O.P. Chairmen, N.Y. TIMES, May
4, 1997, at 1-30; Robert Pear, Closest to Their Hearts, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1997, at Al;
Eric Pianin & Clay Chandler, White House, GOP Reach Budget Agreement, WASH.
POST, July 29, 1997, at Al; Heidi Glenn & John Godfrey, House Budget Panel Passes
Budget Resolution, 97 TNT 96-1 (May 19, 1997). See generally Martin Walker, He
Stoops To Conquer: Clinton's Budget Pact Shows His Messy Means to a Grand End,
WASH. POST, May 11, 1997, at C1. See John Lee, "Death and Taxes" and Hypocrisy, 60
TAx NOTES 1393, 1397 (1993) (discussing the L.A. Times/Gallup Poll late 1980's
dissection of the voting electorate into 11 factions, including "enterprisers" who were
affluent, highly educated, 99% white, 60% male, mostly married, and concentrated in the
suburbs, with strongly pro-business, anti-government, and anti-welfare spending
attitudes. At that time enterprisers made up 16% of all likely voters, and together with
"moralists" (roughly equivalent to the Christian Right), composed the core of the
Republican coalition. Since then the "moralist" faction has become even larger.) See
Laurie Goodstein, Mixing God and Politics Brings Out the Naysayers, WASH. POST, Mar.
27, 1995, at Al;
[The] best way to teach this recent period of U.S. history is to frame it
in the context of a civil war. On one side, you had the Republican
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Meeting all of this and keeping revenue effects in mind, the pay-go
principle, first used in deficit years and now in surplus years, encourages a
larger number of smaller provisions (limited temporally as well as by
numbers of taxpayers benefitted,267 just as Section 198 was until 2000)
with less revenue loss per provision. 268  Thus the Daley-Gore-Clinton
Party, which had been captured by the well-organized Christian right,
the gun lobby and corporate America. They tolerated no positions but
their own. On the other side, you had the Democrats, who represented
religious tolerance, gun control and labor. They, too, tolerated no
positions but their own, however much trouble they had finding them.
The Republicans represented white males (especially southern white
males), Bible-thumpers (not mutually exclusive) and tax-cutters. The
Democrats represented enlightened white males (mostly in the
Northeast), women and minorities. The schism ran deep along the fault
lines of religion, abortion rights, civil rights, personal responsibility vs.
government responsibility, and such basics as health care, the minimum
wage and child welfare.
Judy Mann, Future Victims of the Culture War, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2000, at C13; Cf.
Dana Milbank, Religious Right Finds Its Center in Oval Office: Bush Emerges as
Movement's Leader After Robertson Leaves Christian Coalition, WASH. POST, Dec. 24,
2001, at A2; Charles Krauthammer, Disqualified by His Religion?, WASH. POST, Jan. 19,
2001, at A37 (Christian Right numbers at least thirty million); Mark I. Pinsky, Religious
Views Can Tell About Political Views of a Person, Too, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 3,
2001, at G1.
267 Editorial, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1999, at A14 ("President Clinton's budget for the
coming fiscal year shows him to be-not surprisingly-a crowd-pleaser who offers a
little something for everyone but not a lot of any one thing to anyone.");
"This Administration, like the other administrations before it, has had a
habit of creating a whole bunch of boutique programs each year, and
taking a few dollars for this and a few dollars for that," Mr. Bond said.
"I have generally opposed creating more boutique programs until we
can fund the ones that already exist."
John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton Backs Environmental Power-Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 1999, at 1-1; Bill Lambrecht, EPA, Bond Disagree on Budget Proposals for the
Environment, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 1999, at A7 ("Sen. Christopher 'Kit'
Bond, R-Mo., sees red flags in the budget proposal and an abundance of 'boutique
programs'.... 'It sounds to me like the vice president has spent too much time traveling
abroad, living in government housing and going to conferences where they come up with
these boutique programs."').
268 [M]uch-heralded agreement [on the budget and taxes] makes only the
most marginal changes in the size of government and in national
priorities . . . . This is a minimalist agreement, a lowest-common-
denominator compromise .... Sharing power in Washington now-
and for the foreseeable future-is a thoroughly chastened Republican
congressional majority and an equally chastened Democratic president.
Cf Broder, supra note 244;
This deal is a political classic .... When the economy gets hot and
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policy entrepreneurship yielded some to the overall Clinton
entrepreneurship. In the end Section 198 as enacted in the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997269 was a severely limited symbolic provision of little
effect other than for the Clinton Administration to proclaim as evidence of
its friendship to the cities.
e. Window of Opportunity for Enactment of Broader Section 198
Opens for Republicans: 2000
By 1999 the ineffectiveness of Section 198 had become painfully
obvious, only two or three dozen sites had utilized it instead of the tens of
thousands originally estimated. 270 Before a 1999 House Ways & Means
revenue pours in, Democrats point to the good things the state can
spend money on, Republicans to the tax cuts they could pass .... [T]he
difference is split. Some money goes to programs, some to tax cuts...
• It happens that the federal budget was moving toward balance all by
itself.
Dionne, supra note 244;
[A] pale shadow of the tax cuts of more than $200 billion that
Republicans originally sought. Clinton and his Democratic allies
claimed victory in reshaping the tax cuts to include his priorities, such
as tax breaks for education and for working-poor families .... As the
product of political compromise, the tax bill looks more like a shopping
list, lacking the ideological clarity or sense of overriding purpose that
was seen in the 1986 tax-simplification bill or the 1981 tax cut that
carried out the theory of supply-side economics.
Janet Hook & Sam Fulwood III, Congress Passes Tax Cut, Spending Bills Easily, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 1997, at A16.
269 Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 94 1(a), 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
270 1999 Hearings on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, supra note 97, at 46 (statement of
D. Reid Wilson, Chief of Staff, EPA) ("The states have surveyed their localities. And we
have found thirty or forty of these sites, brownfield areas, have really been worked well
and are using the tax incentive."); id. at 65 (statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy
Analyst, Economic Development, Northeast-Midwest Institute) ("Only a couple of dozen
sites have used the incentive as of summer 1999 ...."). See also infra notes 349-53 and
accompanying text. Treasury still maintained that making Section 198 permanent would
return 18,000 brownfields to productive use over the next 10 years. 1999 Hearings on
Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, supra note 97, at 39 (written statement of Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Analysis Leonard Burman); see id. at 33 (written
statement of D. Reid Wilson, Chief of Staff, EPA) ("The Treasury Department estimates
that the $.3 billion incentive [making Section 198 permanent, but still limited to
empowerment zones] will leverage $3.4 billion in private investments and return some
8,000 brownfields to productive use."). Surely this is one of the worst cases of inaccurate
"painting by numbers." See Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 609, 611-13 (1995) (in Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts the
"overriding goal... [is] insuring specific annual revenue effects of proposed tax policy
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Subcommittee Hearing on the Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, the
Clinton Administration's Treasury representative rationalized that the
temporary nature of existing Section 198 had been designed "to encourage
faster clean-up of brownfields in targeted areas. But many taxpayers were
unable to take advantage of the incentive because environmental
remediation often extends over a number of years. For that reason the
Administration's budget proposed a permanent extension of the
Brownfields Tax Incentive . "271 Other witnesses agreed with the
advisability of a permanent extension of Section 198.272 Furthermore,
long-time Republican supporters of a brownfield cleanup tax incentive
advocated its extension beyond "empowerment zones," to the suburbs and
small towns. As Representative Nancy L. Johnson, R-Conn., who had
proposed a provision like Section 198 as early as 1996, put it:
Talk about urban-rural disadvantages. You know, a
brownfield site in a small town that may have only one or
two parcels that could possibly attract a new business with
jobs is just as much of a problem as a brownfield site in a
city. But because they are rarely in these empowerment
zones, they do not get the benefit of current law. So we
need to allow that deduction for all brownfields .... 273
Treasury also rationalized the "empowerment zone" limitation in
Section 198 to Representative Jerry Weller, R-1Il., another disbelieving
long-time advocate of a cleanup tax incentive:
Mr. Burman. Obviously, we would like to work with you
on the targeting of the tax incentive, to make sure it is
reaching its intended use. The Brownsfield Tax Incentive
changes over the 'budget period.' . .. [R]elying solely on five- or ten-year annual revenue
estimates and of fashioning tax legislation to achieve a particular result in a distribution
table creates an illusion of precision when such precision is impossible."). The suspicion
arises that at least by 1999, these estimates of tax expenditures were being cooked up to
allow bragging rights for aid to the cities.
271 1999 Hearings on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, supra note 97, at 36 (statement of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Analysis Leonard Burman).
272 Id. at 46 (statement of D. Reid Wilson, Chief of Staff, EPA) (EPA has not seen
Section 198 "used as much as the other brownfields programs." If it were made
permanent, "people will be more willing to get into it because they know it is going to be
there reliably in the future."); id. at 68 (written statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior
Policy Analyst, Economic Development, Northeast-Midwest Institute).
273 Id. at 18 (statement of Rep. Nancy L. Johnson, R-Conn.)
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was limited to the target areas, because in the higher-
income areas market incentives should result in properties
being redeveloped. The land is worth more than the cost of
remediation.
The real concern is that in high-poverty areas the
land, after being remediated might not be worth as much as
it cost to do the remediation.
Mr. Weller. You know, Mr. Burman, one thing I have
always found is that all of us, I think, as we drive through
communities, regardless of how prosperous they are, we all
have noticed that gas station that used to sit there that
closed a few years ago and that has never been
redeveloped. And of course, that is a brownfield. And that
is the cost of the financial liability of that clean-up.
And I just do not understand why we have a bias
against a middle-class community, or a community of any
other economic standard, on whether or not they could take
advantage of this tax incentive. The question I have is,
why not allow any community anywhere the opportunity to
use this tax incentive to revitalize and clean up abandoned
brownfields? 2
74
274 Id. at 48-49. ("[T]he first and most visible impact most likely will come from
development of the city's estimated 450 abandoned gasoline stations. Many of them are
in commercially desirable high-traffic areas but require an environmental cleanup
because of leakage from fuel storage tanks."); Doming, supra note 252. Abandoned
contaminated gas stations, however, are not covered by CERCLA apart from the new
definition of "brownfield." While lesser contamination by petroleum or petroleum
products is covered by the 2002 "brownfield" amendment to CERCLA granting
limitation of liability to innocent purchasers of brownfield sites, see supra notes 74-75
and accompanying text, the other CERCLA definitions (to which Section 198 cross
refers) are not changed. 147 CONG. REc. S3904 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2001) (remarks of
Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., sponsor of "Inhofe Amendment"-which extends the
brownfields definition to sites with a relativly low risk of contamination by petroleum or
petroleum products) ("Neither this nor any other provision of S. 350, in any way, alters
the exclusion of petroleum or petroleum products from the definition of 'hazardous
substance' under section 101 of CERCLA."); see also 147 CONG. REC. S3884, S3900,
S3896, S3903, H10,902-03. Thus, Section 198 still does not cover abandoned gas
stations, almost half of all brownfields. See supra note 75. Non-residential buildings
with friable asbestos (insulation) outnumber all brownfields by 400/-733,000 to
500,000. See infra note 315 and supra note 93 and accompanying text. Such buildings
with flooring containing asbestos outnumber brownfields 7 to 1. See supra text
accompanying note 94. Of course, these asbestos-containing buildings do not pose the
same environmental or societal risks as brownfields-such asbestos usually poses an
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Treasury danced around this question.275  (The Joint Committee Staff
provided the best economic analysis of the effect of targeting the
brownfield cleanup deduction.) 276  The answer was that the exclusion
appears based on politics, not policy. The Clinton Administration wanted
to be known as the friend of cities277 and Vice President Gore wanted to
campaign for President in 2000 as a2proponent of cleaning up urban
brownfields and preserving greenfields.
The EPA Chief of Staff also testified at these hearings that "we
have heard from States and others that to make this [tax incentive] more
broadly available we ought to look at changing the definition of what is a
hazardous substance, to include petroleum, asbestos, and lead paint ....
They certainly make good arguments as to how that would help them
clean up brownfields quicker.",279 EPA "was working with our colleagues
environmental problem only when the building is remodeled or demolished. However,
the issue of tax treatment of asbestos remediation should be much the same conceptually
as that of toxic or hazardous waste remediation. This was implicitly recognized in the
Weller and Johnson bills. See also supra note 97.
275 1999 Hearings on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, supra note 97, at 49 (Burman
responded that the Administration's proposed Better America Bonds has "a special
provision in the case where property is not worth the clean-up cost and is taken over by
the State or local government.").
276 With respect to environmental remediation, it is not clear that the
restriction to certain areas will lead to the most socially desirable
distribution of environmental remediation. It is possible that the same
dollar amount of expenditures for remediation in other areas could
produce a greater net social good, and thus the restriction to specific
areas diminishes overall efficiency. On the other hand, property
located in a nonqualifying area may have sufficient intrinsic value so
that environmental remediation will be undertaken absent a special tax
break. With respect to environmental remediation tax benefits as an
incentive for general business investment, it is possible that the
incentive may have the effect of distorting the location of new
investment, rather than increasing investment overall. If the new
investments are offset by less investment in neighboring, but not
qualifying, areas, the neighboring communities could suffer. On the
other hand, the increased investment in the qualifying areas could have
spillover effects that are beneficial to the neighboring communities.
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET PROPOSAL, JCS-4-98, at 25
tComm. Print 1998).
77 See supra notes 119, 212 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 106, 121 and accompanying text.
2791999 Hearings on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, supra note 97, at 31 (statement of
D. Reid Wilson, Chief of Staff, EPA); accord id. at 96 (statement of John S. Gates, Jr., on
behalf of the Real Estate Roundtable).
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at Treasury to see if that is indeed workable. 28 ° It again was not then
politically workable since such logical broadening would probably have
benefited suburbs more with buildings with indoor asbestos and lead
releases triggered by remodeling, as contrasted with large cities with
abandoned manufacturing plants and plenty of soil and especially ground
water pollution.
28 1
The 1999 Senate bill extended Section 198's coverage to suburban
and rural contaminated property and its effective date to June 30, 2004.282
The Conference bill and enacted legislation, however, just extended
Section 198's expiration date to 2001.283
Then in 2000, after Vice President Gore did not attain the
Presidency, Congress finally expanded Section 198 to apply to any area
"at or on which there has been a release (or threat of release) or disposal of
any hazardous substance" for which the taxpayer has received a statement
from the appropriate state agency that such area meets this requirement
and extended the sunset yet again to 2003.284 Now Section 198 clearly
reaches brownfields in the suburbs, towns, and rural areas and perhaps
will be extended by some states to indoor releases of asbestos and lead at
least where the waste is removed from the site. The survival and growth
of the program can be attributed to a blending of different programs-
some appealing to Democrats and others generally favored by
Republicans-into a single tax bill in 2000 and also the end of the political
need of the Clinton-Gore Administration to favor cities over suburbs. At
the same time the general 2000 anti-poverty initiative (which included the
280 Id. at 31 (statement of D. Reid Wilson, Chief of Staff, EPA).
281 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. News stories abound about urban
groundwater pollution. A Boolean search for "groundwater w/ 10 pollution w/ 10 city" on
March 6, 2002 resulted in 56 hits (4 before 1990).
282 The Committee would like to see more so-called "brownfield" sites
brought back into productive use in the economy. Cleaning up such
sites mitigates potential harms to public health and can help revitalize
affected communities. The Committee seeks to encourage the clean up
of contaminated sites. To achieve this goal, the Committee believes it
is necessary to make two modifications to present law. First, it is
necessary to expand the set of brownfield sites that may claim the tax
benefits of expensing beyond the relatively narrow class of sites
identified in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Second, it is necessary
to permit taxpayers more time to avail themselves of the tax benefits of
expensing.
S. REP. No. 106-201, at 17 (1999).
283 Taxpayer Relief Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 511, 113 Stat. 1860 (1999).
284 I.R.C. § 198(c)(1)(B) and (3); Pub. L. No. 106-554, § l(a)(7), 114 Stat. 2763A-625
(2000) (enacting § 162(a) of H.R. 5662).
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brownfields legislation) promoted by President Clinton and House
Speaker Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., "survived because it was one of the few
trophies the Republicans could stand to let Clinton walk away with."285 In
short, after the city brownfields, a beneficiary of Democrat sentiments,
had enjoyed a three-year window of opportunity, it was time to remove the
competitive advantage enjoyed by the cities and allow the suburbs to reap
the same tax incentive as to their brownfields, which was done
contemporaneously with a variety of social and economic programs for
"renewal communities. ' 286
The brownfields news stories in 1999-2000 do not follow the
garbage can/policy entrepreneurship pattern of earlier years, which here
would be recognition of the problem of brownfields outside inner cities,
linking the policy of extending Section 198 to such exurban sites with
recognition of the problem, and a window of political opportunity for
enacting such extension. In 1999 brownfield news stories mostly dealt
with Clinton and Gore's "smart growth" policy (or cleaning up
brownfields and preserving greenfields as under Clinton's proposed
"Better American Bonds Incentive") 287 and occasionally state programs.
2 88
In 2000 brownfield stories naturally focused on environmental
promises and records of the candidates in Gore's and Bush's Presidential
campaigns,289 as well as general brownfield cleanup stories290 and the
285 David Naher & Lori Nitshke, Modest Tax Deal Passes, 58 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2860
(Dec. 16, 2000) ("The survival of the community renewal package was motivated in part
by Clinton's desire to bolster his legacy and in part by Hastert's gentle prodding."). See
also id. at 2919; Lawmakers Clear Modest Tax Deal, 56 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1841 (2000).
286 See infra note 287.
287 Over the next two years, the money will be used to help local and state
governments develop "smart growth" programs to direct development
away from suburban sprawl and toward cities or village-like
concentrations that preserve open space and reduce people's
dependence on cars .... Al Gore is making efforts to stop sprawl a key
thrust of his 2000 presidential campaign. He and President Clinton, in
their new budget proposal issued yesterday, proposed a "livable
communities initiative" with federal money to buy open space.
Peter J. Howe, EPA Takes on Sprawl in Region, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1999, at Bl;
Peter E. Howard, EPA Chief Endorses Clinton Bond Initiative, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 3,
1999, at 3 ("Seizing on the popularity of the New Urbanism sweeping the country,
President Clinton's budget proposal is pushing an ambitious bond program to help
communities stunt sprawl and preserve sensitive lands.").
288 Joe Hallett, The Voinovich Years 1991-1998, PLAIN DEALER (Sun. Mag.), Jan. 3,
1999, at 8; Tom Daykin, Brownfields Development Gets a Boost, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Jan. 1, 1999, at 1.
289 Francine Kiefer, Green Issues Alter Campaign Climate, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
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familiar topic of new state laws encouraging brownfield remediation.291
Just one story mentions the proposed extension of the federal brownfields
tax incentive.
292
In conclusion, the amendment in 2000 of Section 198 to cover any
contaminated site so certified by the state is not the classic garbage can
model of linking a policy idea (apply to brownfields anywhere) with
problem recognition (brownfields everywhere 293). Instead it is much more
of an unfinished Republican "Public Choice" agenda of taking care of
non-poverty areas in small towns, suburbs, and even rural areas294  all
more Republican areas than inner cities and poverty areas-and waiting
for the window of political opportunity to open for them, which occurred
in 2000 after the November election. 295
4. Symbolism
Apr. 21, 2000, at 3; Jena Heath, Campaign 2000: Bush Urges Renewal of Old Industrial
Sites, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 4, 2000, at B5; Bush Outlines Plans to Clean Up
Contaminated Areas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 4, 2000, at A11; Glen Martin, It's
No Contest on Green Issues: Gore's Record Gives Him Crucial Edge Over Bush, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 5, 2000, at A10; Editorial, Yes to a Brownfields Bill, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
2000, at A30; Mark Z. Barabak, Campaign 2000. Bush Would Overhaul U.S.
Environmental Laws, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2000, at 1; Joby Warrick, Bush's
Environmental Plan Treads on Gore's Key Turf, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2000, at A6; Ron
Hutcheson & Tish Wells, Bush Has Four Years to Put Promises to Test, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Dec. 17, 2000, at A10; cf. Eric Pianin, Lott Under Pressure on Superfund
Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2000, at A2.
290 Dave Simanoff, Brown Is Beautiful, TAMPA TRIB., June 26, 2000, at 8.
291 Tom Daykin, Brownfield Boon: City Uses Law to Sell Polluted Sites Minus Cleanup
Hassle, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 21, 2000, at Dl; Editorial, Solving the
Brownfields Puzzle, BALT. SUN, June 2, 2000, at A26; Sewell Chan, Brownflelds
Measure Raises Hopes of Greener Pastures, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at J3; Matt
Schwartz, City Deemed a Leader in Reuse of Tainted Land, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 28,
2000, at A21.
292 Tax Breaks Are on Way To Aid Development, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 17,
2000, at A7.
293 Indeed, brownfields outside the inner cities never were "recognized" in the media as a
problem. They were a problem mostly to Republican legislators. See supra notes 273-74
and accompanying text. The floor debate on the Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act, however, reveals that Democrats who represented rural
states with brownfields, particularly mine-scarred sites or states with both urban and rural
brownfields (especially abandoned gas stations), supported such broadening as well. 147
CONG. REC. S3889 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev.); 147
CONG. REC. H10,900 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001) (remarks of Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr, D-
N.J.).
294 Cf 147 CONG. REC. H10,900; 147 CONG. REC. S3890.
295 See supra notes 122-24 and 284 and accompanying text.
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Political science literature utilizes "symbolism" to mean
demonizing "political enemies" in political discourse, such as "economic
royalists" by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the 1930's.296
Professor Mark Leff reasons that symbolism tends to deflect and reassure
reform seekers, or at least the populace.297 Thus FDR's populist rhetoric
undermined any true individual taxation reform efforts. In fashioning this
thesis, Leff tells the story of FDR espousing soak-the-rich income tax
policies particularly after 1935, while in fact regressive excise taxes
actually raised from the masses even more revenues 298 compared to "class
tax" individual income tax revenues derived from between five percent
and ten percent of income earners during the New Deal era.299 Congress
296 See generally MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM (1984); Ronald
Brownstein, Parties Defined by Where They See the Enemies, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1996,
at Al.
297 LEFF, supra note 296, at 2-3, 288-93. Mass tax and class tax are, of course, derived
from Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the
Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1988)
(chronicling expansion of individual income taxation during World War II).
During times of crises, as mentioned above, the top marginal rate did
indeed increase. But the domain of these highest rates was so limited,
at first, that they were little more than symbolic. The symbolism
served an important purpose. The top marginal rate bracket attracted
public attention. Due in part to the prominence and in part to the
tendency to equate marginal with effective rates, the typical citizen
might have thought, erroneously, that the tax system was steeply
progressive, and that the truly rich were paying most of their income to
the government. (Interestingly, studies have shown a tendency on the
part of citizens to equate the actual highest marginal tax rate with the
ethically appropriate or "just" one.) This belief in the burdens borne by
the very rich might have made the people's own tax burdens appear to
be less painful. Further, the device allowed Congress later to increase
taxes without raising the highest rate bracket, simply by extending the
reach of the highest bracket downward. The ratchetting-up of the top
rate was a "foot in the door" phenomenon. Thus, in 1942, with the
revenue demands of World War II escalating, the top bracket was
raised from 81 to 88 0/o-a rather minor change. But the income level at
which this bracket kicked in plummeted, from five million
($5,000,000) to two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000)-a
staggering drop. This move was in part non-prominent, because the
citizenry had already digested the fact of high marginal tax rates.
Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1892-93
1994).
99 Leff's elegant thesis is undercut factually in part by the story of FDR's ill-fated 1936
tax on undistributed corporate profits, which "was an integration provision intended to
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in the earlier Mellon-dominated Roaring 1920's knew that fact.30 0 In the
later WWII 1940's the federal income tax for the first time raised more
revenue than regressive consumption and property taxes.
30
'
President Clinton consistently and successfully used symbolism
(e.g., the failure of trickle down in 1992302 and Republican attacks on the
environment in 1995-1996303) and then pushed for enactment of
incremental pilot projects with small costs.3  The effect is the same as
symbolic reform, the small pilot project legislation tends to lessen the
pressure for complete resolution of the problem.
The 1997 version of Section 198 indisputably was intended to be
such a small pilot project and hence symbolic reform.30 5 Mayor Daley, the
force out as dividends otherwise low-taxed (12.5% to 15%) corporate profits so they
would go through the individual high 'tax mill' (which again had been raised to seventy-
five percent at the top)." See John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the
Business Tax Entities Universe: "Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do, "
78 TEX. L. REv. 885, 951 (2000). The corporate profits were forced out, but the high-
income individual shareholders by-and-large avoided, if not evaded, taxation on them.
Id. at 958. Had this reform provision produced its desired end, the individual income tax
would have yielded far more revenue and hardly would have been symbolic.
300 For a long period of years we have relied on a limited rather than a
general income tax. We have become accustomed to high exemptions
and very low rates on the smaller taxable incomes .... Moreover, it
must not be forgotten that the real burden of taxation in this country is
due for the most part to local and State taxes, and they are borne,
generally, by people of small and moderate incomes. (Mills had been a
member of the House Ways & Means Committee in the early 1920's).
Lee, supra note 266, at 1394-95 (citing Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1932 Before the
Senate Comm.on Finance, 72nd Cong., 3 (1932) (statement of Secretary of the Treasury
Ogden Mills)). Mills had been a member of the House Ways & Means Committee in the
early 1920's.
301 Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion
of the Income Tax During World War I, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 689 nn.17-19 and
accompanying text (1988).
302 Lee, supra note 266, at 1397 ("The ultimate triumph of this [trickle-down] rhetoric
was the successful 1992 Clinton presidential campaign.").
303 See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
304 See supra note 267 and accompanying text
305 Still another meaning of "symbolic legislation" is legislation that, rather than
balancing competing concerns in setting standards, addresses a single overriding concern,
which causes difficulties in implementing such a statute with costs grossly
disproportionate to its benefits. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic
Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 234 (1990) ("the enactment of symbolic legislation
reflects a breakdown of the legislative policymaking machinery, a system that all too
frequently addresses real social problems in an unrealistic fashion," speaking to the Clean
Air Act among others).
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original policy entrepreneur of a brownfield remediation tax incentive
limited to urban areas (excluding greenfields) testified, in response to a
question as to the number of sites his proposal would cover in light of the
500,000 brownfield sites nationwide, that "this is a limited proposal that
deals with some large urban areas and some smaller towns and rural areas
on a four- or five-year commitment. The bill is really job creation and
economic development." 30 6 He then agreed with the presiding committee
member's observation that "it really becomes something like a pilot
project. 30 7 The pilot project aspect is borne out by the story of Treasury
estimates of the number of cites that would be remediated under Section
198-in 1996 30,000 sites;30 8 and in 1999, after some experience, only
18,000 over the next decade if Section 198 were made permanent. 30 9 The
ultimate proof of Section 198 being merely symbolic reform is that at a
1999 hearing a witness testified, and EPA and GAO data agreed, that from
1997 "only a couple of dozen sites have used the brownfield expensing
incentive as of summer, 1999.,,310
Prior to the millennial projected budget surpluses (now gone 311), it
was politically difficult to increase spending programs; therefore, the
Clinton Administration was largely limited to new tax expenditures.
There too the Administration chose incremental initiatives, not only
targeted, but also with sunsets to limit costs.312 (The post-facto Treasury
30 1993 House Hearings (Part 1), supra note 160, at 846 (statement of Chicago Mayor
Richard Daley).3 0 7 Id. (colloquy between Rep. Andy Jacobs, Jr., D-Ind., and Mayor Richard Daley).
308 Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Press Briefing on a New Brownfields Tax
Incentive, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Mar. 11, 1996) ($2 billion
cost and 30,000 sites over 7 years), available at 96 TNT 50-31 (Mar. 11, 1996); Zremski,
supra note 255; Shogren, supra note 37; Clinton Proposes Tax Incentives, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 11, 1996, at Cl ("The White House said the program would make cleanup expenses
fully deductible in the year they are spent and could return to productive use as many as
30,000 'brownfields' in the United States.").
309 1999 Hearings on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, supra note 97, at 37, 39
tstatement of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Analysis Leonard Burman).
Io d. at 65, 68 (statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Economic
Development, Northeast-Midwest Institute). Accord id. at 46 ("30 to 40 of these sites")
(colloquy between Rep. Jennefer Dunn, R-Wash., and EPA Chief of Staff D. Reid
Wilson); see infra notes 349-53 and accompanying text for a GAO study to similar effect
and Congressional reaction.
311 Richard W. Stevenson, The Nation: Vicious Cycles- Which Will Recover First: The
Economy or the Politicians?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at 4-5 ("[A] relatively shallow
recession, after a decade of growth, has led to the abrupt disappearance of the projected
budget surplus.").
312 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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rationalization that Section 198 "was designed to be temporary, to
encourage faster clean-up of brownfields in target areas," '313 had the
opposite effect since "environmental remediation often extends over a
number of years."314)
B. Brownfields: Political Rhetoric and Reality
1. Brownfield Rhetoric: City vs. Suburb
There are between 450,000 and 500,000 brownfield sites
nationwide,315 which often do contain asbestos concentrations as
evidenced in Congressional testimony 316 and a recent tax decision.
317
313 1999 Hearings on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, supra note 97, at 36 (statement of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Analysis Leonard Burman).
314 Id.; accord id. at 31, 46, 65, and 68 (statements of EPA Chief of Staff, several
members of Congress, and Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Economic
Development, Northeast-Midwest Institute); 147 CONG. REC. S3884, S3886, S3887,
S3891, H10,902, H10,903, H10,904.
315 147 CONG. REC. H10,899 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001) (remarks of Paul E. Gillmor, R-
Oh.) (chief sponsor of H.R. 2869, Small Business Liability Protection Act); 143 CONG
REC. H2652 (daily ed. May 14, 1997) (remarks of Rep. Christopher Shays, R-Conn.)
Earlier the General Accounting Office ("GAO") estimated between 150,000 and 500,000
brownfield sites nationally. 1993 House Hearings (Part 1), supra note 160, at 846
(statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Economic Development,
Northeast-Midwest Institute); Anne Slaughter Andrew, Brownfields Redevelopment: A
State-Led Reform of Superfund Liability, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 27 (1996); Lesley
Wright, Hitting Pay Dirt: Spurred by More Lenient Policies, Developers Are Buying
Blighted Sites and Turning Them into Profitable Real Estate, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1996,
at DI ("Developers and government officials estimate there are as many as 500,000
'environmentally challenged' sites throughout the United States, many near freeways and
in other prime urban locations."); accord Ann Scott Tyson, A City Creates Jobs on
Abandoned Lots, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 20, 1995, at 4 (mainly in cities in the
Rust Belt, which dominated manufacturing from 1880 to 1950); Urban Land
Reclamation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Env't and Aviation of the House
Comm. on Science, Space, and Tech., 103rd Cong. 26 (1994) (500,000 brownfield sites
according to Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst for Economic Development of the
Northeast-Midwest Institute); David Markell, The Federal Superfund Program:
Proposals for Strengthening the Federal-State Relationship, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL.
L. 1, 27 (1993) (Rep. Michael Synar, D-Okla., estimates between 130,000 and 450,000
brownfield sites nationwide).
316 1993 House Hearings (Part 1), supra note 160, at 831 (statement of Chicago Mayor
Richard Daley) ("problems include asbestos filled rubble, underground storage tanks, and
hazardous waste").
317 Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 1999), aff'd, 219
F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2000).
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Approximately 200,000 of these sites are primarily contaminated with
petroleum. 318 Policy entrepreneurship in Congress links brownfields with
greenfields or undeveloped land outside the cities: (a) potential
environmental cleanup liability, and (b) conventional tax wisdom
regarding the non-deductibility of environmental cleanup costs by a
purchaser of a brownfield-in "a strange twist of logic" 31 9-- compared to
an industrial property owner who having environmentally contaminated its
property may deduct in one tax year the cost of remediation, creates
"inequitable" incentives 32  for companies to locate and develop in
greenfields, generally in the suburbs. "[U]rban flight contributes to urban
sprawl, taking jobs away from the city. It also results in the paving off of
many of the greenfield areas of our country." 321 Thus, the need for a tax
incentive, enacted in 1997, creating a competitive advantage for the
brownfields. But by 2000, apparently after the "brownfield rush" of the
late 1990's had been completed, it was time to return the competing areas
to parity. This even playing field was accomplished by rejecting the
conventional wisdom regarding the non-deductibility of environmental
cleanup costs and expanding the brownfield-type deductions to the
greenfields. Thus, the logic shifted from creating an economic incentive
to create jobs to promoting ecological improvements.
2. Brownfield Facts on the Ground
Brownfield versus greenfield rhetoric overlooks that many
contaminated sites exist in suburbs as well as rural areas, too. 322
318 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
319 143 CONG. REC. S8556 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1997) (remarks of Senator Carol Moseley-
Braun, D-Ill.).
320 Id. at S360 (remarks of Senator Alfonse D'Amato, R-N.Y.) Actually the ground
water cleanup costs-to the extent they relate to a pumping station-are capitalizable and
depreciable, and the purchaser cleaning up land contamination as contrasted with a
building or equipment would not be able to depreciate these costs to the extent she had
discounted her purchase price for such anticipated costs. In any event, environmental
liability rules rather than tax rules drive the selection of greenfield over brownfield
development. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 66, at 914. (maintaining that
neither the tax nor the environmental liability rule apply to unknowing, innocent
urchasers in some cases.).
143 CONG. REC. S 8556 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1997) (remarks of Senator Carol Moseley-
Braun, D-Ill.); accord id. at S860 (remarks of Rep. Jeffords, R-Vt.) ("Most of these
[brownfield] sites were abandoned during the 1970's and 1980's, as industrial
development migrated away from urban areas to the greener landscape of the suburbs.").
322 See supra notes 122, 273-74 and accompanying text.
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Recycling suburban sites would also save paving over true green space,
but would serve different political constituencies than supporters of
brownfield remediation. The urban areas with brownfields have far
greater minority constituencies and patterns of Democratic voting.
323
White males in the suburban areas, particularly in the Sun Belt and
most recently, in the South in general have tended to vote Republican at
all levels. 324 Since 1992 suburban voters have outnumbered urban voters
nationally.325 Moreover, in both the 1992 and 1993 presidential election
suburban women voters have constituted the swing constituency in
Clinton's electoral victories.326 At first blush this would suggest that a
brownfield provision targeted primarily to urban sites and excluding
suburban sites would not be enacted, particularly by a Republican
controlled Congress. Tax bills by and large are up or down votes. A form
327
of "log rolling" took place. In 1997 Republicans obtained a renewed
capital- gains preference while President Clinton obtained a number of
323 See Nancey Green Leigh & Robert Gradeck, Urban Neighborhood Demographics
Associated with Environmentally Suspect, Tax-Delinquent Properties: Equity and
Redevelopment Implications, 25 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 61 (1996); Vogel, supra note
205 ("Whether or not they started out that way, the areas now home to the most industrial
blight are often poor, minority neighborhoods."); Neal R. Peirce, $300 Million to Clean
up Brownfields, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 3, 1996, at 1 iB; Neal R. Peirce, How
Superfund Stifles Urban Recovery, BALT. SUN, May 2, 1994, at 9A.
John W. Lee, Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15 VA.
TAx REV. 1, 27-28 & n.108 (1995).
325 Karen M. Paget, Can Cities Escape Political Isolation?, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan-
Feb. 1998, at 54; David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs, NEW DEMOCRAT, May 1992, at
17; William Schneider, The Suburban Century Begins: The Real Meaning of the 1992
Election, THE ATLANTIC, July 1992, at 33; David Rohde, Future of 'New' Democrats
Tested in Pennsylvania Race, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 1, 1994, at 3; Adam
Nagourney, Power of the Suburbs, USA TODAY, June 1, 1992, at IA; Renee Loth,
Citifying Suburbia: It Isn't What It Was, US Census Figures Show, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
3, 1991, at B17.
326 Michael Tackett, Clinton Could Turn Treaty Defeat Into Political Victory, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 17, 1999, at C5; see Robert L. Borosage, Politics: Kindred Fates-The Clinton,
Nixon Cases, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, at Ml (Clinton "identified constituencies-
suburban women, Latinos and low-income voters-vital to a new majority. He has
pushed a strategy-a politics aimed at the suburbs-that fit the changing times."); Marie
Cocco, Clinton Makes Suburbs Safe for Dems, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6, 1996, at A47.
327 Figiniski, supra note 247. Misjoinder of subjects in a bill subject to a single up or
down vote is a form of log-rolling, id. at 372, which is more common in tax legislation
than actual explicit bargaining. In omnibus budget reconciliation acts, however, with
bargaining sessions between administration leaders and bi-partisan Congressional leaders
from both houses, explicit bargaining is the norm.
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lesser provisions including Section 198.328
According to some commentators, the perception of potential
environmental liability for cleaning up pre-purchase contamination is by
far the greater disincentive to purchase brownfields than adverse tax rules
or any tax incentive such as Section 198.329 "While fears of
environmental liabilities and costs of environmental compliance are
factors contributing to brownfields abandonment, a cause-and-effect
attribution is in error. Brownfield sites are the product of many
interrelated phenomena, many of which are unrelated to environmental
laws. 330  For instance, losses of jobs in cities and often creation of
brownfields as well were due in large part to loss of the manufacturing
base, especially in the cities of the Northeast and old Midwest, with the
manufacturing jobs going oversees not to nearby suburbs.331 Conversely,
328 "The origin of the Act was an agreement by the Republican leadership to provide the
Clinton Administration with increased funding for education and child care in exchange
for their long sought-after tax cuts." TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 1997, supra note 244;
Martin A. Sullivan, Capital Gains 1997: Old Issues for a New Congress, 74 TAX NOTES
124 (1997). This agreement was subject to much valid criticism. See, e.g., Broder,
supra note 244; see also Dionne, supra note 244.
329 Mistick Construction... knows only too well about being an "innocent
land owner." Mistick purchased an acre of land 10 years ago on the
North Side. Before constructing an eight-story apartment building for
handicapped individuals, an environmental assessment of the site was
conducted. It was discovered that soil at the site had been
contaminated by gasoline. Despite the fact that Mistick had nothing to
do with the contamination, the state required that Mistick be
responsible for all sub- surface investigations, sampling and
monitoring. Hundreds of thousands of dollars later, the property
remains vacant and unproductive .... By the time the environmental
issues were resolved, the feasibility of the project was doubtful and the
project was abandoned.
Peterson, supra note 173; John Mangels, Report Due on Revival of Sites: Cleanups at
Old Plants Seen as Vital, PLAIN DEALER, July 13, 1993, at B1 ("Critics say a buyer has to
make tainted land clean enough for children to play on, even if the owner plans to open a
factory there. Thus, lenders are reluctant to lend and buyers are reluctant or unable to
buy old urban industrial sites. They opt instead for virgin suburban lands called
'greenfields,' taking jobs and tax dollars with them.").
330 William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional
Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 6 (1997) (footnote omitted).
331 Federal, state and local policies and programs destroyed urban
neighborhoods around the country and at the same time made moving
to the suburbs easy. The GI Bill, interstate highways, high-density
public housing, school desegregation policies and the change from an
industrial economy to an information, distribution and retail economy
moved middle- and upper-class families out of the nation's major cities
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the growth of new buildings and jobs in the suburbs reflected in part the
growth in the service and knowledge industries.332 According to The
Economist, the more recent boomlet in U.S. center city growth, while
accompanied by various tax incentives and some direct grants, appears
due to dropping urban crime rates and demographics.333
When the cost of the cleanup is known, the price charged the
purchaser would be reduced so that the seller actually bears the burden of
the cleanup costs, and the property can be sold. However, if the cost of
the cleanup is greater than the value of the land after the cleanup, the
property is unsalable, absent a deduction for those costs. The combination
of uncertainty of the amount of the liability and infeasibility of cleanup
has led to the abandonment of sites in urban brownfields and non-payment
of real estate taxes resulting in the local municipal owership of most local
brownfield sites.334 The obvious test of the effectiveness of Section 198
will be whether the suburban and rural areas experience a boom in cleanup
efforts in the years 2000-2003 under the recent amendments to the law.
C. Section 198: Into the Maelstrom
Section 198 provides a temporary (now for six years from its
effective date of January 1, 1998 until a twice-extended sunset, currently
December 31, 2003) ordinary deduction for otherwise capitalizable costs
of abatement or control, i.e., remediation, of hazardous substances
incurred in connection with a "qualified contaminated site."
Contaminated site means a business or investment property at which there
has been a release (or threat of release) or disposal of any "hazardous
substance, '' 335 which in turn is defined by cross reference to CERCLA
and into outlying areas, taking with them much-needed tax revenues for
schools, police, fire protection and other services.
Maureen McAvey, St. Louis Region: The Doughnut and the Hole, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 30, 1996, at 19C.
332 Id.
333 Aren't City Centres Great?, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, at 23 (focusing on
pojpulation increase).
3 See Tom Barnes, Stringent U.S. Industrial Waste Cleanup Laws Hit, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 10, 1994, at CI ("[C]ity government was 'the largest owner of
contaminated property-brownfields-in Pittsburgh."'); Tom Uhlenbrock, For Sale:
10,000 Parcels Of City-Owned Property, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 20, 1996, at
Al (explaining that St. Louis has taken in a multitude of real estate, including a cemetery,
through tax foreclosure, with title to a sixth of the city).
135 I.R.C. § 198(c)(1)(A) (2001).
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336Section 101(14) or 102. Unfortunately, this cross reference does not
pick up the subsequent "brownfield site" amendments enacted in 2002 to
CERCLA, which add, for purposes of eliminating liability of innocent
purchasers, a definition of "brownfield site"337 including, in addition to
hazardous substances contamination by controlled substances (e.g.,
methamphetamine labs 338), low-risk petroleum or petroleum products
contaminated sites (e.g., abandoned gas stations), and mine-scarred
land.339 An obvious remedy is to change the Section 198 cross reference
to "brownfield site" instead of to "hazardous substance." The 1997
legislative' history to Section 198 also adds that the definitions of
hazardous substances are "subject to additional limitations applicable to
asbestos and similar substances within buildings. ' 34°  This rules out
application of Section 198 to indoor emissions of asbestos, etc. In short,
the only change here in 2000 was that "qualified site" now means a
contaminated site in an area designated by the appropriate state agency as
contaminated, rather than just in a "targeted" area; unfortunately
contamination was not also broadened.
Under a conceptually correct interpretation of tax law principles
the scope of Section 198 should be quite narrow, for it applies only to
remediation costs otherwise capitalizable. We believe that remediation
costs, incurred by a purchaser should be capitalized only where the
taxpayer discounted the purchase price for the contaminated property to
take account of the anticipated cleanup costs. In that case the rule of
parity and the deferred purchase price concept requires that when incurred
the anticipated costs be treated as part of the purchase price of as it
happens non-depreciable land (Remediation costs exceeding the fair
market value of the property after cleanup might be currently deductible as
336 Id. § 198(d)(1). The first section cross refers to a number of other environmental
protection acts and the latter delegates to EPA regulations the task of defining hazardous
substances.
337See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
338 In California, we have a terrible problem from the production of
methamphetamine. It turns out that this terribly dangerous drug is not
only illegal, not only does it destroy people-destroy people-but the
byproduct of methamphetamine production is a toxic stew of lye,
hydriodic acid, and red phosphorus. These elements threaten the
groundwater and agricultural lands of the Central Valley and elsewhere
in California where these secret methamphetamine labs are sited.
147 CONG. REC. S3891 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Barbara Boxer, D-
Cal.).
339See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
340 H.R. REP. No. 105-34, at 487 (1997).
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a loss realized under Section 165341). Where the purchaser did not
discount her purchase price for the costs of cleaning up contaminated land,
however, they should be deductible due to the lack of depreciation.
342
United Dairy Farmers, Inc. erroneously holds to the contrary.
The current or ordinary deduction under Section 198 is
recapturable under Section 1245 as if it were a depreciation of tangible
personal property,343 which is sound as a matter of tax policy. The tax
gain equal to the amount of such deduction would not have arisen on the
sale had the remediation costs been capitalized. In 1960, President John F.
Kennedy proposed "recapture" of depreciation as to tangible personal
property used in a trade or business upon its sale or exchange, i.e.,
recharacterization of otherwise capital gain under Section 1231 as
ordinary income to the extent of prior depreciation allowances taken as
ordinary deductions, 3 " in order to eliminate "the opportunity which now
exists of converting ordinary income into capital gains." 345 Precisely the
same abuse would be possible under Section 198 but for the recapture
provision. This recapture provision creates, however, another disparity
between a taxpayer taking a deduction for remediation costs under Section
198 and under Section 162. For such statutory recapture is limited to
deductions claimed under Section 198.346 In contrast, environmental
cleanup costs deducted under the tax common law347 would not be subject
to "recapture" (due, however, to a failure of the tax benefit doctrine348 ).
341 See infra notes 474-509 and accompanying text.
342 See infra notes 471-79 and accompanying text.
343 I.R.C. § 198(e).
344 Revising Tax on Gains from Sales of Depreciable Personal Property: Hearings on
H.R. 10491 and H.R. 10492 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong.
1960).
45 Id. at 3 (statement of Secretary of Treasury Robert B. Anderson).
3 46 H.R. REP. No. 105-220, at 1299 (1997) (Conference Report).
347 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997, JCS-23-97, at 133, 136 (Comm. Print 1997) ("Congress
clarified that providing current deductions for certain environmental remediation
expenditures under the Act creates no inference as to the proper treatment of other
remediation expenditures not described in the Act.").
348 Statutory recapture constitutes a partial codification of the tax benefit doctrine. See
Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370, 386 n.20 (1983). A fundamental
difference is that statutory recaptures apply automatically upon certain dispositions of the
property as to which the recapturable deductions were taken, whereas the tax benefit
doctrine requires a year two event fundamentally inconsistent with the assumption upon
which the year one deduction was taken. Id. at 383-85. If the "repair" remediation
deduction is based upon the restoration principle, a year two disposition would not appear
inconsistent with the year one deduction. If, however, the year one deduction were based
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Section 198 has rarely been utilized by taxpayers. EPA estimated
that as of the end of 1999 only twenty to thirty sites had been designated
nationwide.349 The General Accounting Office in a 2000 study of five
states "operating some of the largest or most innovative brownsfields
programs in the nation" 350 found that only twenty-three sites had been
certified under Section 198 as of August 31, 2000."5' Senator Robert
Torricelli, D-N.J., noted this in the floor debate on the "Small Business
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act."
352
In August of 1997, this body approved a potentially
significant brownfields tax incentive. This tax incentive,
referred to as the "expensing provision," allowed new
owners of these contaminated sites to write cleanup costs
off their taxes in the year they were deducted. This allows
for increased cashflow for redevelopment projects.
Surprisingly, despite the potential advantage of this
expensing provision, there have been relatively few takers.
A GAO study reported in December of 2000 that in
New Jersey there had been only three development projects
which had even applied for this tax benefit. Developers
told me they are discouraged from using the provision
because of the provision's indefinite future and the
exclusion of brownfield sites containing petroleum. There
is simply no incentive for real estate developers to
complete projects and market them quickly if the tax
benefit they have derived is going to be taxed as ordinary
income at 39.6 percent rather than capital gains at 20
percent.
The financial impact of that reality is very
upon the distortion of income arising from no or slow depreciation, i.e., recovery of the
remediation cost, as this Article advocates, then a year two disposition not too long after
year one would have avoided such distortion by allowing a recovery against the proceeds
of the disposition. In such circumstances tax common law recapture would be
a ]ropriate.
See supra note 310.
350 GAO, BROWNFIELDS; INFORMATION ON THE PROGRAMS OF EPA AND SELECTED
STATES 3 (GAO-01-52 2000) (Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin).
351 Id. at 34 (three each in Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey, six in
Pennsylvania, and eight in Wisconsin).
352 See supra note 74.
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significant. 353
While these reasons, especially the inapplicability of Section 198
to petroleum contamination, may be significant factors in the scant use of
Section 198 to date, probably a greater factor is that the cost of
remediation is often more than the value of the land after the cleanup.
354
The cost of cleanup is often four times the cost of site preparation for a
comparable sized lot that is uncontaminated.355 The ideal tax answer to
this problem would be to make the excess of such costs over the value
after remediation into a tax credit, offsetting dollar for dollar such excess
against federal income taxes. In such a regime the cost up to the value
after remediation should be capitalized, just as the cost of a greenfield and
the site preparation costs are capitalized and usually not depreciable. The
potentially huge revenue losses from such a tax credit (over the deduction
for such excess losses that should be allowed under a sound interpretation
of tax principles 3 6 should be measured against the societal benefits of
direct EPA grants.
353 147 CONG. REC. S3900 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Robert Torricelli,
D-NJ). Much the same arguments were made in the 1999 Hearings on Impact of Tax
Law on Land Use, supra note 97, at 65, 68 (prepared statement of Charles Bartsch,
Senior Policy Analyst, Economic Development, Northeast-Midwest Institute); id. at 31,
46, 48 (statement of D. Reid Wilson, Chief of Staff, EPA).
Mary Sit, Making Hazardous-Waste Sites Saleable: New Agreement Protects New
Owners and Encourages Recycling Contaminated Properties, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26,
1994, at 43 ("Sites we want to really clean up might have such a high cost of cleanup-
even if you got the property for nothing, it may still cost too much to acquire .... )
(quoting David I. Begelfer, Executive Director of the National Association of Industrial
and Office Properties) (reporting on Massachusetts' "clean site initiative," a state pilot
program ensuring a new owner of no liability for future hazardous waste clean-ups of
contamination existing at purchase); Vogel, supra note 205 ("'1 think cost of cleanup is
still a great impediment,' said Edmund Frost, president of Clean Sites Inc. 'Before
brownfields are solved, we're really going to have to dig deeper to find new ways to
eliminate urban contamination and end urban sprawl,' he added.").
355 While the unremediated brownfield may be available at little or no cost, "total site
costs per acre for long-time industrial sites in inner city areas can be quadruple those of a
site of the same size in a new exurban development . . . .The mere presence of
contamination has increased lending costs-more than three-fold in real dollar terms
since 1980." Hearing on Impact of Tax Law on Land Use Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 66 (1996) (written
statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Economic Development, Northeast-
Midwest Institute).
356 See infra notes 471-509 and accompanying text.
357 Cf Abouhaka, supra note 252 (arguing that it makes good sense to offer federal and
state tax breaks to cleanup brownfields, but "costs-and longterm benefits-to taxpayers
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In short, the tax common law as to asbestos remediation costs will
continue to be determinative for many purchasers with serious
environmental problems but not of the type that fit the definition of a
"qualified contaminated site" (in particular, indoor friable asbestos and
abandoned gas stations). Unfortunately in these wide areas where Section
198 is not determinative, as well as in the case of an owner of self-created
contamination (to which Section 198 can never apply), as to remediation
undertaken in connection with a general plan of rehabilitation or which
adapts the previously contaminated site to a new use, "doubt" 358 remains
as to the deductibility of expenses incurred. A prime and frequent
example is removing or otherwise remediating asbestos in aging structures
built or acquired at a time when asbestos was not considered to be a
potentially hazardous material. At a minimum, this uncertainty
substantially increases the cost of such remediation. More likely the
current uncertainty acts as a disincentive to the removal of potentially
hazardous materials. 359  This Article maintains that hazardous waste
remediation costs by a purchaser should be capitalizable only where
anticipated in the purchase price. Otherwise, such costs should be
deductible under Section 162 on the ground that capitalization would
result in no or slow depreciation and thus distort the taxpayer's income,
360
or constitute an economic loss currently deductible under Section 165.
3 6 1
need to be closely watched").
358 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET PROPOSAL,
JCS-4-98, at 25 (Comm. Print 1998) ("The proposal to make permanent the expensing of
brownfields remediation costs would promote the goal of environmental remediation and
remove doubt as to the future deductibility of remediation expenses. Removing the doubt
about deductibility may be desirable if the present law expiration date is currently
affecting investment planning.").
359 [W]hile significant progress has been made with regard to
encapsulating asbestos and certain contaminated soil expenses,
significant uncertainty remains as to the deductibility of expenses
incurred in the course of removing asbestos from aging structures built
or acquired at a time when asbestos was not considered to be a
potentially hazardous material. At a minimum, this uncertainty
substantially increases the cost of such remediation. More likely the
current uncertainty acts as a disincentive to the removal of these
potentially hazardous materials.
Letter from Steven A. Wechsler, on behalf of the National Realty Committee, to Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin 3 (Oct. 18, 1996), available at 96 TNT 222-225 (Nov. 14,
1996) [hereinafter Wechsler Letter].
360 See infra notes 471-72 and accompanying text.
361 See infra notes 474-509 and accompanying text.
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Likewise remediation of self-created contamination should be currently
deductible even if incurred in connection with a general plan of
rehabilitation or a plan which adapts the previously contaminated site to a
new use if the remediation adds no additional value compared to before
the contamination occurred or was discovered.
Even where Section 198 is available, the common law of taxation,
as to capitalization versus expensing, will still be relevant in determining
whether recapture of a Section 198 deduction will apply if the remediated
property is subsequently sold or disposed of by the taxpayer. Some
aggressive remediating taxpayers who could meet the strictures of Section
198 might even prefer the "at best murky" common law,362 with a Section
162 "repair" deduction or a Section 165 loss deduction and no subsequent
recapture, to a more "clear and consistent"363 Section 198 deduction
accompanied by recapture of the deduction upon sale.
Finally, given the complex state of the common law of
capitalization, the ex post facto nature of how environmental issues
become known (i.e., innocent parties using what is later determined to be
hazardous materials), it seems appropriate to lower the standards for the
application of Section 198. The EPA identifies problems so severe that a
"stick"--liability for cleanup and possible fines-may be required to
prevent future contamination. 364 But there may be other situations where
environmental improvements should be encouraged-the business should
be given a "carrot." The definitions of situations requiring penalties
should differ from the situations where certain behavior should be
encouraged.
IV. THE COMMON [MIS]UNDERSTANDING OF THE TAXATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION COSTS
A. Overview
An ordinary business or investment expense is currently deductible
under Section 162 in the tax year incurred or paid.365 An expenditure
362 MacEwen Statement, supra note 90, at 80.
363 S. REP. No. 105-33, at 110 (1997).
364 See supra note 71.
365 I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2002). A cash basis taxpayer deducts such expenditure in the
tax year paid; an accrual basis taxpayer in the tax year in which all events have occurred,
fixing the liability with reasonable certainty, subject to the economic performance rules.
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (as amended in 2001); Treas. Reg. § 1.461(h) (as amended in
1995).
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capitalized under Section 263, in contrast, may be deducted from ordinary
income only through (a) depreciation under Sections 168 or 169, usually
ratably, over the useful life of the asset acquired, created, or improved by
the expenditure or amortization; or (b) upon sale, destruction, or
abandonment or other realization prior to the end of such life as a loss
under Section 165.366 Thus Sections 162 and 263 are designed to more
accurately calculate net income 367 by generally matching expenses with
revenue in the taxable periods in which the expenses actually generate that
revenue.
368
Conceptually, depreciation and amortization "consist of allocating
a capitalized cost to the tax years to which it contributes to the production
of income."369  Capitalization is therefore necessary to prevent the
distortion of the taxpayer's net income that would result from deducting
the entire cost currently of an expenditure "properly attributable, through
366 See John W. Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195 and Clear Reflection of Income: A
Tale of Talismans, Tacked On Tax Reform and a Touch of Basics, 6 VA. TAX REV. 1, 9-
10 (1986) [hereinafter Lee, Start-Up Costs]; Lee et al., supra note 100, at 633-35.
367 Taxing net annual income is a fundamental policy of the Code. See 50 CONG. REC.
3,849 (Part 4) (Aug. 28, 1913) (remarks of Sen. John S. Williams, D-Miss.). Today the
keystone is Section 446's mandate that a taxpayer's method of income tax accounting
must clearly reflect income. See I.R.C. § 446(b) (1994).
368 Justice Blackmun had provided this insight in Comm 'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S.
1, 11 (1973) ("When the asset is used to further the taxpayer's day-to-day business
operations, the periods of benefit usually correlate with the production of income. Thus,
to the extent that equipment is used in such operations, a current deduction is an
appropriate offset to gross income currently produced."). See generally Alan Gunn,
Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1984)
(using "matching" to mean only deferral of deductions for expenditures so as to more
clearly match them with the income they produce and not the financial-accounting
influenced notion of deferring current income to match future expenses or currently
deducting expenditures because they relate to past revenue). For the notion that
remediation costs should be matched with past revenue as sunk costs see Thomas L.
Evans, Clear Reflection of Income: Using Financial Product Principles in Other Areas
of the Tax Law, 48th ANN. FED. TAX CONF. OF U. CHI. LAW SCHOOL, 73 TAXES 659, 661
(1995); American Bar Association Section of Taxation Committee on Tax Accounting,
Report on Capitalization Issues Raised Under Sections 162 and 263 by INDOPCO, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 50 TAX LAW. 181 (1996); Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, IRS Splits
on 'General Plan of Renovation' Argument, 97 TNT 147-99 (July 31, 1997); United
Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2001) ("for a valid
deduction under §162 for environmental clean up costs . . . the taxpayer [must have]
contaminated the property in the ordinary course of its business").
369 See John W. Lee, Doping Out the Capitalization Rules After INDOPCO, 57 TAX
NOTES 669, 679 (1992) [hereinafter Lee, Capitalization Rules]. For a restatement of an
economic analysis of depreciation and more detailed analysis of the authorities discussed
in this section, see Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 366, at 11.
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amortization, to later years when the capital asset becomes income
producing."
370
Self-evidently a deduction dollar is worth more today than it is
tomorrow, or 7/2 years later, and much more than thirty-nine years from
now.371  If remediation costs are capitalized as an improvement, or if
anticipated at purchase as payment of a contingent purchase price, and
then added to the basis or depreciable cost of the remediated property
under Section 1016, they then are (a) depreciable under Section 168 over a
stated period, generally thirty-nine years and 7 years in the case of
remediated non-residential real estate improvements and equipment,
respectively, 372 or (b) conceivably not depreciable at all in the case of
remediated land.373  Businesses remediating hazardous waste therefore
370 Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added); accord INDOPCO v. Comm'r,
503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (Blackmun, J.) ("endeavors to match expenses with the revenues
of the taxable period to which [the expenses] are properly attributable, thereby resulting
in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes"); Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of
Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002) ("A ftudamental purpose of
Section 263(a) is to prevent the distortion of taxable income through the current
deduction of expenditures relating to the production of income in future taxable years.").
371 Fishman v. Comm'r, 837 F.2d 309, 312 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) ("Because of the
time value of money-real riskless rates are positive-a deduction taken today is worth
more than one taken a year from now."); Kevin J. Coenen, Note, Capital or Ordinary
Expense? The Proper Tax Treatment of a Target Corporation's Expenditures in an
Acquisitive Reorganization, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 583, 586 (1997). The 7% and 39-year
periods represent the recovery period for most depreciable personal property and non-
residential real estate, respectively. I.R.C. §§ 168(c), (d)(1) (half year convention). For
calculation of economic impact using various interest assumptions see Black, supra note
70, at 1326 n.33; David G. Coolidge, Note, A Square Hole for a Square Peg: Section 165
and Environmental Cleanup Costs, 14 VA. TAX REV. 779, 781 n.5 (1995); Eileen S.
Mazo, Taxing Our Way to a More Polluted Environment, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW J.
357, 362 (1995); Pasquale Sommella, Note and Comment, Revenue Ruling 94-38: The
Uncertainty Continues-A Look at Using the Tax Code to Effectuate Environmental
Remediation, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 346 n.1 (1995). The present value of
depreciation using a 39-year recovery period and a 5% discount factor is 45% of a current
deduction. David G. Efird & Roy E. Strowd, Jr., A DRA 1984 Perspective Concerning
The Deductibility of Environmental Costs, 94 TNT 56-24 n. 1 (Mar. 23, 1994).
372 I.R.C. §§ 168(c), (d)(1) (half year convention).
373 Capital expenditures allocated to land are generally not depreciable with the
exception of certain landscaping costs. I.R.S. PUBLICATION No. 946, How TO
DEPRECIATE PROPERTY (2001) ("Although you cannot depreciate land, you can
depreciate certain costs (such as landscaping costs) incurred in preparing land for
business use. These costs must be so closely associated with other depreciable property
that you can determine a life for them along with the life of the associated property.");
Certain types of improvements to land (such as sidewalks, roads,
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prefer a current deduction for these costs, which was Congress' thought
behind Section 198-to encourage earlier cleanup of [a few] contaminated
areas.374 Conversely not allowing a current deduction for, e.g., asbestos
remediation costs, and instead requiring capitalization with attendant
depreciation permitted only over a much longer period offers no tax
incentive to voluntarily cleanup environmental hazards. 375 Consequently,
the enormous costs of EPA and OSHA regulation approved hazardous
waste remediation fuels an intense tax debate over whether such costs
should be (a) currently deductible under (i) Section 162 as a repair or (ii)
under Section 165 as an economic loss, or (b) capitalized under Section
263 and if so, over what period they are then depreciable.
Taxpayers, the government, and commentators by-and-large have
analyzed the taxation of environmental cleanup costs against the backdrop
of the deductibility of repair costs. 376 Since 1918, 3 7 the business expense
regulations' test for a currently deductible "repair" has been an incidental
expenditure which neither appreciably extends the life nor increases the
value of property, but keeps it in efficient operating condition. 378  By
landscaping, etc.) may be depreciated. However, certain other land
improvements may be so 'inextricably associated' with the land as to
be nondepreciable. Examples of nondepreciable land improvements
include certain clearing and grading costs associated with land and golf
course improvements.
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND DESCRIPTION OF
PROPOSALS RELATING TO FEDERAL INCOME AND ESTATE TAX PROVISIONS THAT IMPACT
LAND USE CONSERVATION AND PRESERVATION, JCX-53-01, at 2 (Comm. Print 2001).
374 See 143 CONG. REc. S860 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1997) (remarks of Sen. Alfonse
D'Amato, R-N.Y.) ("[T]he Federal Government needs to encourage development of once
abandoned, unproductive sites that will bring real economic benefits to urban distressed
and rural areas across the United States. By encouraging redevelopment, jobs will be
created, economic growth will continue, property values will increase as well as local tax
revenues."); S. REP. No. 106-201, at 17 (1999) ("Committee seeks to encourage the clean
u, of contaminated areas").
5 See Black, supra note 70, at 1327.
376 See Glenn Carrington, Capitalization After INDOPCO and Into the New Millennium,
93 TAX NOTES 813 (2001). A perceptive student note, however, argues that Section
165 should apply. See Coolidge, supra note 371. He solves the most difficult doctrinal
problem to a loss deduction for toxic waste remediation, the realization requirement, with
a "double discovery," that the "before" in the before versus after valuation or restoration
rule is before the hazard was discovered, not before it existed. Such approach seems to
have later been adopted by Norwest Corp. v. Comm 'r, 108 T.C. 265 (1997). This Article
argues that the realization requirement should be met by the remediation itself. See notes
487-89 infra and accompanying text.
377Treas. Reg. § 45, art. 103 (1918).
378 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1960); see generally Black, supra note 70, at 1324-25; Roy
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contrast, "[r]epairs in the nature of replacements" must be capitalized.37 9
Since 1958, the capitalization regulations have added that a repair which
adapts the property to a new or different use must be capitalized,38 ° which
originated in the oft-cited 1926 decision, Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v.
Commissioner. 
38 1
The repair regulations have provided from the beginning that
incidental repairs which "keep" property "in an ordinarily efficient
operating condition" are currently deductible.382 Ultimately many courts
came to distinguish repairs "necessary to put, rather than to 'keep,' . . .
[the property] in an 'ordinarily efficient operating condition ' '" 383 as capital.
Indeed, some decisions characterized the "oft-litigated distinction between
repair expenses and capital improvements . . . as the difference between
'keeping' and 'putting' a capital asset in good condition." 384  Putting
Whitehead et al., The IRS Plows New Ground In the Tax Treatment of Land Cleanup
Costs, 48 OKLA L. REV. 417, 423 (1995). Chief Counsel's office prior to Rev. Rul. 94-38
articulated 5 factors to be considered in evaluating the deductibility of soil remediation
costs--capitalizing amounts which (1) add to the value or substantially prolong the useful
life of property such as plant or equipment, or (2) adapt the property to a new and
different use. See Mazo, supra note 371, at 365-67. For criticism see Christine Black,
Comment: Saving the Green: Who Should Pay for Environmental Cleanup Costs?, 20
IOWA J. CORP. L. 671, 682-83 (1995) [hereinafter Black, Saving the Green].
379 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (as amended in 1994).
380 Treas Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(b) (as amended in 1994); see also Dominion Res., Inc. v.
United States, 219 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2000). This rule first appeared in the 1954 code
regulations. T.D. 6313, 1958-2 C.B. 114. This Article maintains that this rule (like the
general plan of rehabilitation doctrine) must rest on the rule of tax parity; therefore,
where cost of remediation if undertaken by a seller could not economically be passed on
to a purchaser (because it adds no value above the uncontaminated value), the owner's
undertaking of the remediation should be deductible under Section 162 on the rationale
that no or slow depreciation of the cost would distort the taxpayer's income or as an
economic loss "realized" under Section 165 as measured by the cost of remediation.
381 4 B.T.A. 103, 106 (1926).
382 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1960). See also supra note 378 and accompanying text.
383 Stoltzing v. Comm'r, 266 F.2d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1959); Moss v. Comm'r, 831 F.2d
833, 835 (9th Cir. 1987); Walling's Estate v. Comm'r, 373 F.2d 190, 193 (3d Cir. 1967);
see generally J. Wendell Bayles & Clair R. Rich, Repair or Capital Expenditure: The
Tenth Circuit's General Plan of Betterment Rule, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 272, 283 (citing
Jones v. Comm'r, 242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957)).
384 Moss, 831 F.2d at 835; Schroeder v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1996-336, 72 T.C.M.
(CCH) 185 (1996). One commentator argues that the put-keep dichotomy obscures "a
clear analysis of the taxpayer's true condition. See Bayles & Rich, supra note 383,, at
288. Moreover, in analyzing this "put-keep" distinction as it applies to environmental
cleanup costs, other commentators have argued that this test inevitably leads toward
capitalization: "In the case of cleanup costs, as opposed to waste treatment costs or other
preventive measures, it seems that the costs are indeed incurred to 'put' the taxpayer's
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property in an ordinarily efficient operating condition appears generally
synonymous with the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine 385 discussed
below. The repair rules in general at best correspond only roughly with
the emerging tests for capitalization/expensing.
B. "Contemporary Legal Context"386  as to the Taxation of
Remediation Costs
Initially the Service denied any deduction for brownfield
remediation requiring capitalization of the costs to the land.387 Gradually
the Service shifted, as sketched by the Joint Committee on Taxation in
1996 in its Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the
President's Fiscal 1997 Budget Proposal,38 8 repeated virtually verbatim in
property in good condition." Blake D. Rubin et al., The Tax Treatment of Environmental
Cleanup Costs, 54-11 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N §§ 11.01-.13 (1996). See also
Taiyo Hawaii Co. v. Comm'r, 108 T.C. 265 (1997); Dominion Res., Inc., 219 F.3d 359.
Nevertheless, Tech. Adv. Mem 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993) relied upon Midland Empire
Packing Co. v. Comm 'r, 14 T.C. 635 (1950), acq. 1950-2 C.B. 3, in finding that the
purpose of asbestos encapsulation was to keep the property in ordinarily efficient
o,erating condition.
385 Moss, 831 F.2d at 835-36; Jones v. Comm'r, 242 F.2d 616, 617-18 (5th Cir. 1957);
Jones v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 772, 776 (D. Del. 1968).
386 Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 563 (1991). The Supreme Court, in
determining the meaning of the term "property differing materially" in Treas. Reg. §
1.1001-1, looked "to the case law from which the test derives and which we believe
Congress intended to codify in enacting and reenacting the language which now
comprises Section 1001(a)." Id.
387 Bukro, supra note 178 ("The IRS wanted Blacklidge to pay for the cleanup from
savings, or after-tax dollars.")
388 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1997 BUDGET PROPOSAL
(RELEASED ON MARCH 19, 1996), JCS-2-96, at 50 (Comm. Print 1996). For the
exceptions under conventional wisdom to current deduction of remediation costs of
owner-caused contamination, see supra text accompanying notes 28-29;
Generally, costs incurred for new buildings or for permanent
improvements made to increase the value of any property (including
amounts incurred to prolong the useful life of property or to adapt
property to a new or different use) are not currently deductible, but
must be capitalized. This general capitalization requirement covers
both purchases and improvements to currently owned assets, but does
not apply to repairs (which are generally deductible when incurred with
respect to business and investment property).
In a ruling issued in 1994 (Revenue Ruling 94-38), the IRS
concluded that certain costs incurred to clean up land and groundwater
are currently deductible as business expenses. That ruling only
[Vol.26:613
THE BROWNFIELDS TAX INCENTIVE
the 1997 legislative history of Section 198."'
The Joint Committee staff description and the Section 198
legislative history recite a few currently deductible repairs and capital
expenditures general principles and then the holdings of post-INDOPCO
remediation rulings 390 with no explanation of underlying theory or
attempts at reconciling superficially disparate results. First they contrast
current deductible "incidental repairs" with "capital expenditures" which
either materially add to the value, substantially prolong the useful life, or
change the use of the taxpayer's property having a life extending beyond
the taxable year. The description and legislative history also cite
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner39l for the proposition that expenditures
producing significant economic benefits to the taxpayer extending beyond
the current year must be capitalized to match such expenditures with the
income produced.
The Joint Committee staff report and the Section 198 legislative
addressed cleanup costs incurred by the same taxpayer that
contaminated the land, rather than someone who acquired previously
contaminated property. Also, the cleanup was not done in anticipation
of putting the land to a new use. Additionally, the ruling concluded
that the cost of monitoring equipment with a useful life beyond the year
of acquisition had to be capitalized. While this ruling resolved some
issues, it is still unsettled whether other remediation costs not addressed
in that ruling are currently deductible or must be capitalized.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
REVENUE PROPOSALS (Mar. 1996), available at 96 TNT 56-9 (Mar. 20, 1996) (presenting
an earlier, much more bare bones statement).
389 S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 108-10 (1997); H.R. REP. No. 105-220, at 485-86 (1997)
(Conference Report). The only change from the 1996 Joint Committee description in the
1997 committee report was from "more recently" to "in 1995" in the last paragraph of
these otherwise identical passages.
390 H.R. REP. No. 105-34, at 485 (1997).
391 503 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1992). See generally Lee et al., supra note 100, at 643 n.36. The
tax common law as to taxation of asbestos cleanup costs came to the fore in the aftermath
of the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in INDOPCO. See Wechsler Letter, supra note
359. This should be no surprise. The Service, as part of an Industry Specialization
Program dealing with audits of large corporations, early listed the proper tax treatment of
asbestos abatement expenditures as a "significant issue." See John J. Monaco, Executive
Director Coordinated Examination Programs, Industry Specialization (ISP):
Opportunities To Relieve Corporate Tax Burden (Dec. 22, 1992), available at 92 TNT
256-17 (Dec. 24, 1992). This tact naturally generated audits of currently deducted
asbestos remediation costs, leading to, first, two administrative rulings arising from such
audits and then, more recently, two judicial opinions as to the tax treatment of asbestos
remediation. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992); Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-
002 (Nov. 19, 1993); Norwest Corp. v. Comm'r, 108 T.C. 265 (1997); Dominion Res.,
Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2000).
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history point out that the regulations "do not set forth a method of
determining how and when value has been increased., 392 They continue
that the tax court in Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner393 had
compared value after the expenditure with value before the condition
necessitating the expenditure: "an expenditure which returns property to
the state it was in before the situation prompting the expenditure arose,
and which does not make the relevant property more valuable, more
useful, or longer-lived [then before such event], is usually deemed a
deductible repair., 394 The repair versus "increase in value" factor roughly
corresponds with future benefit, although an expenditure may increase the
property in value without increasing its useful life. Early on the courts
acknowledged that most repairs result in an increase in value, at least to
the taxpayer,39 5 otherwise it would not be economical to undertake the
expense.
The classic decision in Illinois Merchants Trust Co. defined a
"repair" as "to restore to sound state or to mend. 397 The tax court began
to analyze whether the expenditure increased the useful life of the property
or made it more valuable than it had been before the event necessitating
the expenditure, 398 culminating in the restoration principle of the landmark
tax court decision in Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner.399
There the taxpayer was a public water company seeking to deduct the
costs of replacing the lining in a water main after a switch from neutral
well water to acidic river water caused tuberculation, reducing the
carrying capacity of the pipe. The government asserted that the value of
the piping to the taxpayer was materially increased by the expenditure.
The tax court replied that "any properly performed repair adds value as
compared with the situation existing immediately prior to that repair. The
392 H.R. REP. No. 105-34, at 485-86 (1997).
39339 T.C. 333 (1962), nonacq., 1964-2 C.B. 8.
Id. at 337.
395Black Hardware Co. v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 841
(1930) (capitalized expenditures which did not increase value or prolong useful life of the
item in question but made it more valuable to taxpayer).
396 See William L. Raby, IRS Splits on "General Plan of Renovation" Argument, 97 TNT
20 (July 31, 1997).
397 4 B.T.A. 103, 106 (1926); see also Regenstein v. Edwards, 121 F. Supp. 952, 954
(M.D.Ga. 1954).
98 Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 635, 639, 641 (1950) (oilproofmg
meat packing basement after seepage from nearby oil wells so federal meat inspectors
would not shut down packing plant).
399 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962), non-acq. 1964-2 C.B. 8. Accord Oberman Mfg. Co. v.
Comm'r, 47 T.C. 471, 483 (1967), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 3.
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proper test is whether the expenditure materially enhances the value, use,
life expectancy, strength, or capacity as compared with the status of the
asset prior to the condition necessitating the expenditure.
'AOO
Revenue Ruling 94-38,401 relying on Plainfield-Union Water Co.
v. Commissioner,402 stated that the appropriate test for determining
whether expenditures increase the value of the damaged property and thus
must be capitalized is a comparison of "the status of the asset after the
expenditure with the status of that asset before the condition arose that
necessitated the expenditure (i.e., before the land was contaminated by X's
hazardous waste). 'a 3 According to the author of the ruling it was not
meant to apply to asbestos remediation,40 4 but such pronouncement is not
binding.
The description and committee report next set forth the holdings of
several post-INDOPCO toxic waste technical advisory memorandums
("TAM's") in which the Service declined to apply the Plainfield Union
valuation test and instead required asbestos insulation removal costs to be
capitalized under a future benefits analysis: "the asbestos removal
eliminated human health risks, reduced the risk of liability to employees
resulting from the contamination, and made the property more
marketable., 40 6 A subsequent TAM required the capitalization of asbestos
removal and replacement costs in the converting of a boiler room to
garage and office space, while permitting current deduction of the
400 Plainfield-Union Water Co., 39 T.C. at 338. Note that this doctrine is seen as starkly
contrasted with a doctrine discussed in detail later in this Article, the General Plan of
Rehabilitation Doctrine. See Mary Lou Hopun, To Expense or To Capitalize? The Impact
of Federal Income Tax Treatment of Environmental Cleanup Costs under CERCLA, 19
U. DAYTON L. REv. 679, 688-89 (1994).
401 1994-1 C.B. 35.
402 39 T.C. at 338.
403 Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. at 36; see Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Treatment of
Environmental Transactions, 52 TAX LAW. 81, 98-99 (1998).
404 See Marlis L. Carson, Environmental Cleanup Ruling Has Narrow Impact, Says IRS'
Feldstein, 94 TNT 155-6 (Aug. 9, 1994); see generally Sommella, supra note 371, at 377
n. 161.
405 See Armco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 865, 867 (1986) (views of drafter of regulation
not relevant as to meaning; "his opinion on the intended meaning.. . would be only one
among a number of opinions held by individuals responsible for the adoption of the
regulation .... [n]o one's personal views can be accepted as a pronouncement of the
intended meaning of the regulation"). This sound result is supported by the notion of
institutional competency enunciated by William D. Popkin, Symposium on Statutory
Interpretation: Foreword.: Nonjudicial Statutory Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT. L. REv.
301, 307, 309-10 (1990).
406 Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29,1992).
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encapsulation costs of asbestos insulation in an adjacent warehouse. 407 In
fact, the Service had initially resisted the Plainfield-Union Water Co.
restoration principle,40 8 but then reluctantly accepted it,40 9 although first
attempting to limit the rule to relatively sudden, unexpected, or unusual
external factors410 and then conversely to where the property has
progressively deteriorated.4t
The Joint Committee on Taxation ("JCT") description and Section
198 legislative history do not include TAM 93-15-004, the PCP cleanup
TAM, which required capitalization of soil remediation but allowed
amortization over the life of the taxpayer's chief operating asset.41 2 Rather
they summarize Revenue Ruling 94-38.f' The ruling first considered the
potential improvement to the land and, in an about face from that TAM,
explicitly accepted the Plainfield Union valuation analysis, comparing the
value of the land immediately before the contamination with its value after
remediation. The ruling concluded that by returning the property to its
original state, the treatment failed to improve the land. Nor did the
"expenditures... prolong the useful life of the land, nor.., adapt the land
to a new or different use. 4 14 Significantly for purposes of this Article,
Revenue Ruling 94-38 also reasoned that:
Since the land is not subject to an allowance for
depreciation, amortization, or depletion, the amounts
expended to restore the land to its original condition are not
407 Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993).
408 The Service explained that it had not appealed Plainfield-Union Water Co. because of
a "factual weakness" in the government's case. Elizabethtown Water Co. v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo 1966-235, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1216 (1966), action on dec. (Feb. 20, 1966).
409 Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. United States, 558 F.2d 1379 (Ct. Cl. 1977), action
on dec., 1978-35 (Dec. 13, 1977); accord Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
410 Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 333, 340-41 (1962), non-acq. 1964-2
C.B. 8. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. at 37, specifically noted that Rev. Rul. 88-57,
1988-1 C.B. 8, was modified to the extent that it implied that the value test established in
Plainfield-Union Water Co. cannot be an appropriate test for cases other than those in
which there is a sudden and unanticipated damage to an asset.
411 Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992) (distinguishing asbestos removal).
412 Hearings on Miscellaneous Revenue Issues Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways & Means (Part 2), 103d Cong. 1701 (prepared
statement of Professor John Lee).
413 1994-1 C.B. 35.
414 Id. ("During and after the remediation and treatment, the taxpayer will continue to use
the land and operate the plant in the same manner as it did prior to the cleanup except that
it will dispose of hazardous waste in compliance with environmental requirements.").
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subject to capitalization under 263(a)(2). Accordingly, the
expenses incurred by X for the soil remediation and
ongoing groundwater treatment do not constitute capital
expenditures under 263.415
The implicit reasoning is that capitalization without amortization would
distort the taxpayer's income more than a current deduction.416 Only that
rationale explains- the ruling's capitalization of costs allocable to
constructing a groundwater treatment facility, which then was depreciable,
while allowing current deduction of the soil remediation expenditures and
ongoing water treatment expenditures. Assuming that the pumping
facility would be useless and hence valueless once the ground water was
cleaned up, its costs too should have been deductible under a Plainfield
Union restoration test.
417
The Joint Committee staff report and the committee reports
accompanying Section 198 also describe TAM 95-41-005, which held that
hazardous waste remediation costs were not deductible under Section 162
by a taxpayer who "acquired the land in a contaminated state. '418 The
TAM limited the Plainfield Union or "restoration principle" of Revenue
Ruling 94-38 to where "the taxpayer acquire[s] the property in a clean
condition, contaminate[s] the property in the course of its everyday
business operations, and incur[s] costs to restore the lproperty to its
condition at the time the taxpayer acquired the property."4'
The "restoration principle" is dubious in any event,420 but the
TAM, in citing Mt. Morris Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Commissioner,
421
415 Id.
See Glenn R. Carrington, Capitalization after INDOPCO, 53-2 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON
FED. TAX'N §§ 25.01-.05 (1995); accord Lee et al., supra note 100, at 639-40 n.21.
417 1994-1 C.B. 35.
418 H.R. REP. No. 105-34, at 486 (1997) (citing Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13,
1995), revoked and superseded by Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-27-002 (July 5, 1996)).419 id.
420 See Black, Saving the Green, supra note 378, at 682-84.
421 25 T.C. 272 (1955), aff'dper curiam, 238 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1956).
[I]t was obvious at the time when the drive-in theatre was constructed,
that a drainage system would be required to properly dispose of the
natural precipitation normally to be expected, and that until this was
accomplished, petitioner's capital investment was incomplete. In
addition, it should be emphasized that here there was no mere
restoration or rearrangement of the original capital asset, but there was
the acquisition and construction of a capital asset which petitioner had
not previously had, namely, a new drainage system.
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alluded to a sounder basis for requiring a taxpayer to capitalize hazardous
waste remediation costs when it knowingly purchases property in a
contaminated state. Mt. Morris Drive-In Theatre Co. in effect holds that a
cost incurred after acquisition, but anticipated at such time, must be
capitalized as an acquisition cost under the rationale that until the
anticipated cost is incurred the taxpayer's investment is not complete.422
The tax court used reasoning reminiscent of the Arrowsmith doctrine.423
"If petitioner had included in its original construction plans an expenditure
for a proper drainage system no one could doubt that such an expenditure
would have been capital in nature."424 In such event a rational taxpayer
discounts her original purchase price for the anticipated costs. 425 Failure
to treat such anticipated expenditure as part of the purchase price would
violate the rule of tax parity.
426
From this ultimately not quite "contemporary legal context,
'A27
Senate Finance Committee supporters of a tax deduction for brownfield
remediation concluded that while a property owner who contaminated its
property could deduct the cleanup costs, "in a strange twist of logic,
someone who buys an environmentally damaged piece of property and
cleans up that property is not allowed to expense these cleanup costs, but
instead must capitalize the cost and depreciate the cleanup expense over
Id. at 274.
422 Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 366, at 30 n.121; cf. Bayles & Rich, supra note 383,
at 284 ("Acquisition of a building and its immediate, substantial renovation is difficult to
view as anything other than a single completed transaction.").
In January, 1996, the IRS revoked and superseded TAM 9541005 (PLR
9627002). Noting that the company's contamination of the land and
liability for remediation were unchanged during the break in ownership
by the county, the IRS concluded that the break in ownership should not,
in and of itself, operate to disallow a deduction under section 162.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995). See Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344 U.S. 6, 8
(1952) ("It is not even denied that had this judgment been paid after liquidation, but
during the year 1940, the losses would have been properly treated as capital ones. For
payment during 1940 would simply have reduced the amount of capital gains taxpayers
received during that year.").
423 Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 366, at 30 n.121; John W. Lee & Mark S. Bader,
Contingent Income Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative
Adj.ustments and Clearer Reflection of Income, 12 J. CORP. L. 137, 211-14 (1987).
42Y Mt. Morris Drive-In Theatre Co., 25 T.C. at 274.
425 Rubin et al., supra note 384, at 11-15.
426 See infra notes 447-51 and accompanying text.
427 See supra note 386. The Joint Committee Staff model for this "legislative history"
had been prepared prior to Norwest Corp. v. Comm 'r, 108 T.C. 265 (1997), which was
handed down subsequently, but prior to the committee prints, which were not updated.
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many years. 428 Similarly if the contaminated property is used for a new
purpose after remediation the cleanup costs would be capitalizable.429
Commentators also scored the perceived disparity and the seeming
favoring of asbestos encapsulation over asbestos removal.430
D. Subsequent Judicial Developments
1. Introduction
Three major decisions involving environmental cleanup costs were
decided either contemporaneously or subsequently-Norwest Corp. v.
Commissioner,43 1 Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States,432 and
United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United States.433 Norwest Corp.'s
significance is two-fold. (a) It applies the Plainfield Union test before the
event and after the repair to remediation of asbestos inside a building from
its construction by pegging the "before" to before the taxpayer discovered
the health hazards of the asbestos, rather than following the Service's
argument that there is no "before" because the building always contained
asbestos. The tax court overturned this part of its opinion on the parties'
stipulation that the asbestos remediation added no value to the property-
any new insulation is less effective than asbestos which also is an
excellent fire retardant. (b) Norwest Corp. held, however, that because the
asbestos remediation was undertaken due to a remodeling of the building,
the costs had to be capitalized under the "general plan of rehabilitation"
doctrine.434 Note that usually there is not a sufficient release of asbestos
428 142 CONG. REC. S7180 (daily ed. June 27, 1996) (remarks of Sen. Carol Moseley-
Braun, D-Ill.); accord 143 CONG. REC. S856 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1997) (remarks of Sen.
Carol Moseley-Braun, D-Ill.).
429 143 CONG. REC. S860 (remarks of Senator Alfonse D'Amato, R-N.Y.).
430 Black, supra note 70, at 1334-35; Lester Droller, IRS Continues Flawed Analysis of
Treatment of Environmental Cleanup Costs: TAM 94-11-002, 94 TNT 88-41 (May 6,
1994). The distinction between removal and encapsulation has also been criticized as
tenuous. Sommella, supra note 371, at 384.
108 T.C. 265 (1997).
432 219 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2000), aff'ing 48 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 1999).
434267 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2001), affing 107 F. Supp. 2d 937 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
The parties also disagree as to whether the Plainfield-Union test is
appropriate for determining whether petitioner's asbestos removal
expenditures are capital. Petitioner contends that it is the appropriate
test because the condition necessitating the asbestos removal was the
discovery that asbestos is hazardous to human health. Accordingly,
until the danger was discovered, petitioner argues that the physical
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within a building to trigger environmental concerns until demolition or
remodeling disturbs the dried out ("friable") asbestos insulation, etc., or
asbestos floor tiles or drywall taping are removed in the remodeling.
Dominion Resources, Inc. declined to place "the focus on how
much value an improvement adds to property. ' 435  Rather the Fourth
Circuit focused on the nature of the improvement.
If the improvement permits the property to be utilized in a
different way, the improvement is most appropriately
presence of the asbestos had no effect on the building's value. Only
after the danger was perceived could the contamination affect the
building's operations and reduce its value.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the discovery that
asbestos is hazardous and that the Douglas Street building contained
that substance is not a relevant or satisfactory reference point.
Respondent contends that the Plainfield-Union test does not apply
herein because a comparison cannot be made between the status of the
building before it contained asbestos and after the asbestos was
removed; since construction, the building has always contained
asbestos. In cases where the Plainfield-Union test has been applied
(such as Oberman Manufacturing Co. v. Comm 'r, 47 T.C. 471, 483
(1967); American Bemberg Corp. v. Comm 'r, 10 T.C. 361, 370 (1948),
aff'd. 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949); and Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v.
Comm'r, 4 B.T.A. 103 (1926)), respondent continues, the condition
necessitating the repair resulted from a physical change in the
property's condition. In this case, no change occurred to the building's
physical condition that necessitated the removal expenditures. The
only change was in petitioner's awareness of the dangers of asbestos.
Accordingly, respondent argues that the Plainfield-Union test is
inapplicable, and the Court must examine other factors to determine
whether an increase in the building's value occurred.
The parties have stipulated that the asbestos removal did not
increase the useful life of the Douglas Street building. We recognize
(as did petitioner) that removal of the asbestos did increase the value of
the building compared to its value when it was known to contain a
hazard. However, we do not find, as respondent advocates, that the
expenditures for asbestos removal materially increased the value of the
building so as to require them to be capitalized. We find, however, that
had there been no remodeling, the asbestos would have remained in
place and would not have been removed until a later date. In other
words, but for the remodeling, the asbestos removal would not have
occurred.
108 T.C. at 282-4.
435 Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 359, 372 (4th Cir. 2000).
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considered a capital expenditure. If the improvement only
restores value to the property that existed prior to
deterioration or to a discrete event that damaged the
property, the improvement may be properly treated as a
deductible repair expense.436
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit noted that the cost of the cleanup, "$2.2
million, may have dwarfed the value of the property itself prior to the
cleanup-DLI paid $870,167 for it, and the average appraised value was
less than $1.6 million.' 437 After remediation, the appraised value was $9
million.438 Rather than analyzing this case as a discounted purchase price,
the Fourth Circuit applied a substantial alteration in character analysis.439
The transferor subsidiary and the transferee parent corporation (the
taxpayer) in Dominion Resources, Inc. filed a "consolidated return" under
which, during the tax years in question, a group of related corporations do
not report any gain or loss as to an intercompany transfer of property until
its disposition outside the group. 440 In effect the timing of recognition was
on a single entity basis, but character of such gain or loss was determined
on a separate entity approach.441 After 1995 the regulations were amended
to adopt a "matching rule" under which character and other attributes as
well as timing are determined on a single entity basis.442 Clearly at least
436 Id. at 371.
437 Id. at 372.
438 Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 527, 553 (E.D. Va. 1999).
439 Dominion Res., Inc., 219 F.3d at 372.
440 Dominion Res., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d at 548; Treas. Reg. §1.1502-13 (1966). The
transfer was necessitated because the utility company subsidiary could not under local
law develop the property. And further, pursuant to local law, the property had to be
transferred at 50% of appraised value. Dominion Res., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
441 Preamble to Proposed Regulations Consolidated Groups and Controlled Groups:
Intercompany Transactions and Related Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 18011,18012-13 (Apr. 15,
1994).
442 The prior intercompany transaction system used a deferred sale
approach that treated the members of a consolidated group as separate
entities for some purposes and as a single entity for other purposes. In
general, the amount, location, character, and source of items from an
intercompany transaction were given separate entity treatment, but the
timing of items was determined under rules that produced a single
entity effect. The matching rule of the proposed regulations expands
single entity treatment by requiring the redetermination of the attributes
(such as character and source) of items to produce a single entity effect
.... The Treasury and the IRS believe that single entity treatment of
both timing and attributes generally results in a clear reflection of
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under the revised regulations, the parent would stand in the shoes of the
transferee subsidiary and thus come within Revenue Ruling 94-38.
United Dairy Farmers, Inc. considered the plight of a taxpayer
purchasing contaminated property, unknowing of the contamination. The
trial court held that the before-versus-after test of Revenue Ruling 94-38
did not apply since the ground was contaminated when purchased (a
convenience store with abandoned underground gasoline tanks that had
been paved over). The taxpayer paid more for the properties than they
were worth in a contaminated state. 44 The district court unconvincingly
found that the remediation costs increased the value because the taxpayer
overpaid for the properties:
[H]ad the prices of the properties been adjusted to reflect
the contamination on the properties, its remediation
expenditures would have increased the values of the
properties, and, therefore those costs would have to have
been capitalized. The Court sees no reason for the
taxpayer's subjective belief as to the value of the property
to control the determination of whether its remediation
costs are deductible or whether they must be capitalized.
As discussed below, this reasoning is inconsistent with (a) the before (the
effect of)-the contamination is discovered approach in Norwest Corp., and
(b) the better approach of avoiding distortion of income arising from no
depreciation (unless trumped by discount of purchase price for anticipated
cleanup costs).
In affirming the district court's result, the Sixth Circuit agreed that
the restoration principle was inapplicable to defects present when the
taxpayer purchased the property and that cleanup costs of $260,000 as to
property purchased for $760,000 was not an "incidental" expenditure.""
5
The Sixth Circuit went on to "harmonize" Dominion Resources, Inc.,
Plainfield-Union Water Co., and Revenue Ruling 94-38:
consolidated taxable income.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(a)(2)(1995); Preamble to Final Regulations Consolidated Groups
and Controlled Groups: Intercompany Transactions and Related Rules, 60 Fed. Reg.
36671, 36673 (July 18, 1995).
443 United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 510, 513 (6thCir. 2001).
444 United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 937, 943 (S.D. Ohio
2000).
445 United Dairy Farmers, Inc. 267 F.3d at 518.
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That is, three elements must be satisfied for a valid
deduction under §162 for environmental cleanup costs:
first, the taxpayer contaminated the property in its ordinary
course of business; second, the taxpayer cleaned up the
contamination to restore the property to its pre-
contamination state; third, the cleanup did not allow the
taxpayer to put the property to a new use. In Dominion
Resources, the taxpayer did not satisfy the third element,
because the cleanup allowed the taxpayer to put the
property to new use as a real estate development. In this
case, failure to satisfy the first element is sufficient for
rejecting UDF's soil remediation claim." 6
2. Criticism of General Plan of Rehabilitation as Applied in Norwest
Corp.
The most defensible policy for the general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine is close to the taxpayer's argument in Moss. The doctrine is
supported by the "rule of tax parity," between self-construction and
purchase of a new facility-ennunciated by the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.4 4 7 -so that a taxpayer self-constructing
a plant should not be tax advantaged over a taxpayer purchasing a plant or
hiring an independent contractor to perform the construction work. In
Idaho Power Co. Justice Blackmun justified capitalization of depreciation
on vehicles used to transport employees of the utility company to a remote
self-construction job site because a hypothetical contractor would have
included such costs in her contract price to the taxpayer for the
construction of the plant.448 This rule is based on the tax policies of
horizontal equity (similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed the
same 449) and neutrality (tax rules should not drive business
446 Id. at 519 (citation omitted).
447 418 U.S. 1, 14 (1974); Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 366, at 34-35; Lee,
Capitalization Rules, supra note 369, at 677. A student commentator suggests "judicial
economy," i.e., administrative convenience in another guise, as the basis for the general
plan of rehabilitation doctrine. See Sommella, supra note 371, at 376; Cf. Stoeltzing v.
Comm'r, 266 F.2d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 1959).
448 Section 198 covers such costs, as well as those capitalized under Section 263A, but
otherwise carves out depreciable assets.
449 See, e.g., Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L.
REv. 567, 581-86 (1965).
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decisions450 ).451  Jones v. Commissioner452 came close to expressly
adopting this rationale as underpinning the general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine. 53 There the Fifth Circuit applied the rehabilitation doctrine to
the restoration of a historical building in the New Orleans "French
Quarter" which was in complete disrepair.4 54 The Jones court reasoned
that if the city had permitted the taxpayer to demolish the property as he
requested,455 he would have constructed an entirely new building, the
expense of which would not have been deductible. 56 Accordingly, the
renovation expenditures should not be currently deductible either.45
Under the rule of tax parity, for instance, while replacing small
items alone, such as shingles and window panes, would be currently
deductible, their cost should be capitalized when part of an owner's
rehabilitation of a structure. If such costs were incurred by a contractor in
a turnkey project, she would include these items in her sales price. Such
costs would then be part of the purchaser's overall cost in the construction
project and be depreciated as part of the improvement.458 In contrast, in a
450 Because of the time value of money-real riskless interest rates are
positive-a deduction taken today is worth more than one taken a year
from now. Hence if an expense incurred to produce future income can
be deducted from current income rather than postponed until it has
borne its fruits, taxpayers will have an incentive to incur such expenses
earlier than they would if there were no income tax; and tax law seeks,
to the extent compatible with revenue and distributive objectives, to
interfere as little as possible with the pattern of expenditures that would
exist in the absence of taxation.
Fishman v. Comm'r, 837 F.2d 309, 312 (7th Cir. 1988).
451 Edward Yorio, The President's Tax Proposals: A Major Step in the Right Direction,
53 FORDHAM L. REv. 1255, 1262 (1985) ("In a sense, the neutrality criterion is the
economic complement of the equality criterion: Where the equality criterion insists on
equal tax treatment for reasons of morality, the neutrality criterion demands equal tax
treatment for reasons of efficiency.").
452 242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957).
453 Cf Cal. Casket Co. v. Comm'r, 19 T.C. 32, 37-38 (1952).
454 See Jones, 242 F.2d at 617.
455 In this case, the taxpayer did not want to make the repairs. He wished instead to
demolish the structure and rebuild upon it. The city, however, refused to allow the
taxpayer to demolish the property because it was considered a historical building. See
Jones, 242 F.2d at 617.
456 See id. at 620.
457 See id.
458 Under component depreciation some of such costs could be broken out separately.
Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 366, at 34-35. However, such a method is not permitted
for property depreciated under Section 168.
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fair market value purchase of an asbestos remediated property, the seller
would bear the cost of asbestos remediation because a new, comparable
replacement building or machine would have no asbestos insulation and
hence no cost of remediation.459  The seller could not economically
include such a remediation cost in her sales price and be competitive with
a comparable new building or machine. The seller may be allowed an
ordinary deduction for such remediation.46°
The rule of parity also in effect applies in reverse so that a taxpayer
employing an independent contractor is afforded tax parity with a taxpayer
self-constructing an item.461  Extending this thought, assume that a
taxpayer purchasing a remodeled and remediated building without
asbestos insulation for use in her business would not functionally include
the seller's cost of remediating the asbestos insulation in her cost basis in
the remodeled building because the seller could not economically pass on
such cost to her but would instead have to absorb the remediation cost
himself. (Such remediation costs could not be passed on because
competing new or used property that never contained asbestos products
would be that much cheaper.) Accordingly, a taxpayer self-remediating
the asbestos insulation should not have to capitalize her cost under the
general plan of rehabilitation doctrine even when undertaken in
conjunction with remodeling as in Norwest Corp. As Glenn Carrington
pointed out while still in the Chief Counsel's office:
The plan of rehabilitation doctrine is secondary to failure
under one of the four prongs of the [traditional repair
versus replacement] test. "Rehabilitation alone in my view
does not make you capitalize the costs; you must fail under
one of these four prongs" ..... The key is the general test,
and whether individual repair expenditures would come
together to represent a capital investment is a "facts and
459 Cf Coolidge, supra note 371, at 792.
460 Michelle Kamen Friedman & Avi 0. Liveson, Rulings and Legislation Seek to Clarify
the Tax Treatment of Environmental Cleanup Costs, 26 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 121, 125 n.8
(1999). Whether disposition costs are ordinary is debatable. Walling's Estate v.
Comm'r, 373 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'ing 45 T.C. 111 (1965). The origin of the
claim doctrine, requiring capitalization, applies to disposition costs as well as acquisition
costs. Helgerson v. Comm'r, 426 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1970). Such capitalized costs may
cause the remediated property to be sold at a loss which could be ordinary under Section
1231.
461 Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 592 F.2d 433, 435-36 (8th Cir. 1979) (costs
of purchased credit reports could be currently deducted because "had taxpayers directly
acquired credit information, capitalization of the expense, including employee wages,
would not have been required").
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circumstances" situation .... 462
The holding in Norwest Corp. that otherwise deductible asbestos
remediation costs must be capitalized as part of a general plan of
rehabilitation also results in economic inefficiency. The tax court noted
that combining the asbestos remediation with remolding was less
expensive than carrying out each separately. Now tax advisers may be
expected to recommend that asbestos remediation be performed apart from
remodeling, presumably before. As long as the two activities are not
linked under the step transaction doctrine, the asbestos remediation would
be currently deductible under the intimations in Norwest Corp. rather than
being depreciable over thirty-nine years. The tax savings likely would
more than offset any increased pre-tax costs of separately remediating and
remodeling. Thus, the tax consequences will drive the structuring of the
asbestos remediation.
Assume, as Norwest Corp. holds, that a taxpayer in Scenario A
remodeling a building and hence hastening asbestos remediation must
capitalize the asbestos remediation costs and then depreciate them
straight-line over thirty-nine years, but can take a current deduction if the
462 j. Andrew Hoemer, Service Ponders Environmental Cleanup Costs; Carrington
Uncertain of Outcome, 93 TNT 102-10 (May 12, 1993) (discussing Carrington's 4
prongs, which are as follows:
1. Increase in value. The remediation costs must not materially add value to the
property prior to the condition (for example, discharge of hazardous waste) that
triggered the remediation efforts. See Oberman Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.
471 (1967); Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 333 (1962); Rev.
Rul. 94-38.
2. Prolong useful life. The remediation costs must not substantially prolong the
useful life of the property beyond its original useful life. See Ill. Merch. Trust
Co. v. Comm'r, 4 B.T.A. 103 (1926), acq., V-2 C.B. 2.
3. New and different use. The expenditures must not adapt the property to a new or
different use. See Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 635 (1950),
acq., 1950-2 C.B. 3.
4. Incidental cost. The remediation costs must not be more than incidental. Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-4 provides that the cost of incidental repairs can be deducted. In
TAM 9315004, the IRS viewed soil remediation costs as not "incidental"
because the expenditures were for extensive replacements of significant sections
of land. However, see Rev. Rule. 94-38 (discussed below), where extensiveness
of the cleanup efforts seemingly was irrelevant. See also Rev. Rul. 2001-4,
where the IRS ruled that costs of heavy maintenance of aircraft airframe are not
required to be capitalized unless part of a plan of rehabilitation, modernization,
or improvement to the airframe.
INDOPCO's effect on the four-prong test. Based on various IRS
pronouncements, the "significant future benefits" test of INDOPCO is an additional
factor or prong that may have to be overcome in order to deduct environmental
remediation costs.).
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asbestos remediation is taken apart from a remodeling. (The apparent
difference is the erroneous application of the "general plan of
rehabilitation" doctrine because otherwise, according to Norwest Corp., no
value or increase in useful life is added by restoration to an asbestos-free
state.) Taxpayers will instead simply structure the transaction differently.
In Scenario B the bank holding company, instead of remodeling,
removes asbestos from the bank building, reinsulates, and sells it to
another. At that point the asbestos remediation will either be currently
deductible or possibly reduce the gain or increase the loss on the sale by
the bank holding company of the asbestos remediation. Then the taxpayer
can lease, buy, or build another bank building at current reproduction fair
market value rates. (This hypothetical ignores any market or cost
problems in obtaining another branch bank permit.) The taxpayer could
then have an ordinary loss for the asbestos remediation under the
restoration principle and a new fair market value basis in the replacement
modem bank building.
In scenario C the taxpayer forgoes remodeling the bank building
and instead rewraps or encapsulates the asbestos insulation as needed in
the future (and never more than twenty-five percent at a time463). While
this approach perhaps best fits the clear reflection of an income mandate,
it probably is the more contrary to environmental policies, social
463 In Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-110-02 (Nov. 19, 1993), the taxpayer was engaged in the sale
of rental warehouse space and related services with facilities consisting of a warehouse
and a boiler house with heating equipment that had not been used for several years. The
boiler house (and its equipment) and warehouse were treated as one asset for purposes of
depreciation. To secure a bank loan for expansion of its facility, the taxpayer was
required by its lender to abate asbestos in its boiler house and warehouse. The taxpayer
removed all asbestos-containing materials from its boiler house converting it into a two-
truck garage and office space which it rented to a related freight company. The taxpayer
engaged an asbestos contractor to perform asbestos encapsulation in the warehouse area,
re-wrapping and encapsulating the damaged or punctured areas of asbestos-containing
pipe insulation which amounted to less than 25% of the total pipes in the warehouse. The
TAM required capitalization of the remediation as to the boiler house but not as to the
warehouse. The TAM held that the costs incurred to remove asbestos in the warehouse
increased its value, use, and capacity as compared to its status in its original asbestos-
containing condition. It allowed a current deduction as to the re-wrapping costs,
reasoning that they constituted incidental repair costs that neither materially added to the
value of its property nor appreciably prolonged its life. The application of a canvas or
plastic wrapping over damaged pipe insulation reduced, but did not eliminate, the threat
of exposure to airborne asbestos fibers. Moreover, because of the continued presence of
asbestos, the expenditure did not enable the taxpayer to operate on a changed, more
efficient, or larger scale. See Carrington, supra note 376, at 841.
464 There are generally three accepted methods of asbestos abatement: (1) encapsulation;
(2) removal; and (3) enclosure. Encapsulation involves the coating and sealing of walls,
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policies (a remodeled bank building hiring local workers might help to
stabilize a neighborhood), and probably even sound business policies.
3. Critique of United Dairy Farmers, Inc.
The result in United Dairy Farmers, Inc. is incorrect because the
purchaser did not discount its purchase price for the remediation costs.
Under the approach of Norwest Corp. the remediation added no value
compared to before the taxpayer discovered the contamination. Of course,
the two authorities conflict. Norwest Corp. is more sound.
As discussed further below, the better approach is to determine
whether the remediation costs would be depreciable. The remediation of
the soil would result in a nondepreciable addition to basis so that
capitalization is not appropriate unless the costs were anticipated at
purchase and reflected in the purchase price. They were not so reflected in
United Dairy Farmers, Inc..
4. Better Doctrinal Ways
a. Post-INDOPCO Analysis of a Section 162 Deduction
Under INDOPCO, future benefits are a strong indicator of a capital
expenditure, but "incidental" future benefits do not mandate capitalization.
The better view is that the determination of whether future benefits require
capitalization is ascertained under a balancing test: whether the burdens to
the taxpayer (and to the government in contesting the taxpayer's current
deduction of the expenditures in question) of such capitalization with slow
or no depreciation outweigh the benefits to the government of more exact
matching.465 Notwithstanding the restoration concept, most repairs and
cleanups of toxic waste do yield future benefits.466 Many traditional repair
authorities can be justified upon one of the "rough justice" balancing
exceptions to future benefits capitalization, e.g., (a) small in amount,4 67 (b)
ceilings, pipes, or other structures. Removal involves the elimination of asbestos from
the property, while enclosure involves the construction of a barrier between the asbestos
and the environment. Environmentalists prefer removal or perhaps enclosure over
encapsulation.
465 See supra notes 17 and 131.
466 Brown, Saving the Green, supra note 378, at 681.
467 Where the burden on both taxpayers and Service to account for each
item of property separately is great, and the likelihood of distortion of
income is nil or minimal, the Code is not so rigid and so impracticable
that it demands that nevertheless all items be accounted for
[Vol.26:613
THE BROWNFIELDS TAX INCENTIVE
short term or variable benefit,468 or (c) regularly recurring.469 None of
individually, no matter what the trouble or the onus .... The burden on
plaintiff, if the minimum rule is not to be followed for income tax
purposes, would be heavy; at the same time, the clearer reflection of
income would be exceedingly slight if there were any at all.
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 572 (Ct.
Cl. 1970); Sharon v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 515, 527 (1976) (dictum) ($25 fee paid for license
to practice in New York was a capital expenditure. "Since the amount of the fee is small,
the petitioner might, ordinarily, be allowed to elect to deduct the full amount of the fee in
the year of payment, despite its capital nature. Cf sec. 1.162-12(a), Income Tax Regs.,
with respect to the treatment of inexpensive tools."), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); Lee et al., Rough Justice II, supra note 131, at 1523-
27. For repair/improvement see Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2000-323,
80 T.C.M. (CCH) 532 (2000) ("If we were to assume that a new automobile cost
$30,000, then a 1.6-percent maintenance cost would equal $480. Relatively and
comparably, the $100,000 and $480 appear, at least in size, to represent an incidental as
opposed to a major repair, improvement, or procedure."); Treas Reg. §1.162-4 (1960)
("The cost of incidental repairs which neither materially add to the value of the property
nor appreciably prolong its life, but keep it in an ordinarily efficient operating condition,
may be deducted as an expense." (emphasis added)).
468 Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 616-18 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Iowa-
Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979); see generally Lee
et al., Rough Justice 11, supra note 131, at 1527-28. The repair improvement formulation
is whether the expenditure makes the asset longer-lived. See, e.g., Plainfield-Union Water
Co. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 333, 337 (1962).
469 Both this court and the IRS have recognized this type of regularity as
something that tends to support a finding of deductibility. Because
they recur every year, there is less distorting effect on income from
future tax year benefits over time. In every year, that is, while
Freightways will be able to reap the tax advantage of deduction for
some part of the following twelve months, it will have 'lost' the
deductions for the months covered by the prior year's licenses, for
which it has already received the benefit. In a hypothetical last year of
Freightways' corporate life, it would finally be entitled to only a
prorated deduction for licenses (if any) that are acquired during that
year, partially evening out the score with the first year of deductions.
U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1145 (7th Cir. 2001);
[A]llocating these expenditures among the different books is not always
necessary to produce the temporal matching of income and
expenditures that the Code desiderates, because the taxable income of
the author or publisher who is in a steady state (that is, whose output is
neither increasing nor decreasing) will be at least approximately the
same whether his costs are expensed or capitalized. Not the same on
any given book-on each book expenses and receipts will be
systematically mismatched-but the same on average. Under these
conditions the benefits of capitalization are unlikely to exceed the
accounting and other administrative costs entailed in capitalization.
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Comm'r, 685 F.2d 212, 215 (7th Cir. 1982) (dictum).
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these exceptions to future benefits capitalization would be available as to
the cleanup costs of toxic waste. However, the fundamental principle
underlying all of the capitalization-expensing rules is minimum distortion
of income.4 70  Several authorities hold that where depreciation is not
available capitalization is not appropriate, because capitalization without
depreciation would distort the taxpayer's income.47 1
The analysis in Part IV shows that the application of the general
plan of rehabilitation was incorrect in Norwest Corp., but it also pegged
the value in the before part of the restoration principle to before the
dangers of the contamination were known by the taxpayer. Under this
construction of the restoration rule a current deduction would be in order
where the toxic waste remediation adds no value compared to the value
before such dangers were known. Similarly where a purchaser was not
aware of contamination, such construction of the restoration rule would
result in a current deduction since there would be no increase in value
compared to before the purchaser was aware of the contamination. A
better reason for allowing a current deduction is that capitalization of
remediation costs in either situation results in no depreciation if soil
See generally Lee et al., Rough Justice II, supra note 131, at 1529-31, 1539-43. For
repair /improvement see P. Dougherty Co. v. Comm'r, 159 F.2d 269, 272 (4th Cir. 1946)
("The work done was more in the nature of a permanent betterment or restoration than a
recurrent repair or upkeep. The benefits to petitioner were to last over a period of
several years, perhaps for the remaining life of the barge. It was more like putting on a
new roof. . . ." (emphasis added)).
470 Lee et al., supra note 100, at 727-28.
471 The useful life of the survey is very uncertain; as the trial judge found,
the estimates in a reserve study are subject to change at any time and
have to be updated every few years to take account of subsequent
developments. In those circumstances, it is not compulsory to amortize
such a recurring item over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it
appropriate to require capitalization without amortization; such a
requirement would clearly distort Southland's income.
Southland Royalty, 582 F.2d at 618;
The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a property
interest. They produced nothing corporeal or salable. They are
recurring. At the most they introduced a more efficient method of
conducting an old business. The government suggests no way in which
they could be amortized. The government's theoretical approach
ignores the practicalities of the situation, and permits a distortion of
taxpayer's financial situation. If an expenditure, concededly of
temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amortized, the adoption of
technological advances is discouraged.
Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 1974).
See Lee et al., Rough Justice 11, supra note 131, at 1549.
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remediation is involved or depreciation that is too slow if a depreciable
asset such as a building is involved-slow because no value is added and
there is no increase in useful life of the building and, hence, of the
replacement insulation. This is a principled basis for a current deduction
and the only rationale that explains the result in Revenue Ruling 93-28,
where the soil remediation costs were currently deductible, but the water
remediation costs were not since a depreciable asset was involved:
No other aspect of § 263 requires capitalization of X's
ongoing soil remediation or ongoing groundwater treatment
expenditures. These expenditures do not prolong the useful
life of the land, nor do they adapt the land to a new or
different use. Moreover, since the land is not subject to an
allowance for depreciation, amortization, or depletion, the
amounts expended to restore the land to its original
condition are not subject to capitalization under §
263(a)(2).4'
This no depreciation rule would be unavailable where the purchaser knew
of the contamination and discounted her purchase price for the cleanup
costs, since in that case such costs would be a deferred part of the
purchase price.
The adaptation to a different use repair rule also is justifiable only
on a rule of parity analysis. The capitalization of asbestos remediation
result reached in Dominion Resources, Inc. is correct, however, unlike the
result in Norwest Corp., if the taxpayer is treated as having discounted its
purchase price for the cost of remediation. Where the contamination is
known and the taxpayer rationally discounts its purchase price, then the
remediation costs are properly capitalized under Mt. Morris Drive-In
Theatre Co. v. Commissioner,473 which also is justified under a rule of
472 Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35; see Lee et al., Rough Justice H', supra note 131.
473 [I]t was obvious at the time when the drive-in theatre was constructed,
that a drainage system would be required to properly dispose of the
natural precipitation normally to be expected, and that until that was
accomplished, petitioner's capital investment was incomplete. In
addition, it should be emphasized that here there was no mere
restoration or rearrangement of the original capital asset, but there was
the acquisition and construction of a capital asset which petitioner had
not previously had, namely, a new drainage system.
25 T.C. 272, 274 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 238 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1965). Tech. Adv.
Mem. 95-41-005 (Sept. 27, 1995) (perceptively reading Mt. Morris Drive-In Theatre Co.
as an example of origin of claim doctrine); see generally Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note
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parity analysis.
b. Section 165 Loss Deduction
An alternate approach to current deduction of toxic waste
remediation costs is a "loss" under Section 165. The loss regulations
provide that a deductible "loss must be evidenced by closed and
completed transactions [and] fixed by identifiable events . . . . , The
case law holds that a mere diminution in value does not result in such a
closed transaction.475 In this context a closed transaction or realization is a
judicial gloss ensuring that only measurable economic changes or
alterations in a taxpayer's anticipated future earnings are taken into
account.476  "A decrease in value must be accompanied by some
affirmative step that fixes the amount of the loss, such as an abandonment,
sale, or exchange. '"477  Asset value fluctuations are not recognized as
events giving rise to objectively measurable changes in economic
worth.
A commentator has suggested that Section 165 should apply to
losses caused by environmental contamination or hazards when the hazard
is discovered, reasoning that a change in circumstances, such as enactment
of a environmental hazard cleanup law, coupled with discovery of the
environmental hazards as to the taxpayer's property, results in an
economic loss being sustained within the meaning of Section 165. 9 In
Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-19-007, a nuclear-powered electric utility taxpayer
similarly argued that incurring an obligation to store spent nuclear fuel
("SNIF") caused it to suffer a recognizable Section 165 loss not less than
the costs of constructing the SNFISF. 480 The Service disagreed, equating
such obligation with a mere diminution in value.48' The Service later
366, at 30 n.121.
474 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (as amended in 1977).
475 United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398 (1927); La. Land and
Exploration Co., 7 T.C. 507 (1946), acq., 1946-2 C.B. 3; Gen. Couns. Mern. 35727 (Mar.
15, 1974), considering Rev. Rul. 74-306, 1974-2 C.B. 58; see generally Coolidge, supra
note 371, at 803.
476Scott Lenz, Note, The Symmetry of the Realization Requirement and Its Application to
the "Mortgage Swap" Cases, 9 VA. TAX REv. 359, 382 (1989).
477 Lakewood Assocs. v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 450, 459 (1997).
478 Citizen Bank of Weston v. Comm'r, 252 F.2d 425, 428 (4th Cir. 1958).
479 Coolidge, supra note 371, at 803-05.
480 Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-19-007 (Jan. 17, 1997).
481 [M]erely incurring the obligation to encapsulate and store the spent
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conceded an analogous capitalization issue on other, strained grounds once
comparable storage containers had been filled.482
Asbestos remediation, for instance, is usually distinguishable from
Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-19-007. As the TAM implies and as discussed
below, a taxpayer may suffer a Section 165 loss as to a component of
nuclear fuel is insufficient to sustain a loss that is deductible under
section 165. Further, it is well recognized for tax purposes that a mere
diminution in value will not result in a deductible loss under section
165.
The regulations under sections 165 and 167 do allow a loss
deduction for the permanent withdrawal of depreciable property from
use in a trade or business or in the production of income. Section
1.167(a)-8(a) of the regulations provides that the withdrawal of
property may be accomplished by either selling or exchanging the asset
or by actual physical abandonment. The taxpayer in this case has not
sold or exchanged the asset in question, the SNFISF. [T]he nuclear
power plant continues to operate... [T]hus there is no abandonment of
the SNFISF as part of an overall shutdown and abandonment of the
nuclear power plant.
In addition, the SNFISF itself had not been abandoned within
the meaning of section 1.1 67(a)-8(4) . . . . During the years at issue...
no casks had yet been delivered to the taxpayer, used to store spent
nuclear fuel, or place on the concrete pad. Thus no casks had yet been
placed in service, and therefore no abandonment loss could be
predicated on the storage of spent nuclear fuel in the casts.
Id. at 31-32.
482 Upon being filled with waste and sealed, the new USTs [underground
storage containers] have no remaining useful life to X. X's new USTs
are used merely to facilitate the disposal of waste and therefore are
similar to a material or supply that is consumed and used in operation
during the taxable year. Accordingly, because X acquired, filled and
sealed the new USTs all in 1998, the costs of acquiring and installing
the new USTs are not capital expenditures, but are ordinary and
necessary business expenses deductible under §162. The new USTs,
which are used once and then sealed indefinitely, are distinguishable
from the groundwater treatment facilities in Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1
C.B. 35, which are used by the taxpayer substantially beyond the
taxable year.
Rev. Rul. 98-25, 1998-1 C.B. 998; Priv. Letter Rul. 2001-32-031 (May 15, 2001) (spent
fuel facilty built in connection with abandonment of nuclear power plant deductible as
abandonment loss). See generally David W. Kotab, Note, Revenue Ruling 98-25:
Deducting the Costs of Dealing with Underground Storage Tanks as an Ordinary and
Necessary Business Expense, 3 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 196 (1999); Walter G.
Wright, Jr. & Travis J. Morrissey, Arkansas Facility/Real Property Redevelopment in the
Year 2000: Tools Available to Resolve Environmental Issues, 52 ARK. L. REV. 751
(1999).
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property, such as a building, while continuing to use the property.483
Asbestos insulation when remediated is in effect abandoned, or better
removed or demolished, unlike the SNFISF facility which actually had not
yet been built. In Gilman v. Commissioner4 8 4 the tax court in dictum
approved a partial demolition loss under Section 165 when part of a
building was demolished. There the taxpayer demolished the roof of a
one-story building used in his business so that a second floor could be
added. The tax court allowed a demolition loss for the removal of the
roof.485 In the process of removing the first story roof and installation of
the second story floor, the taxpayer removed and scrapped several air-
conditioning units and duct work (attached to the first story roof and
ceiling) belonging to his tenants and reimbursed them by installing new
air-conditioning units and duct work attached to the new second story roof
and ceiling. The tax court distinguished the hypothetical case where the
air-conditioners belonged to the taxpayer: "If the air conditioners had
belonged to petitioner, any portion of their basis which had not been
recovered by depreciation at the time they were scrapped would be
deductible when they were scrapped, and the new air conditioners placed
on the second story roof would be depreciable over their useful life."
486
Analogously, the costs of removing asbestos insulation should be
deductible, only the costs of the new installation and its installation would
be capitalized.
This article asserts that paying for such removal of friable asbestos
insulation or any other toxic waste remediation supplies the realization
event, taking the loss from a mere diminution in value created by the
discovery of the hazard to a realized economic loss. This is a step beyond
discovery of the defect. Paying such a loss also evidences the amount of
the taxpayer's economic loss from asbestos contamination once
discovered. The casualty loss rules provide substantial authority for both
notions. The regulations there limit casualty loss deductions to the lesser
of (1) the difference in value of the injured property immediately before
and immediately after the casualty-the functional equivalent of the
Plainfield-Union Water Co. restoration principle, or (2) the adjusted basis
483 See Coors Porcelain Co. v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 682, 686, 694 (1969), af'd, 429 F.2d 1
(10th Cir. 1970); Stanley Burke v. Com'r, 32 T.C. 775, 779-80 (1959).
84 72 T.C. 730 (1979). See also McGee Grigsby at al., Section 28OB: Impediment to
Environmental Remediation?, 97 TNT 139-72 (July 21, 1997).
485 Gilman, 72 T.C. at 742 (stating that costs of demolition now must be capitalized to
the cost of the land under Section 280B).
486 Id.
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of such property. 487 The regulations define acceptable means of
determining such difference in value as (i) a competent appraisal or (ii) the
cost of repairs (which the courts often prefer as the more realistic
measure4 88).
The cost of repairs to the property damaged is acceptable as
evidence of the loss of value if the taxpayer shows that (a)
the repairs are necessary to restore the property to its
condition immediately before the casualty, (b) the amount
spent for such repairs is not excessive, (c) the repairs do not
care for more than the damage suffered, and (d) the value
of the property after the repairs does not as a result of the
repairs exceed the value of the property immediately before
the casualty.
489
The tax court and other tribunals usually require that the repairs
actually be made to avoid abuses from inflated estimates.490  The same
rules extend to the costs of removing (a) debris caused by a storm, or (b)
dead pine trees killed by an infestation of southern pine beetles.491 Under
this approach, the loss deduction is not for the costs of repairs themselves;
rather the cost of repair is evidence of the amount of the economic loss in
value as to the property.4 92 Thus the loss deduction is allowable in the
year in which the loss occurs, rather than the year in which the repairs are
487 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1) (1960).
488 See, e.g., Clapp v. Comm'r, 321 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1963); Keith v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.
41,49 (1969).
489 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(20)(ii) (1960).
490 Lamphere v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 391, 396 (1978); Farber v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 714, 719
S1972); Johnson v. Comm'r, 51 A.F.T.R.2d 313 (9th Cir 1982).
91 Bliss v. Comm'r, 256 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1958); accord Stuart v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo
1961-186, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 938 (1961); Rev. Rul. 71-161, 1971-1 C.B. 76 (considering
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,438 (Feb. 22, 1971)) ("The presence of debris on the property
contributes to the loss in the fair market value of the property immediately after the
casualty. Thus, the cost of debris removal may be used, like the cost of repairs, as
evidence of the amount of the casualty loss sustained .... "); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,236
(Aug. 26, 1977); Black v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1977-337, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1347
(1977) (under restoration costs rule "an estimate of the cost of totally removing the dead
trees from the property would be reasonable estimate of the loss in value of the property
as a result of the 30 trees dying.").
492 Clapp, 321 F.2d 12; Priv. Ltr Rul. 99-03-030 (Nov. 24, 1998); Gen. Couns. Mer.
39,228 (May 4, 1984) p. 20-1; Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,236 (Aug. 26, 1977).
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made.493
The tax court has extended the casualty cost of repair rule by
analogy to theft losses, for instance increasing an allowable theft loss by
the costs of attempted recovery of the stolen property.494 Similarly paying
the asbestos cleanup costs fixes the amount of the loss from the discovery
of defects from the friable asbestos insulation.
495
c. Adjusted Basis Limitation on Allowable Loss
A substantial problem in toxic waste remediation is that the costs
may exceed the taxpayer's adjusted basis (this is probably more likely in
chemical waste contamination and less likely in remediating in-door
asbestos products or underground gasoline storage tanks). Section 165(b)
limits the amount of a deductible loss under Section 165 to the taxpayer's
adjusted basis in the loss property. The rationale for such adjusted basis
limitation is that "[w]here the taxpayer suffers a loss from a destruction of
market value greater than the cost of the property to him, that excess of
value destroyed represents unrealized appreciation. And he may not claim
a deduction for such loss because he has never recognized or paid a tax on
the gain."4
96
The issue then arises whether the cleanup costs are taken into
account in the adjusted basis limitation. The taxpayer in Waldrip v.
United States497 sought to deduct as a casualty loss both the pre-casualty
493 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165-1(d) and 1.165-7(a)(1) provide that a loss shall be allowed as a
deduction only for the taxable year in which the loss is sustained. See, e.g., United States
v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398 (1927); Hickman v. Comm'r, 207 F.2d 460
(4th Cir. 1953) (deduction allowed in year of hurricane damage, not year of repairs); cf
Comm'r v. Highway Trailer Co., 72 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 626
(1934) (deduction allowed in the year of fire, not year of final judgment); Kunsman v.
Comm'r, 49 T.C. 62 (1967) (damage to the taxpayer's swimming pool caused by a storm
in 1959 did not give rise to a casualty loss deduction in 1962 when the pool was repaired;
deduction may be permitted in years after the damage was sustained only in situations in
which the full extent of the loss was not, or could not be known until the subsequent
year).
9 Ander v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 592, 594 (1967) (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8 which
provides that the deductible amount of a theft loss is to be determined consistently with
the casualty loss rules).
495 Coolidge, supra note 371, at 810.
496 Ward v. United States, 428 F.2d 1288, 1292 (Ct. Cl. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1008 (1971). Accord Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 80, 100 (1994)
(depletion block, not the tree stand, was the single, identifiable property), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 92 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1091 (1997).
497 81-2 U.S.T.C. 9653,48 A.F.T.R.2d 6031 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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adjusted basis and capitalized cleanup costs. The taxpayer argued that
clean-up expenses have been generally recognized as constituting a
portion of the casualty loss and further, that because clean-up expenses are
an out-of-pocket expense, they are proper additions to basis in arriving at
the adjusted basis for determining the limits of the allowable deduction.
The taxpayer soundly contended that allowing a deduction for out-of-
pocket expenses in addition to his pre-casualty adjusted basis in the
property would not defeat the purpose for the basis limitation rule because
he would not be claiming a deduction for unrealized appreciation; further
such allowance would more nearly fulfill the purpose behind the statute:
compensating the taxpayer for either his actual economic loss or for his
out-of-pocket loss if his out-of-pocket loss is less than his economic
loss.
498
The district court agreed with the government that existing
authorities find clean-up expenses are includable as a measure of the loss
under Treas. Reg. Section 1.165-7(b)(1)(ii), but not as an addition to the
taxpayer's pre-adjusted pre-casualty basis. Waldrip misread, however, the
authorities it relied on.499 No other authority has considered the issue,
perhaps suggesting that the Service usually allows a loss deduction
measured by the cleanup costs.
An approach not inconsistent with WaIdrip is to use the taxpayer's
basis in the entire remediated property as the ceiling on the current loss
deduction. The loss regulations provide that a deductible loss is
determined "by reference to single identifiable property damaged or
destroyed., 500 The rationale for such a narrow construction is so that the
identity of "the property," the loss of which will generate the deduction,
will be reasonable in relation to the loss. 5 0 1  The claims court in
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States50 2 applied this regulation to damages
498 Id.
499 There is no direct evidence of the value of the property immediately
before and after the damage was done. We think, however, that the
expense of $41 for removal is some evidence of the amount of the
damage and there is no evidence to the contrary .... Respondent does
not contend that $41 was in excess of basis.
Stuart v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1961-186,20 T.C.M. (CCH) 938 (1961); Bliss v. Comm'r,
27 T.C. 770 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 256 F. 2d 533 (2d Cir. 1958), acq. 1957-2
C.B. 4 (holding that Commissioner erred in denying a deduction for any portion of the
loss, apart from the cost of removing the debris).
500 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(2) (as amended in 1977).
501Westvaco Corp. v. United States, 639 F.2d 700, 708 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
502 32 Fed. Cl. 80 (1994), aff'd in part 92 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1091 (1997).
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from the Mount St. Helens eruption and other casualties to sections of
taxpayer's logging road system and to trees in stands of timber. The
government argued that the "single identifiable property" ("SIP") as to (a)
the logging roads was some linear unit of measurement such as mile of
road; and (b) the timber, the timber stand maintained by the taxpayer. The
taxpayer asserted that as to the logging roads the SIP was the entire road
system; and as to the timber, the larger depletion block was maintained on
the taxpayer's tax records. The claims court agreed with the taxpayer as to
the road system, analogizing it to a "large edifice:"
If a commercial entity erects one building, the whole
structure would be considered as one unit, i.e., the SIP,
notwithstanding the fact that one or more different groups or
functions of the corporation occupy separate floors or
sections of the building. If, for example, a casualty
destroyed one portion of the structure, it could not be argued
that the business should only be allowed to deduct the
amount of basis attributable to that section of the building.
Neither the fact that each function of the corporation
operated independently nor the fact that the groups residing
in the unaffected areas of the building continued in their
performance of duty unimpeded by the casualty should
affect the status of the structure as a single identifiable
property. The entity constructed and maintained a single
asset to be used as such in the conduct of its operations, and
that is how it should be recognized.
50 3
The claims court explained that the casualty loss provision was a remedial
provision (and hence more liberally construed 50 4) intended "to afford relief
503 Id. at 104.
504 Similar remedial policies birthed a number of liberal doctrines applicable to Section
1033, involuntary conversion, and its predecessors. See Haberland v. Comm'r, 25 B.T.A.
1370 (1932); Washington Market Co. v. Comm'r, 25 B.T.A. 576 (1932) (addressing
liberal "related use"); Henderson Overland Co. v. Comm'r, 4 B.T.A. 1088, 1092 (1926);
Masser v. Comm'r, 30 T.C. 741 (1958) (discussing economic unit rule); John Richard
Corp. v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 41 (1966) (addressing how timely replacement by purchased
controlled corporation altered its purchase, pursuant to step transaction doctrine); Cusack
v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 156 (1967) (discussing contingencies in purchase price); S & B
Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 863 (1970) (discussing "threats" of condemnation); S.H.
Kress & Co. v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 142 (1963) (discussing sales under "threat" to third
party); Graphic Press v. Comm'r, 523 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing "severance"
and reimbursements).
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to a taxpayer who has suffered a loss of capital by making him, to the
extent of such investment, reasonably whole."50 5
We believe that the same reasoning should apply to components of
the edifice or building, such as asbestos insulation. This is particularly
true since most likely only the building and not its components such as
asbestos insulation can be tracked on the taxpayer's tax records. This
approach still will not yield the correct result where remediation costs
exceed the entire basis.
In sharp contrast to Waldrip, the demolition loss rules point to the
correct solution. The demolition loss regulations (which have not been
amended to reflect 1984 changes 506) provide that where intent to demolish
business or investment property is formed subsequent to its acquisition, a
demolition loss is allowable under Section 165; and the allowable "amount
of the loss shall be the adjusted basis of the buildings demolished
increased by the net cost of demolition . . . . The basis of any building
acquired in replacement of the old buildings shall not include any part of
the basis of the property demolished. 50 7
The implicit rationale of the demolition loss regulations is sound.
Following the logic of the pre-section 280B rule that where improved
property is purchased without an intent to demolish the improvements,
demolition of such improvements results in the taxpayer incurring an
economic loss. 50 8  This loss is measured in part by the cost of
505 The purpose of limiting the deduction to that of the adjusted basis
remaining in the "single identifiable property" is to ensure that only the
investment truly lost is used to offset income and to prevent the
borrowing of basis from other assets to unreasonably increase the
deduction. The regulation's purpose is manifestly not to enable the IRS
to squeeze the deduction down to the smallest conceivable molecule of
the taxpayer's venture, but rather to allow a loss that is reasonable and
bona fide. Such a negative interpretation would be in direct conflict
with the objective of the Code and the regulations.
Weyerhaeuser, 32 Fed. Cl. at 104.
506 In 1976. Congress enacted Section 280B, which required capitalizing the costs of
demolishing historical buildings with the cost of the underlying land. See Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2124(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). In 1984 this
provision was broadened by a Senate floor amendment to cover the demolition costs of
any building. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1063(a)(1), 98
Stat. 1047 (1984).
507 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(b)(1) (as amended in 1976).
508 What distinguishes this case from so many of the others is the
undisputed fact that the building involved was built for a specific
purpose and that its use for that purpose was abandoned by the owner
by an economic event not of his making. It had become as worthless as
2002]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
demolition. 50 9
V. CONCLUSION
The origin of Section 198 is the policy entrepreneurship of tax
incentives to increase voluntary brownfield remediation, beginning in
1993 by Democratic Chicago Mayor Richard Daley and then picked up in
1996 by the Clinton Administration. After initially opposing Mayor
Daley's proposal, the administration adopted it in the wake of the
Republican-controlled Congress' 1995 attempts to rollback federal
environmental regulation. The big city mayors wanted any brownfield tax
incentive to be targeted to them and denied to suburban communities.
This position was articulated as leveling the playing field-but it also
served as punishment for having taken jobs and population from the cities.
The national policy entrepreneurs similarly aimed it primarily at
"targeted" (high poverty) urban brownfields as part of a successful grand
strategy of gaining the support of large cities and minorities for Clinton
and Gore in the 1996 and 2000 Presidential elections.
In this early stage of the development of Section 198, the Clinton
Administration demonized the Republican-controlled Congress as to its
position on the environment, thus painting itself as a "friend of the
environment;" but producing only "symbolic reform," undercutting any
true reform of tax treatment of toxic and hazardous waste remediation.
Section 198 constitutes an even more symbolic reform, in that it was
hardly ever used due to a number of design defects. A major defect
arising from the already discussed "Public Choice" considerations was its
limitation to targeted, largely urban brownfields. The Clinton
Administration's desire to keep revenue costs low in order to promote a lot
of "boutique" incentives, providing a little something-but not much-for
as many constituent interest groups as possible, lead to: (a) a near-term
sunset of Section 198 (since twice extended); (b) the apparent exclusion of
indoor releases of absestos and other hazardous substances and abandoned
gas stations; and (c) a deduction rather than a tax credit. All of this
worked to make Section 198 of little use, other than as a fine piece of
political rhetoric.
if it had been destroyed by fire or other casualty loss. Its special
purpose was stipulated by the parties and was so found by the Tax
Court. Not one shred of evidence supports any finding of an alternate
use for the building when Yates was obliged to abandon it and move to
another location in order to retain the Ford franchise.
Yates Motor Co. v. Comm'r, 561 F.2d 15, 18-19 (6th Cir. 1977).
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Republican supporters of a brownfield cleanup tax incentive
consistently advocated eliminating the targeted aspect of Section 198 and
extending it to any site state-certified as contaminated, especially suburbs
and small towns. After Governor George W. Bush had been elected
President in late 2000, with Republican control of Congress and the White
House imminent for the first time since 1954, the Clinton Administration
abandoned its cities-only strategy (now that it no longer mattered) and
agreed to the expansion of Section 198 to cover brownfields everywhere,
thereby encompassing Republican constituencies as well. This broadening
still does not remedy the other design defects of a sunset, exclusion of
low-risk petroleum or petroleum-product contaminated sites (e.g,
abandoned gas stations), and indoor emissions of asbestos, etc.
The stick of punishing suburbs has already been eliminated. If
Section 198 is to be cleaned up, the stick of punishing contaminators by
denying Section 198 to them, inconsistent with general tax principles, also
should be eliminated. Cost containment features (such as a sunset,
exclusion of abandoned gas stations, and exclusion of indoor releases of
asbestos by remodeling) similarly should be eliminated. With all of these
tools, Section 198 should be effective to help cleanup lesser
contamination, particularly abandoned gas stations and indoor asbestos in
remodeling. It still would be largely ineffective as to the very expensive
cleanup costs of traditional brownfields, abandoned factory sites, etc. To
work here, the carrot probably would have to be sweetened to a dollar-for-
dollar tax credit.
There does not appear to be political support currently for any of
the above statutory changes. Accordingly, Section 198 should be allowed
to die a natural death-no more extended sunsets. Instead, Treasury and
the Service should remediate the repair regulations to permit a current
Section 162 deduction when remediation adds no value (and was not
accounted for in the purchase price). The justification would be to avoid
distortion of the taxpayer's income from no or too slow depreciation and is
also supported by the "reverse" rule of tax parity. Alternatively, when
remediation adds no value a current deduction should be allowed under
Section 165 as a realized economic loss. These steps still would not solve
the problem of expensive brownfield cleanups. The tax expenditures that
would have been used to extend Section 198 should be converted into
direct expenditures, awarded by states and overseen by EPA, to cleanup
brownfields.
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